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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.

'
r

and
New York City Taxi Drivers Union
Local Union #3036, AFL-CIO

'
'
'
'

Opinion
and
Award

i

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Metropolitan Taxicab Board
of Trade, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Employer,"
and New York City Taxi Drivers Union, Local Union #3036,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," has been requested by the Employer to grant an extension for the commencement of the "weekly pay check," pursuant to Article IX of the
Collective Agreement.
Article IX (Weekly Pay Check) reads:
Section 1. By the 17th of November, 1968 all
employees including but not limited to all taxicab drivers and inside personnel, including
mechanics, service employees and maintenance
personnel, shall be paid by check each week.
Section 2. The Employer may request the
Impartial Chaiman to grant an extension of
this time if it can show good and sufficient
reason for the granting of such extension.
On September 25, 1968 representatives of the Employer and
Union, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties,"
orally set forth to the Undersigned their respective positions
on the issue0

The parties were also afforded an opportunity

to state their contentions and arguments in written form, to
be submitted by a fixed date.

- 2 Based on the record before me I make the following
findings of fact:
1. The constituent members of the Employer, hereinafter referred to as the "Industry," have
made a good faith attempt to computerize payroll bookkeeping in an effort to meet the
November 17, 1968 deadline.

A computer system

which was installed in January, 1968, failed,
and was discontinued at considerable loss.
2. The Industry interviewed and negotiated with
at least six other data processing and computer
service companies with a view towards establishing the necessary programming for a weekly payroll.

Following several months of developing

programming techniques for the Industry, some
of the computer companies were able to start
trial runs in May, 1968.
3. Unfortunately, in each case, technical difficulties and other mechanical problems developed,
which required further study and changes in
methods by the computer companies.

One piece

of trial equipment, a "data phone," used by the
computer company which contracted with a substantial number of industry corporations, proved
to be unsuitable and was finally abandoned in
favor of a different piece of equipment to transmit information to the computer.

Another computer

company found by example, that it had to change

- 3 its procedure from taking information from the
trip cards to utilization of the police sheets.
4. Though test runs of equipment to be used are
now under way, additional work and time will
be required to eliminate what the computer companies refer to as "the usual initial technical
problems."
5. Not only is the Industry not yet efficiently
equipped with the necessary computers and data
processing services, but it is impracticable,
if not impossible, to attempt to commence the
new service during a quarter.

The computer com-

panies insist that the program must commence
with the beginning of a quarter.

This is so be-

cause the computer has been or is being programmed
to carry cumulative totals for each employee on
days worked (quarterly for the attendance bonus;
annual for vacation credits, etc.) Also at the
end of each respective reporting period the computer will prepare the necessary tax forms and
information for filing W-2s, Federal Depository
receipt information and similar data.

If the

systems were commenced on any day other than the
beginning of a quarter, the computer would not be
able to prepare these required records since it
would not have all of the information in its
memory bank.

And, to commence the system during,

rather than at the beginning of a quarter, would

- 4impede preparation of necessary legal documents
including Internal Revenue reports because more
than a single source for the information would
have to be used - the manually recorded books and
records up to the day that the data processing
system took over, and the information produced
by and recorded within that system thereafter,,

I am persuaded, based on the foregoing facts that the
Employer has shown good and sufficient reasons for a reasonable extension of the commencement of the "weekly pay check."
Accordingly, based on my authority under Article IX Section 2
of the contract, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, I render the following
AWARD
The Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc.,
on behalf of each of its members, is granted
an extension of time for the commencement of
the weekly pay check to the quarter commencing
January 1, 1969.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: October 9, 1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss .
)

On this 9th day of October, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz, to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Taxi Drivers Union Local 3036, AFL-CIO
and

'
i
'
t
'

Award

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc., '
on behalf of Circle Maintenance Corp.
'

This proceeding is between Taxi Drivers Union Local 3036,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade, Inc., on behalf of Circle Maintenance Corp., hereinafter referred to as the "Company," before
the Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the applicable
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The dispute involves the Union's grievance on behalf of
Mr. Max Azulay, a Union Committeeman employed by the Company
as a driver.
A hearing was held on November 1, 1968, at which time
all concerned were afforded full opportunity to present evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The grievance is granted in its entirety.

Mr. Azulay,

hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," is a committeeman
enjoying super-seniority under the contract,,

One of the ex-

press benefits of super-seniority is the right to select a
day off.

The grievant selected Sunday as his day off each

week and is entitled to that selection.

Accordingly the Com-

pany is directed to grant the grievant, unconditionally, his
selection of Sunday as his off day.
Obviously the seniority provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, as all other terms and conditions, must

- 2 be applied uniformly and equally to all parties covered.

It

would be manifestly unfair to enforce the seniority provisions
against one employer or constituent member of the Metropolitan
Taxicab Board of Trade, while violations of or variations
from the same seniority provisions by other members are allowed or ignored.

For the result, of course, would be to place

the former at a distinct competitive disadvantage with the
latter.

Junior employees, assigned Sunday work under the

seniority clause, might quit that employer, and instead obtain jobs elsewhere in the industry with other employers, who,
by ignoring the seniority requirements, are willing to grant
the more desirable day off0
The resultant inequity is patent.

The employer adhering

to the seniority requirements of the contract is penalized.
He suffers a depletion of scarce personnel, lured to other
employers as a direct result of the unrestricted practices of
those employers in violation of the contract.
To prevent this, as Impartial Chairman, I shall insist,
and shall direct that the seniority provisions of the contract,
as well as all other provisions thereof, be equally and uniformly enforced, applied and administered at and by all parties
to the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The Union has the

duty to police the contract toward this end, and the Board
shall take steps to inform each of its members of this directive.
With regard to the specific problem raised by this case,
it is my determination that nomember employer under the contract may grant nor may the Union allow newly hired employees

- 3 or employees with less seniority Sunday as a day off, if by
doing so the seniority rights of more senior employees are
violated.
For implementation of this decision the Union shall conduct an investigation of the manner in which the seniority
provisions of the contract are being applied at the following
companies:
Tone Operating Co.
Fare Co.
M & S Maintenance Co.
Zebra Co.
The Union shall determine whether any of the practices
at the aforesaid employers are in violation of the seniority
requirements of the contract.

If so, and if not ceased in

accordance with the foregoing directive or by direct negotiations, the Union shall grieve such violations to arbitration
before the Undersigned.

Violations of the seniority provis-

ions of the contract by any other employer shall be handled
by the Union in the same manner.

Eric J.( Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: November
1968
STATE OF New York
) .
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of November, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 307 United Papermakers and
Paperworkers, AFL-CIO
and
Natvar Corporation

i
'
i
'
'
i
'
i

Award

!

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated June 1, 1966 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as
follows:
The Company violated Article VII Section 13
when on June 16, 1967 it paid Carl Giangrasso
six hours pay at his base rate0 Mr. Giangrasso
should have been paid four hours pay at time
and a half for the hours 12 noon to 3 P0M. and
straight time for the hours 3 P.M. to 6 P.M.
The Company shall adjust his pay accordingly,.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

1968
)Ss.)

On this
day of February, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0
File #68A/931
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In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 307 United Papermakers and
Paperworkers, AFL-CIO
and
Natvar Corporation

1

'
i
'
'
'

Opinion

'

In accordance with Article XIV, Fourth Step, of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated June 1, 1966 between
Natvar Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the "Company,"
and Local 307, United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was
designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate Article VII Section 13
when on June 16, 1967, it paid Carl Giangrasso
six hours pay at his base rate?
A hearing was held in Elizabeth, New Jersey on February 16,
1968 at which time Mr. Giangrasso, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant," and representatives

of the Union and Company,

hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared.
Full opportunity was afforded the parties to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath0
The pertinent part of Article VII Section 13 is the last
sentence thereof which reads:
Whenever an employee is ordered in once having
gone home, he shall be paid a minimum of four
hours pay at time and a half the applicable
base rate.
The Union's grievance is that the grievant was not paid
in accordance with the foregoing contract section for his

- 2 work between noon and 3 P.M. on June 16, 1967.
The grievant's normal shift is from 3 to 11 P 0 M 0

During

the morning of June 16 he was called at home by his supervisor
and directed to report in as quickly as possible.

He first

indicated an unwillingness to do so but when told it was an
emergency, reported in and began work at 12 noon.

He contin-

ued work up to and thereafter into his regular work shift until 6 P.M. at which time he left the plant on Union business
pursuant to permission he had obtained from the Company earlier that week.

For the total of six hours worked he receiv-

ed six hours pay at his regular base rate, at straight time.
The Union contends that the hours between 12 noon and 3 P.M.
constituted a "call-in" for which he was entitled to a minimum of four hours pay at time and a half; plus straight time
for the hours 3 P.M. to 6 P.M.
The Union's position is sustained.

I find that the

grievant met all the requirements of the foregoing contract
section.

He had gone home from his previous regular shift,

and was called back to the plant from his home.

He was not

"pre-scheduled" to work the earlier hours on June 16 before
the call to his home.

There is no doubt that he was directed

to report in for the hours of work prior to his regular shift
in order to meet what the Company characterizes as an emergency.

These are the conditions set forth in the last sent-

ence of Article VII Section 13 which entitle an employee to
the minimum of four hours pay at time and a half.
condition is set forth in that sentence.

No other

And because the

sentence is clear on its face, I find no reason why any

- 3 additional condition should be implied„
Accordingly, I reject the Company's contention that an
employee is eligible for the premium pay only if he is called
in after having gone home and thereafter returns to his home
before again reporting to the plant to begin his regular
shift.

There is nothing in the language of the controlling

sentence which requires an employee to make two trips to the
plant (one for the call-in and then another to begin his regular shift,) in order to be eligible for the premium pay. Attention is directed to the word "whenever" which begins the last
sentence of Section 13.

The meaning is clear.

To my mind

it means that any time the conditions or circumstances which
follow are met, the employee is entitled to the premium pay.
The condition that the called-in employee make a round trip
or second trip to the plant before he is eligible for the
premium pay for the period of his call-in, is not amongst
those enumerated.
Indeed, in view of the generally accepted theory that
call-in pay is designed to compensate an employee specially for
an abrupt interference with his off hours or leisure time, a
more limited basis for the payment, namely to compensate him
only if he makes a double trip to the plant, ought to be expressly stated in the contract.

Here it is note

Nor is the clear language and meaning of the last sentence of Section 13 overturned by past practice, the contention
of the Company notwithstanding.

The Company asserts that it

has never paid the minimum premium when an employee was called
in for hours earlier than his regular shift if he worked those

- 4hours and then his regular shift, back to back.

In all in-

stances, contends the Company, where the early hours and the
employee's regular shift merged, Article VII Section was inapplicable; but the call-in premium was only intended and only
paid to make it economically worth while for an employee to
make a round trip or second trip to the plant between the end
of his call-in and the beginning of his normal work shift. The
Company's evidence in support of such a past practice is not
persuasive, because it has not distinguished between the instant case and circumstances with which the Union has no objection.

For example, the Union would have no cause to complain

about an employee who was called in prior to his regular shift
and thereafter continued at work through his entire regular
shift, because the employee's pay for that day would be exactly
the same whether the early hours were treated as a call-in or
as overtime,,

In either instance, no matter how the Company

apportioned it, the employee would receive eight hours pay at
straight time and the extra hours at time and a half.

So, the

fact that the Company may have paid employees on the basis of
overtime rather than for a call-in in such circumstances is
not a practice in support of the Company's position in this
case, simply because there is nothing about that formula over
which the Union could or should complain.

Indeed in that sit-

uation the Union construed the extra hours as a call-in though
the Company may have treated it as overtime.

In any event be-

cause the contract prohibits the pyramiding of premium pay no
basis for a Union grievance would have been present„
Also it appears that at other times when employees worked

- 5earlier hours and then their regular shift hours back to back,
they were not paid the minimum premium for the earlier hours
(assuming also that they worked a total of no more than eight
hours that day) because they were "pre-scheduled" to work the
earlier hours by notice during some preceding day or at least
before they had gone home0

In such cases they were not

"ordered" or directed "in once having gone home;" but rather
their work schedule was re-arranged with them before they
left the plant.

This practice is conceded by both parties,

and the Union neither objects to it nor seeks to stop it.

And

I agree, that in that circumstance, because of "pre-scheduling"
an employee's normal working hours is changed to a new starting time and presumably a different quitting time.

But it

appears that the Company has included that circumstance as well,
in the past practice upon which it relies in this case.

Ob-

viously, a "pre-scheduled" call-in is different from what
happened in the dispute before me, and provide^ no precedent
for disposition of the present dispute.
Nor do I find that the contract negotiations of 1966 lead
to a different conclusion.

The Union's explanation of its De-

mand #9, for a clarification of the call-in benefit, or for its
extension to all earlier hours worked, including those "prescheduled," is just as plausible as the Company's claim that
the Demand was intended but failed to achieve what the Union
seeks in this arbitration.
I also must reject the Company's claim that the grievant
was paid properly because he received a total amount of money
(six hours straight time pay) equal to the pay requirements of

- 6the last sentence of Section 13.

Merely because the grievant

received a total of six hours pay for June 16, 1967 does not
mean that the minimum requirement of four hours pay at time and
a half has been met.

It is obvious to me and I am satisfied

that the premium pay entitlement set forth in the last sentence of Article VII Section 13 is for the period of the callin only and confined to the time that the employee works outside of his normal working hours.

Hence the minimum of four

hours at time and a half is applicable only to the earlier
hours that the grievant worked, namely 12 noon to 3 P0M.

The

pay he received for time worked thereafter may not be applied
to meet the premium pay requirement for the call-in.
Accordingly the Company violated Article VII Section 13
when on June 16, 1967 it paid the grievant six hours pay at
his base rate.

The grievant should have been paid four hours

pay at time and a half for the hours 12 noon to 3 P0M. and
straight time for the hours 3 P.M. to 6 P0M.

The Company shall

adjust his pay accordingly.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
United Steelworkers of America

and

Award

I. T0 T. Nesbitt Company

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:

The two day disciplinary suspension of J.A. Clark
was proper and is upheld„
Mr. Clark's claim for a day's pay for October 27,
1967 is denied.

Eric J/f Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:

June

1968

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
United Steelworkers of America
Opinion

and
I. T. T. Nesbitt Company

In accordance with the Arbitration Provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between I. T. T. Nesbitt
Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and United
Steelworkers of America, hereinafter referred to as the "Union,"
the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide disputes concerning the propriety of a two day disciplinary suspension imposed on Mr. J 0 A. Clark, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant," and his claim for one day's pay for the
failure of the Company to schedule him for inventory work on
Friday, October 27, 1967 in accordance with his seniority.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on June 12, 1968
at which time the grievant and representatives of the Union and
Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties,"
appeared„

Full opportunity was afforded all concerned to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The issues are inter-related.

The Company contends that

the grievant absented himself from his job from 3:45 P0M. through
the end of the shift at 4:30 P.M. on Thursday, October 26, contrary to the instructions of his supervisor; warranting the
two day disciplinary

suspension.

It also asserts that because

of this absence he was not available to be asked to work the
following day when a canvas of the employees was made that

- 2afternoon by the Company supervisor of labor relations.

Addition-

ally it contends that on the morning of October 26, when the
Company realized that too few employees had agreed to work the
following day, October 27, the grievant failed to respond to
pages over the public address system made by the labor relations
supervisor, generally to all employees then working and to individual employees by name, including the grievant, though he
was working in areas where the address system could be heard.
The grievant and the Union on his behalf deny his absence
from his work place on the afternoon of October 26; and deny
that he was paged during the morning for inventory work the
following day.

The contention is that the grievant was at work

on his assignment in the parking lot doing clean-up and inventory work during the period from 3:45 to 4:30 on October 26;
that the Company that afternoon should not have by-passed him
in soliciting employees to work the following day; and that during the morning while he was at work in the plant maintenance
area, he heard no public address pages for work the following
day.

He seeks a day's pay for the Company's failure to so sched-

ule him0
I shall deal first with the events of the afternoon of
October 26.

The grievant together with employee William Chase

were assigned clean-up and inventory work in the Company parking
lot.

There is no dispute that early in the afternoon, at about

2 P.M. the grievant absented himself for about 20 minutes "to go
to the men's room."

There is also no dispute that upon his re-

turn he was instructed by his supervisor, Mr. Vandegrift, not
to again leave his work place without notification and permission.

- 3 The question is whether the grievant so absented himself
again from 3:45 through the quitting time of 4:30 P.M0

Based

on a careful study of the facts and record I am persuaded that:'
he did.

I find the testimony of Mr. Heckroth, the Company

labor relations supervisor, and that of Vandegrift to be more
persuasive than that of Messrs. Chase, May and Burns, all employees.

As a supervisor it is Vandegrift1s duty and responsib-

ility to observe employees under his supervision; to know where
each was located and what each was doing during the working day.
This is a normal function of a supervisor.

And it is Vande-

grift' s unequivocal testimony that the grievant was away from
his job without permission from 3:45 to 4:30.

But such is not

a normal function or responsibility of bargaining unit employees.
Hence I do not think it realistic that Chase, May and Bruno
would have given much attention to the grievant's whereabouts
during the course of the afternoon.

They were involved in

their own work, and as distinguished from Vandegrift, had no
particular interest in or authority regarding the grievant's
whereabouts.
Indeed the specific testimony in support of the grievant's
position is not entirely inconsistent with the Company's claim
that the grievant was away from his work place from 3:45 to
4:30 P.M.

Mr. Bruno who was also assigned work in the parking

lot, but at a location well removed from where Chase and the
grievant worked, testified not that he saw the grievant at work
until the end of the shift at 4:30, but that he last saw him at
work at 4 P.M0

There is no evidence to show that Bruno knew

the precise hour to be 4 P..M,, and it is quite possible that

- 4though he saw the grievant, the time was somewhat earlier before 3:45.

So there is no accounting for the grievant from

at least 4 to 4:30 P.M., and, in my view, quite probably from
3:45 to 4:30

P.M.

Additionally the evidence shows that Chase, with whom the
grievant worked, left at the end of the shift at 4:30 by himself unaccompanied by the grievant.

This means, of course,

that the grievant was not present at 4:30, and lends support to
a conclusion that he was not around for some time earlier as
well0
Conclusive, I believe, is the testimony of Heckroth that
he neither saw nor was able to find the grievant at work.

There

is no doubt that Heckroth urgently sought volunteers to work on
Friday, October 27.

The planned work for Friday was of an un-

desirable type -- cleaning paint booths -- and through the
morning despite pages in the public address system, he was unable to obtain a sufficient number of volunteers.

Therefore,

in the afternoon, he made a personal tour of the plant and the
parking lot to ask each employee then at work to work the following day.

So urgent was the need to obtain employees for work

on Friday, October 27, that I have no doubt that had the grievant been at or near his work area that afternoon, Heckroth
would have asked him to work the following day/

Indeed the

evidence indicates that all other employees at work were so
solicited by Heckroth.
Accordingly I conclude that the grievant was the exception
only because he was neither at or near his work station in the
parking lot nor anywhere he could be seen when Heckroth by

- 5 personal canvas, sought volunteers between 3:45 and 4:30 on
October 26.
If this not be enough, the conclusion is further supported by the grievant's past record.

He was suspended in April,

1967 for 1/2 a day for absenting himself from his work station,
and formally warned in June, 1967 for the same offense.

Pre-

viously he had received a number of verbal warnings on the same
subject.

These disciplinary penalties were not carried through

the grievance procedure by the Union and hence stand as part
of the grievant's employment record.

Nor do I find that they

are of such old vintage as to have no bearing on the instant
case.

On the contrary I think that they show that the grievant

is prone to conduct giving rise to a charge that he leaves his
work area without permission or notification.

And therefore,

together with the other facts as I determined them, I find that
the Company's version of what transpired on the afternoon of
October 26 is accurate.
Considering this finding together with the grievant's
prior disciplinary record, the two days suspension was not
only warranted but modest, and is accordingly upheld.
It follows therefore that I can find no merit to the
Union's charge that the grievant was suspended only after and
in retaliation to his claim for pay for October 27.
There remains the question of whether the Company erred
in failing to reach the grievant during the morning of October
26 to ascertain his willingness to work the following day.
find that it did not.

I

The evidence shows that during that

morning the grievant worked in or around the maintenance area

- 6where the public address system is easily heard and understood.
The testimony shows that other employees within the plant heard
the page for volunteers to work the next day and also heard
employees paged for that purpose.

There is no refutation of

Heckroth's testimony that, faced with an urgent need for more
employees, he made regular and frequent pages for employees
generally and individually, that morning.

I conclude there-

fore that the grievant was paged; that he could or should have
heard the page; and that his failure to respond is his failing
not that of the Company.
Also, even if the grievant did not hear the public address
system, I fail to see how the Company violated the seniority
provisions of the contract with regard to scheduling men for
inventory.

In accordance with a fair and reasonable applica-

tion of the contract, the Company made a diligent effort to
reach every employee, by seniority sequence for work the
following day.

Heckroth paged individual employees based on

their seniority as well as all employees generally.

Volun-

teers who were willing to work were obtained and assigned in
accordance with their seniority.

Employees not at work in

the plant that day were called at home.

And of course, be-

cause the grievant was not at work in the plant, there was
neither need nor obligation for the Company to place a call
to his home„
So though I believe the grievant knew that the Company
was seeking help for the following day, I find that even if
he was not so informed, the Company made every reasonable

- 7 and diligent effort to do so; and that is all that I would require of it.
Accordingly, the grievant's claim for a day's pay for
October 27, 1967 is denied.

"Lp J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

Office of Collective Bargaining

In the Matter of

'
i

UNIFORMED FIREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO

'

Findings of Fact

T

-andNEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF LABOR RELATIONS

on behalf of the City of New York

'
i
'
i

-andDeterminations

'
t

This proceeding, under the auspices of the Office of Collective
Bargaining, is between the Uniformed Firemen's Association, AFL-CIO,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union", and the New York City Office
of Labor Relations on behalf of the City of New 'York, hereinafter
referred to as "The City".
The Union and the City, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties", have been unable, through direct discussions, to reduce to
writing certain negotiated provisions of their current Collective
Bargaining Agreement.

The difficulty stems from their disagreement,

on certain matters, over what in fact was negotiated, or what contract
language should be used to express what was negotiated.
The matter was referred by the parties to the Office of
Collective Bargaining, and the Undersigned, as a public member of
that Office, was appointed to conduct an investigation.

During the

investigation, and in order to resolve the disputed questions, the
parties requested and authorized the Undersigned to make Findings of
Fact and Determinations on each matter in dispute.

The parties

expressly agreed that the Findings and Determinations would be final
and binding.
-continued-

-2-

Specifically, the contract provisions over which the parties
are in disagreement relate to Adjusted Tours; Personal Leave Day;
Vacations; Health & Hospitalization

Plans; Out of Title Assignments;

Right of Representation; Guarantee of Benefits; Grievance Procedure;
Job Description; Ordered Overtime and the "Saving" Clause.

All other

provisions of the current contract between the parties are not in
dispute, and either have been or can be reduced to writing without
difficulty.
I see no useful purpose in reciting the adversary contentions
of the parties regarding each matter in dispute.

Rather, I will

confine my Findings and Determinations to what, amongst the disputed
items, was negotiated and hence part of the current contract; which
items or parts thereof were not negotiated and hence not part of the
present contract; and where applicable, what language expresses the
substantive matters agreed upon.
Accordingly, having afforded the parties full opportunity to
be heard, the Undersigned makes the following Findings of Fact and
Determinations:
Adjusted Tours; Personal Leave Day; Vacation
There is no dispute between the parties over their agreement
to grant each fireman time off with pay for an adjusted tour of
15 hours each calendar year.

Nor is there any dispute over the

agreement to grant each fireman one personal leave day of a day tour
each fiscal year.

Similarly there is no dispute over the agreement

of the parties on the quantity of vacation entitlement for the
employees involved.

These agreements are and shall be part of the

current contract.
-continued-

-3What is in dispute is what provision was agreed to in the event
an employee is not granted or is unable to make use of these benefits
during the calendar of fiscal year of his entitlement.

I find no

agreement that the employees were to receive a cash payment in lieu
of the paid time off if they did not take or were not granted the
adjusted tour 5 the personal leave day, or the vacation during the
prescribed period.

However, the parties did agree that though 'the

employees are entitled to these times off with pay, to be taken
normally within the calendar or fiscal years involved, where an
employee has not 3 the end of the calendar or fiscal year is no automatic bar to his receipt of the benefits thereafter.

It is recog-

nized that, due to the needs and exigencies of the Department, a
personal leave day off is subject to the approval of the Department.
It is my Determination that if an employee does not receive, or
because of illness or the needs of the Fire Department is unable to
take, these benefits during the applicable

calendar or fiscal year,

the entitlement may be carried over into, and shall be taken during,
the immediate succeeding year, but not beyond.
Out of Title Assignment
From time to time firemen are assigned duties as Acting
Lieutenants.

I find the parties did not negotiate an agreement to pay

the employee involved at the Lieutenant's rate during the periods
of that assignment.

However, I find the parties reached an agreement

regarding certain benefits to which the employee or his beneficiary would

-continued-

be entitled if he became permanently disabled or was killed while
serving as an Acting Lieutenant.

It was my Determination that the

parties agreed that a fireman permanently disabled while serving as
an Acting Lieutenant would receive disability benefits based on the
Lieutenant's

rank; and if killed in the line of duty while serving

as an Acting Lieutenant, his beneficiary would receive the death
benefit of the Lieutenant rank.
Right of Representation
I find that in the negotiations on this question the parties
mutually intended to implement the general principles of due process
as expressed in the Miranda Decision of the United States Supreme
Court.

I find and Determine that the parties agreed that an employee

who is a "suspect" in a Departmental investigation or trial has the
right to be represented either by an attorney or the Union.
The parties further agreed that employees are obliged to
answer questions put to them by the Fire Marshall, or his office,
in the course of an investigation or interrogation.

Employees so

questioned and who are not accused are deemed "witnesses".

I find

and Determine that the- parties agreed that though a witness is
required to cooperate in the investigation

of a complaint, statements

he has made in the course thereof may not be used against him or
used to incriminate him in a subsequent proceeding on•that complaint
in which he becomes a suspect.
Grievance Procedure
There is no dispute between the parties over their agreement
in a three Step grievance procedure and arbitration of grievable
and arbitrable disputes.

That agreement is and shall be part of the

current contract.
-continued-
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The parties also recognized that matters

not grievable or

not arbitrable could not be processed through the grievance procedure,
but rather were appropriate subjects to be taken up with the Department
in regular labor-management meetings.
The parties also recognized that certain grievable disputes
might be Departmental in nature or of such wide scope as to make
adjustment at Steps 1 or 2 of the Grievance Procedure impracticable.
I find and Determine that the parties reached an agreement whereby
such disputes, provided they are grievable and arbitrable, could be
processed by the Union within the Grievance Procedure beginning at
Step 3.
Ordered Overtime
I find and Determine that the parties did not negotiate any
change in existing practices regarding the ordering of overtime at
the scene of a fire or the manner in which employees would be compensated for working that overtime.

Therefore it is m/ Determination

that present practice shall continue to obtain during the life of
the current contract.
Continuance of Benefits
I find and Determine that the parties did not negotiate a
continuance of benefits clause, and therefore none is or shall be
part of the current contract.
"Saving" Clause
I find and Determine that the parties agreed that if any
provision(s) of the contract is declared illegal, invalid or
unenforceable by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of the contract will remain in full force and effect.
-continued-
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I find and Determine that the parties did not agree to re-negotiate
any provision which may be declared

illegal, invalid or unenforceable.

Health & Hospitalization Plans
I find and Determine that the parties did not agree to or
negotiate a provision guaranteeing no reduction in present health
and hospitalization benefits, and hence no such guarantee is or shall
be part of the current contract.
I do find and Determine, however, that the parties agreed
that once during the year 1969, on a reopening date selected by the
City, the employees would be entitled to choose, amongst the plans
offered by the City, the Health & Hospitalization Plan under which
they wish coverage.
Job Description
I find and Determine that the parties agreed that the City
would provide a job description of the duties of a fireman consistent with the arbitration Award of Peter Seitz, Esq.

Pursuant

to that Award,the Union and the employees are entitled to a
description, but the content thereof is an exclusive
of the City.

prerogative

Consistent with the foregoing, I Determine that

within ten days from this date the City shall provide a job
description which shall be part of the current contract.

I shall

retain jurisdiction over this item for implementation thereof.

Eric J. Schmertz
Dated:

New York, N. Y.
April

, 1968

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

On this

SS

day of April, 1968, before me personally came and appeared,
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ERIC J. SCHMERTZ, to me known and known to me to be the individual
described herein and who executed the foregoing instrument and he
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Notary Public

OFFICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

In the Matter of
City Employees Union, Local 237,
International Brotherhood of
Teamsters
DETERMINATION

-andNew York City Office of Labor Relations
on behalf of the City of New York

This proceeding is between City Employees Union, Local 237,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, hereafter referred to as the Union and
New York City Office of Labor Relations on behalf of the City of New York, hereinafter referred to as the City.

It was initiated by letter dated April 25, 1968 from

the Union to the Office of Collective Bargaining which reads in pertinent part:
Local 237, Teamsters respectfully requests
the services of your office in a dispute
between this union and the City of New York
regarding the heavy-duty (C, D & E) Laborer's
rate of pay.
It is this union's contention that the original
agreement arrived at between the parties was not
based on all the facts that have since become
known to Local 2 3 7 . The City's position is
simply that an agreement has been reached and
they are not willing to reopen discussions of
any of the issues concerning rates of pay for
Laborers.
As a Public Member of the Office of Collective Bargaining I was

re-

quested to conduct an investigation of the facts and make a determination. At
my request representatives of the Union and City appeared at a hearing on April
2 9 , 1968, at which time all concerned were afforded full opportunity to present
their respective positions.
The Union charges that the City mislead it regarding the private prevailing rate for heavy duty laborers. It asserts that the City based its negotiations on the lesser rate of $5.05 an hour when a higher rate of $ 5 . 2 0 an hour
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also obtained; and that the Union learned of the latter rate only after negotiations
were concluded. For that reason the Union seeks rescission of its present agreement with the City on the wage rate and other terms and conditions for Laborers
C, D and E .
The wage scale for the Laborers involved in this proceeding is
subject to the provisions of Section 220 of the Labor Law, commonly referred
to as the Prevailing Rate Law. The rates of pay and conditions of employment
which are to compare with those received by similar employees in private industry are determined by order of the Comptroller, following hearings, or where
possible by a consent agreement negotiated by the City, the Union and the
employees involved.

Historically, including the most recently reached agree-

ment, the latter procedure was successfully followed.

By practice, for a number

of years, the City and the Union agreed that the prevailing rate in private industry was as set forth in the collective bargaining agreements of Locals 1010
and 731 . Until the most recent negotiations the pay rates in the contracts of
both these locals were identical.

Also by practice, and in part at least be-

cause the fringe benefits and continuity of employment with the City have been
more favorable than those in the private sector, the parties have not adopted
the full private prevailing rate but rather negotiated a percentage thereof, as the
wage scale for the City employed Laborers. In prior years 90% of this private
prevailing rate was agreed to as the wage rate for Laborers C and D, with five
cents an hour additional for Laborers E. In the most recent negotiations between
the City and the Union, the 90% formula was again agreed to (after the Union demanded 100% and the City offered 83%), plus some improvements in fringes for
the subject employees, especially regarding week-end work and pensions. The
90% formula is not now in dispute.
What is in dispute, however, is whether the "minds of the parties
met" on the private prevailing rate, to which the undisputed 90% formula would
apply. The difficulty centers on the fact that in 1967 the private industry con-
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tract rates of Local 1010 and 731 were no longer the same. Local 1010 chose to
apply some of its wage increase to fringe benefits, so that its direct wage rate
was $ 5 . 0 5 . Local 731 took all or most in direct wages, which pegged its rate
at $ 5 . 2 0 . The City, in its negotiations with the Union, used the $5.05 figure
as the prevailing rate, and there is no dispute that the Union had full knowledge
that it was dealing with that rate.

The negotiations produced an agreement on the

rate for Laborers C and D at 90% thereof, with five cents additional for Laborers
E, plus the improved fringe conditions.
I do not find , as the Union claims, that the City mislead or improperly induced the Union into believing that $5.05 was the single and sole
prevailing rate in private industry or that that rate obtained in both the Local
1010 and 731 contracts.
The Union, just as well as the City, had access to the contracts of
both locals, which previously had been used as the standard for negotiations
of a City laborers' rate. If the City knew of the discrepancy between the two,
the Union could have known of it as well, just as readily and on its own initiative. The record contains no evidence that the City concealed the fact that
the rates of the two locals were no longer identical, and despite a bare allegation by the Union, vigorously denied by the City, there is no evidence that the
City stated that the rates in both contracts were the same, at $ 5 . 0 5 . I am satisfied that the discussion between the parties included no reference either to the
similarity or the difference between the current private industry contracts of
Locals 1010 and 731, but dealt only with the private pay rate of $5.05 which the
City deemed more appropriate and comparable to the work performed by City
Laborers.
Indeed, in arms length, negotiations between the City and the Union,
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it is for each to maintain its own research and its own reliance on the information
obtained. So long as the City did not erroneously inform the Union or willfully
conceal vital information accessible to it alone, or act to deceive the Union, I
see no legal necessity for the City to have made overt reference to the difference
in the two private contracts. In my view, provided its purpose in using the $5.05
figure was a reasonable and good faith attempt to comply with Section 220 of the
Labor Law, the City had the right to assume that its knowledge of a higher rate
in the Local 731 contract was also known to the Union. And further, if the Union
considered the higher rate to be more applicable to the negotiations, it was
reasonable for the City to believe and expect the Union had the burden to introduce that point.
The question then is, whether the City's bargaining position based on
the $5.05 rate rather than $ 5 . 2 0 , was reasonable and in good faith.

If so, a

charge that the City took unfair advantage of the Union would per force fail.
I am persuaded by the facts before me that the City met this test of
propriety.

Its selection of the $ 5 . 0 5 rate, I am satisfied, was based on its belief

that that rate best reflected the purpose of Section 220 of the Labor Law. It will
be remembered that the parties were not negotiating wages alone, but other terms
and conditions of employment as well. A total package was to be arrived at. The
facts indicate that the City weighed the value of its fringe benefits for the subject
employees, both in effect and as improved (particularly week-end work and pensions)
and concluded that the situation in private industry between Local 1010 and its employees, where that Local had decided to improve its fringe benefits at the expense
of direct wages was more comparable to the negotiations with the Union. Without
judging the accuracy of the City's calculations, I can understand and find justification in its judgment that the overall contract package obtained by Local 1010
squared more with the employment conditions of the City Laborers than that of
Local 731. Indeed, significantly the record indicates that for just this reason the
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City stated to the Union during negotiations that its point of reference was the
rate paid "private highway laborers". And as both parties knew, highway laborers
fall within the jurisdiction of Local 1010. The Local 731 contract covers excavation personnel. Hence, I do not find an absence of good faith in the City 's use
of the $5.05 rate.
So in short, if the Union believes its negotiations with the City on
«*•the basis of a private industry prevailing rate of $5.05 was premised in error,
it was an error unilateral to the Union. It was neither induced nor taken advantage of by the City, and for it the Union cannot avoid sole responsibility .
Accordingly, it is my determination that the agreement reached
between the City and the Union, on a wage rate of 90% of $ 5 . 0 5 an hour for
Laborers C and D with five cents an hour additional for Laborers E plus the
undisputed fringe benefits, is binding on both sides and is upheld. The Union's
request for rescission is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Member
Dated:

New York, New York
May 3, 1968

OFFICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Local 508 Lifeguard Supervisors Union,
District Council 37, American Federation
of State, County & Municipal Employees
AFL-CIO
-and-

Report
of
Fact Finder

The City of New York

On July 3, 1968 the Undersigned, as Mediator and Fact-Finder, made
certain recommendations which the above-named parties (and Local 461
Lifeguards Union) accepted as the settlement of their current contract
dispute„
Among the items agreed to was the daily rates of pay for Lifeguards
during the new two year Collective Bargaining Agreement effective
May 1, 19683 as follows:
1st year of
contract
(May 1, 1968)

2nd year of
contract
(May 1, 1969)

Entering level

$20/day

$2I/day

After two consecutive seasons
experience on City beaches
or pools

$22/day

$23/day

After four consecutive years
experience on City beaches
or pools

$24/day

$25/day

Also, as part of the settlement the parties agreed to submit the
determination of the rates of pay for Lieutenants and Chiefs to fact
finding before the Undersigned as Fact Finder.
In accordance therewith a fact finding hearing was held on
July 9, 1968 at which representatives of the parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine

and cross examine witnesses.

Also the parties expressly authorized me

to conduct an independent investigation of all matters I deemed
relevant and in any manner I saw fit.
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My determinations are based on a careful study of the following:
lo

The respective positions of the parties regarding
comparability with the Assistant Supervisor

(boatswain);

the Supervisor (Lieutenant); and the Senior Supervisor
(Captain) at Jones Beach.
2,

Where applicable the pay rates at other non-city
beaches in the near geographical area.

3„

The respective positions of the parties regarding
comparability with seasonal park formen and
seasonal general park foremen.

4.

The bargaining history of the parties, including
the rates agreed to effective May 1, 1968 for
lifeguards; the agreement for the first time on a
higher rate of pay for lifeguards with four consecutive seasons of experience on City beaches or
pools; and the previous differentials between
lifeguards and lieutenants and between lieutenants
and chiefs.

5.

The respective economic conditions of the parties.

6.

My judgment of a fair, equitable and realistic
rate of pay with which both sides can live.

In some respects I find comparability respectively between
Lieutenants and Chiefs employed by the City, and Supervisors
ind Senior Supervisors (Captains) employed at Jones Beach.
significant differences as well.

(Lieutenants)
But there are

The similarities relate to supervision

>ver stretches of beach and subordinate lifeguards.

However, as an

•xample of a difference, some of the responsibilities of a Lieutenant
quare with those of the Assistant Supervisor (Boatswain) at Jones
each, especially because both, at their respective beaches, represent

3 <=»
t

the first promotional opportunity available to lifeguards.

Also, the

administrative responsibilities of the Jones Beach Captain exceed and
significantly differ from what is required of the Chief employed by
the City0

Accordingly, in applying this test of comparability alone,

it would appear that a Lieutenant employed by the City ought to
receive a wage rate higher than that of a Jones Beach Boatswain
(presently $25.20), but not quite as much as a Jones Beach Lieutenant
(at $28.80).

And, similarly, the pay of a City-employed Chief should

approach, but not equal, the present pay of a Jones Beach Captain
(averaging $33.OO).
Also relevant to any determination of a proper rate of pay are
the pay scales of other comparable but non-city beaches in the near
geographical area, especially those on the ocean such as the Jersey
shore.

There is no dispute that the rates of pay on those beaches

are less than what the City pays and less than what is being paid
at Jones Beach.

So, though the City concedes that its "principal

competition" comes from Jones Beach, these other rates of pay may
not be wholly discounted,,
I am not able to reach any determinative finding from a comparison of the jobs of Lieutenants and Chiefs with those of the
Seasonal Park Foremen and Seasonal General Park Foreman.
ferences exceed the similarities.

The dif-

Though the park foreman, on a

seasonal basis, works primarily at the beaches, his duties involve
maintenance, and cleaning, and the supervision of personnel assigned
to perform those tasks.

He has no life-saving functions; nor does

he handle life saving equipment; nor does he deal with personnel
with those responsibilities.

So,, any comparison involves an attempt

to equate wholly different duties, albeit at the same location.
Therefore, I am not persuaded that any sound conclusions can be
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reached one way or the other.

Moreover, even though the Seasonal

Park Foremen and the Seasonal General Park Foremen, like the Lieutenants
and Chiefs, perform their duties at the beaches, the dissimilarities
become all the more enlarged by the fact that the former two may be
called up and required to perform duties elsewhere within the Park
Department, the nature of which have no relation whatsoever to the
beaches.
Of significance to ray mind, however, is the bargaining history
of the parties and the current settlement of the wage rates for lifeguards.

In the expired contract a $4.00 differential existed between

the top lifeguard pay and the pay for Lieutenants.

But it must be

noted that the top lifeguard pay then applied to all lifeguards with
more than two seasons' experience.

In the new contract, the City,

based on my recommendation, granted the Union's demand for a "third
tier-' amongst lifeguards, by fixing a new and higher rate of pay for
lifeguards with four or more seasons of consecutive experience.

To

grant this benefit represented not only an additonal expense to the
City, but a significant new benefit to the employees.

It introduced

intot he new contract a factor that did not exist in the old.

It

accords to the 4 year men not only greater recognition but establishes
a basis to expect of them greater responsibilities in the performance
of their assignments.

Hence, I deem it both proper and appropriate

to take a new look at what had previously been a $4.00 differential
between the lifeguards and Lieutenants.

Under the new wage rate,

lifeguards with two seasons of experience will receive $22.00 a day
during the first year of the contract, and $1.00 additional during
the second.

If, as in the past, Lieutenants are to receive $4.00

more than the two year lifeguards, their pay would be pegged at $26.00
and $27.00 respectively in each year of the contract.
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But this would provide them with a rate of pay very close to that which
the City granted lifeguards with four or more seasons' experience.
only a $2.00 differential would exist.

Indeed,

I consider this inadequate.

On the other hand, to require the City to maintain an immediate $4.00
differential between the new top lifeguard rate of $24.00 a day would be
to impose an additional economic burden on the City as a direct consequence
of its willingness to grant new wage rate for lifeguards with four or more
seasons' seniority.

In short, it would penalize the City for the benefit

it extended to senior lifeguards.

So, while a $2.00 differential is not

enough for the Lieutenants, an immediate $4.00 differential between the
new lifeguard rate and the pay for Lieutenants is not fair to the City.
Yet, because of the prior bargaining recognition of pay distinctions
between lifeguards and Lieutenants, I am persuaded that there is justification for reestablishment of the $4.00 differential during the life of
the contract.

And, coupled with my finding that the Lieutenant's rate of

pay and that of the Chiefs has some comparability with Lieutenants and
Captains at Jones Beach, I think it logical, therefore, that this be
realized at the beginning of the second year of the contract.

But I see

no reason why the existing differential between Lieutenants and Chiefs
should not be continued throughout the new contract.
I believe this approach is fair., responsible and realistic, and consistent with the material facts.

And though it is not what each side

fully wished, it is what each side can and should be able to live with.
Accordingly, based on all the facts before me, I find as follows:
Effective May 1, 1968, the daily rate of pay for
Lieutenants should be $27.00
Effective May 1, 1969, the daily rate of pay for
Lieutenants should be 629,00
Effective May 1, 1968, the daily rate of pay for
Chiefs should be $31.00
Effective May 1, 1969, the daily rate of pay for
Chiefs should be $33.00

Dateds

July 15, 1968
New York, N. Y.

Eric/J. Schmerlz

REPORT OF SPECIAL PANEL
appointed by Mayor John V. Lindsay to assist
in the contract negotiations between the City
of New York, and the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, the Uniformed Firefighters
Association, and the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association.

New York
October 13, 1968

REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF SPECIAL NEW YORK CITY
UNIFORMED FORCES PANELS
''J'WO WEEKS AGO Mayor Lindsay requested the Undersigned to
constitute three special panels in order to assist in the critical
negotiations between the City and the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, the Uniformed Firefighters Association and the Uniformed
Sanitationmen's Association. He asked Mr. Justice Arthur Goldberg
to serve as Chairman of the three panels and Mr. Vincent McDonnell,
Chairman of the State Mediation Board to serve on each panel as well.
Eev. Philip Carey was named as the third member of the panel for the
negotiations between the City of New York and the Patrolmen's
Benevolent Association; Dr. Walter Eisenberg for the negotiations
between the City and the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association; and
Eric J. Schmertz for the negotiations between the City and the Uniformed Firefighters.
The Fire Department has 10,500 union employees; the Sanitation
Department, 10,000; and the Police Department, 30,000. These three
departments and their employees provide the City with its most fundamental and essential services. It is well to recall the circumstances
at the time of the appointment of the panels, including the protracted
nature of the negotiations between the City and the above three unions,
and the fact that the negotiations of the previous contracts took nine
months or more after their effective dates, and were marred by a
disastrous sanitation strike. When the Mayor asked the panel members to serve, the contracts of the three unions had passed their
expiration date and the City was threatened with strikes or job actions.
The outlook was not promising. The panel was not anxious to accept
an obviously thankless task, but agreed to do so in view of the overriding public interest and the urgency of the Mayor's request. In the
face of the enormity of the crisis, the panel determined that though it
was ready to respond to its public duty, it would not and could not
undertake such a duty under a crisis atmosphere. Therefore the panels
through their Chairman Ambassador Goldberg, established certain
absolutely essential preconditions:

i

1. That all three unions and the City agree to the panel's establishment and composition.
2. That all of the unions agree that there would be no strike, job
action, or any disruption in the services during the period of
the panel's deliberations.
All unions agreed to these two conditions.
In the last ten days, during which around-the-clock negotiations were conducted, jointly, separately, formally and informally, the
panel encouraged all of the parties to engage in direct collective bargaining across the table. The panel examined into the facts submitted;
permitted opportunity for all unions and the City to explain fully
their positions; and made suggestions to facilitate collective bargaining.
We are satisfied that all concerned have had full opportunity to present
their views. The parties have agreed that it will facilitate their collective bargaining agreement if the panels make recommendations of
terms of settlement. With their agreement, we herewith submit our
recommendations. In formulating our recommendations, the panels
have taken note of the regrettable state of affairs of recent years,
characterized by strikes of public employees against public employer.
Throughout our considerations we have tried, to the best of our
ability, to keep in the forefront of our deliberations the public interest
as our keystone both in reaching our conclusions and in assisting
towards resolution of the issues. We have recognized the necessity of
considering the economics of the settlement; what is fair and just to
the employees, and to the administration of the City of New York;
together with the need for continuity of essential services to the public.
Our recommendations are what we have collectively considered to be a
just balancing of these interrelated interests.
The Chairman would at this time like to thank the members of the
panels for their hard work, diligence, untiring efforts; and their ability
to make recommendations while maintaining the confidence of the
parties during these past difficult days. All members of the panel wish
to express appreciation to the representatives of the parties who have
cooperated fully with the panels in the execution of this difficult assignment. Attached are recommendations pertaining to the various union
11

forces of the City of New York. Each panel member, signatories
hereto, joins in and supports each attached report and recommendation.
Dated October 13,1968

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, Chairman

VINCENT D. MCDONNELL

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ
for Fire Negotiations

REV. PHILIP A. CAREY
for Police Negotiations

DR. WALTER J. EISENBERG
for Sanitation Negotiations
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SANITATIONMEN'S CONTRACT
RECOMMENDATIONS
HTHE DUTIES of the Sanitationmen employed by the City of New
York are of such scope and arduousness as to merit the most serious
consideration when appropriate wage adjustments for those fulfilling
these duties are under review in collective bargaining.
Clearly, the wide range of responsibility and skills entailed in the
New York City Sanitationman's job is unusual, if not unique, for this
kind of employment in the major cities of the United States. Equally
clearly, official data indicate extraordinarily high exposure of Sanitationmen to the hazards of job-connected injury and illness.
Furthermore, the requirements of Sanitation Department operations make necessary the scheduling of work for Sanitationmen on
Saturdays. For such work they have been paid straight-time despite
the generally prevailing and long-standing practice in private trucking
and other craft employments in this area for payment of time and
one-half for work on Saturdays as such.
Moreover, actuarial information and other pension program data
applicable to Sanitationmen indicate that equity would be served if
certain pension revisions and adjustments are made.
In addition to considering the needs and equities we have discerned in behalf of the Sanitationmen, we have taken into account the
present economic situation of their Employer, the City of New York.
Weighing all of these factors in the balance, we are of the unanimous view that the following recommendation for settlement of the
collective bargaining dispute between the Uniformed Sanitationmen's
Association, Local 831, I.B.T. and the City of New York, as Employer,
constitutes an equitable and just resolution of all of the issues involved:
1. Wages—a 5% increase in their annual salary rates for the first
year, retroactive to October 1, 1968; and an additional 4%
increase in these increased annual salary rates for the second

year of a two-year contract, effective October, 1969 (by way
of illustration: the new annual maximum salary for the first
year would be $8,801, and the new annual maximum salary
for the second year would be $9,181).
2. Saturday Work—effective October 1, 1968, work performed by
Sanitationmen on Saturdays as such to be paid for at the
applicable straight-time rates for the first 2 hours worked
and at time and one-half the applicable rate for all hours
worked after the first 2 hours.
3. Pensions—(1) Sanitationmen who failed to elect the 20-year
benefit option should be given a second opportunity to make
such a written election.
(2) the ordinary disability benefit to be amended to provide a % pay benefit for those with service of 5 years and
more, up to 10 years; and a % pay benefit for those with 10
years or more of service.
(3) retirement allowances for ordinary disability, accidental disability, ordinary death, and accidental death benefits to be based on annual salary at the date of retirement
as will be defined in a supplementary memorandum.
(4) a mutually agreed upon medical appeals procedure
to be established by the Union and the Employer for cases in
which applications for retirement for ordinary disability or
accidental disability are rejected.
(5) the President of the Union is to become a member of
the Board of the Eetirement System, in accordance with
mutually agreed upon enabling steps for the provision of
such representation.
4. Human Relations Committee—To facilitate harmonious, efficient and effective dispute settlement within the term of the
contract and whenever the parties are engaged in bargaining
over the terms of a new contract, the Union and the Employer should establish immediately a Human Eolations
Committee, whose Chairman shall be Professor Walter L.
Eisenberg, and whose functions shall include the arbitration
of grievances and adoption and application of impasse pro2

cedures in bargaining, provided that such functions are to
be consistent with the laws under which the parties operate.
5. Non-Economic Issues—the agreements previously reached by
the parties on all non-economic issues should be reduced to
writing and, where appropriate, incorporated into their
collective bargaining contract.
6. Term of Contract—the new contract between the parties to be
for the two-year period beginning October 1, 1968 and ending
September 30,1970.
7. Excused Days—Excused times as accorded to all other City
Employees shall be equally granted to members of (Police
Department, Fire Department, Sanitation) including the
retroactive application of days off granted as a result of the
1966 Transit Strike, as well as days off granted in observance
of the funerals of Dr. Martin L. King and Senator E. F.
Kennedy.
The retroactive excused time, totalling seven (7) days
which is due to each patrolman, fireman, sanitation-man)
shall be taken during the term of the contract. All compensatory time covered under this section shall be taken subject
to the exigencies of the Department.

POLICE CONTRACT
RECOMMENDATIONS
'T'HERE CAN BE no doubt that the Police Department is in the
forefront of emergency services that are so essential to the protection of life and property in a great metropolis like Now York City. We
must, therefore, pay rapt attention to the incessant demands made
upon our police officers. A citizenry that desires law, order and justice must be prepared to fairly compensate those who are charged
with the responsibility of enforcing these essential factors in our daily
life. Accordingly, it is the unanimous feeling of the mediators that
substantial wage and benefit adjustments are mandatory in order that
the members of the New York City Police Department be counted
among the highest paid officers in the nation.
In this vein, we have taken particular note of an American Bar
Association committee report, following extensive study of the police
function, which recommended a $10,000 national salary standard for
police officers. Viewed in terms of this proposed national standard,
the recommendation implies higher rates for major cities in the
United States. Further support for a meaningful adjustment is found
in the report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice which included a recommendation that the
large cities should strive to match the FBI salary scale, a range that
reaches a maximum of almost $17,000 per year. Clearly, the necessity
to recruit and retain capable, dedicated policemen is unassailable and
we must recognize that the turmoil and changing needs of our times
requires unprecedented incentives to attract manpower that might
otherwise be drawn to private industry. The performance of our
Police Department has been outstanding in face of difficulties that
would have strained lesser men to the breaking point. We feel that
the panel's recommendations are not only geared to a fair rate of
compensation for this burden and responsibility, but represent an
equitable assessment on the people of New York City who have demanded, and are entitled to maximum performance in the police
function.

The collective bargaining agreement recommended for implementation between the City and the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association gives grateful recognition to the calibre and performance of our
police, not only by providing a higher economic status, but by instituting future benefits and improved working conditions that should
insure high morale and guarantee an unprecedented level of devotion
to duty.
LENGTH OF SERVICE INCENTIVE
A. Effective October 1, 1968 longevity increments shall be paid as
follows:
1. The salary rate for Patrolman, First Grade Khali be adjusted
to $10,425 upon the completion of five years of service.
2. The salary rate for Patrolman, First Grade shall be adjusted
to $10,525 upon the completion of ten years of service.
3. The salary rate for Patrolman, First Grade shall be adjusted
to $10,625 upon completion of fifteen years of service.
4. The salary rate for Patrolman, First Grade shall be adjusted
to $10,725 upon completion of twenty years of service.
B. Effective October 1, 1969 longevity increments shall be paid as
follows:
1. The salary rate for Patrolman, First Grade shall be adjusted
to $10,850 upon the completion of five years of service.
2. The salary rate for Patrolman, First Grade shall be adjusted
to $10,950 upon the completion of ten years of service.
3. The salary rate for Patrolman, First Grade shall be adjusted
to $11,050 upon completion of fifteen years of service.
4. The salary rate for Patrolman, First Grade shall be adjusted
to $11,150 upon completion of twenty years of service.
The adjustments for service provided herein shall not be deemed
to he part of salary for purposes of retirement allowances unless at
the time of retirement a Patrolman, First Grade paid at the rate of
$10,425 or $10,525 on October 1, 1968 and at the rate of $10,850 or
$10,950 on October 1, 1969 shall have completed twenty years of

service, and a Patrolman, First Grade paid at the rate of $10,625 or
$10,725 on October 1, 1968 and at the rate of $11,050 or $11,150 on
October 1, 1969 shall have completed twenty-five years of service.

TACTICAL PATROL FORCE AND SPECIAL EVENTS SQUAD
The Tactical Patrol Force and the Special Events Squad shall
both be units comprised entirely of volunteers. Accordingly, any member now assigned to either unit who desires transfer shall be accommodated upon request. Patrolmen assigned to the Tactical Patrol Force
who perform steady eight hour tours of duty during the hours between
6:00 PM and 6:00 AM shall work a duty chart of four tours per week.
Patrolmen assigned to the Special Events Squad shall be scheduled
for eight hour tours of duty only during the daylight hours between
6:00 AM and 6:00 PM.
As a consequence of the volunteer status of these units; the incentive of four tours of duty provided to members of the Tactical Patrol
Force; and the incentive assignment to steady day tours for members
of the Special Events Squad, the contract terms pertaining to "flying"
and re-scheduling as outlined elsewhere shall not be applicable to
patrolmen covered by this section.
MEDICAL PLAN
There will be an annual reopening during the term of this agreement
for active employees to exercise their choice among medical plans.
Patrolmen who are retiring and will be off the payroll prior to the
effective date of change of coverage shall be permitted to change their
health insurance plan during the then current transfer period. Following the effective date of this agreement, patrolmen who retire before
having the opportunity to elect a change of coverage shall be accorded
such right during the next changeover period.
SAFETY HELMETS
The City agrees to furnish a safety helmet and equipment related
thereto for each patrolman. Such headgear shall conform to Police
Department specifications in effect at the time of this agreement.
SEMI-PRIVATE HOSPITAL ACCOMMODATIONS
FOR LINE-OF-DTJTY INJURIES
The City will prepare, submit, and support legislation to amend the
present law so as to provide semi-private hospital accommodations
for patrolmen injured in the line of duty.

PARKING FACILITIES
It is the intent of the Department to make available, without liability
to the City, City-owned property and on-street locations adjacent to,
near or part of police stations or other command locations, as parking
facilities for the personal cars of patrolmen. Where such property is
available for this purpose, and so designated, the City is not obligated
to improve it, nor to maintain it for parking. City-owned property
shall not continue to be made available for parking when a different
use is to be made of it by the City.
SPECIAL TIME OFF

Time off accorded to other City employees under circumstances such
as recognition of services rendered during the 1966 transit strike,
observance of the funerals of Dr. Martin Luther King and Senator
Robert F. Kennedy, and all other similar excusals shall be equally
granted to patrolmen in the Police Department. In accordance herewith, it is agreed that retroactive time off, totalling 7 days, is due to
each patrolman which shall be taken during the term of this contract.
All compensatory time covered under this section shall be taken subject
to the exigencies of the Department.
MAINTENANCE OF FACILITIES

All commands and other Departmental places of assignment shall have
adequate heating, hot water, sanitary and sanitation facilities. If not,
notice shall be given to the Department of this condition. If not corrected by the Department within a reasonable time, it may be the
subject of a grievance at step 3 of the Grievance Procedure.
SENIORITY

The Department recognizes the importance of seniority in filling
vacancies within a command and will make every effort to adhere to
this policy providing the senior applicant has the ability and qualifications to perform the work involved. While consultation on such
matters is permissible, the final decision of the Department shall not be
subject to the grievance procedure.
ORDINARY DISABILITY PENSION

The City will prepare, submit, and support legislation, effective July
1, 1969, to amend the present law so as to provide an ordinary disability retirement allowance equal to one-third final pay for patrolmen
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with less than 10 years of service; and an ordinary disability retirement allowance equal to one-half of final pay for patrolmen with more
than 10 but not more than 20 years of service.
If a member has more than 20 years of service and retires for
ordinary disability he shall receive a retirement allowance equal to
one-fourtieth times the annual salary on the date of retirement multiplied by the number of years of creditable police service.
SETTLEMENTS OF NON-ECONOMIC ITEMS
All clauses in this Memorandum of Agreement were consented to by
the parties and shall be incorporated in the new collective bargaining
agreement, or where noted, are binding understandings which are to
be carried out without inclusion in the final contract.
CONTRACT TERM
The term of the contract shall be two years, October 1, 1968 through
September 30,1970.
SALARY
The following salary plan, effective on the dates indicated, is hereby
agreed to by the parties:
Patrolman:

Effective
10/1/68

Effective
10/1/69

1st Grade
2nd Grade
3rd Grade
4th Grade

$10,325
9,646
9,095
8,874

$10,750
10,071
9,520
9,299

These adjustments represent a 5% wage increase in the first year,
plus restoration of the differential between Patrolmen and Sergeants
that existed prior to July 1, 1966, as well as a 4% wage increase in the
second year. The total wage and benefit increases contained in this
report thus raises Patrolmen in the New York City Police Department
to a competitive level with law enforcement officers in San Francisco,
Detroit and Los Angeles as well as those in nearby suburban communities whose recent gains have been substantial.
Accordingly, in the second year of this agreement we have modified
police compensation so as to place New York City high among the
nation's leaders. In justice, we could do no less.

All rates shown on page 9 are exclusive of:
a. Longevity increments of $100 after 5 years of service; an additional $100 after 10 years of service; an additional $100 after
15 years of service; and an additional $100 after 20 years of
service (specifically treated elsewhere in this memorandum).
b. $190 per annum per member contribution to the Health and
Welfare Fund (specifically treated elsewhere in this memorandum).
The following benefits, granted under a prior agreement, shall be
continued:
a. Eleven paid holidays annually.
b. $185 per annum uniform alloAvance.
c. Assumption by the City of New York of full payment for choice
of health and hospital insurance.
d. 5% pension contribution to provide increased take-home pay.
e. Minimum recall as provided under the prior collective bargaining agreement.
f. Continuation of the $1.00 per day Annuity Fund contribution.
g. One personal leave day.
h. Eight to legal representation at Departmental
interrogations and hearings.

investigation,

i. Grievance procedure with right of final appeal outside the Police Department.
PORTAL-TO-PORTAL PAY

Effective October 15, 1968, the assignment of patrolmen to posts
other than those located within their permanent command (commonly
known, and hereinafter referred to as "flying") shall be accomplished
by such "flying" assignment originating and terminating at the
permanent command within a regular eight hour tour of duty, except
as otherwise hereinafter provided.
If, for any reason, the Department is unable to, or desires to
avoid, fulfilling the foregoing condition, a patrolman notified of a
10

"flying" assignment before the commencement of his next regularly
scheduled tour of duty, shall automatically receive a minimum overtime travel guarantee of one hour's compensatory time off at the
rate of time and one-half, except that should normal travel time from
his permanent command to a designated "flying" assignment be less
than fifteen minutes, no overtime obligation will accrue. In the event
that normal travel time between his permanent command and the
"flying" assignment shall exceed one hour after calculating travel
time in both directions, the patrolman is to be credited with additional
overtime compensation at the rate of time and one-half in compensatory time, computed in quarter hour segments, for all such travel
time incurred.
SUPPLEMENTAL PENSION FUND
The City and the Association agree to cause to be paid over to a
separate fund, established within the present Police Pension Fund,
the proceeds of the annual yield and capital appreciation, realized or
unrealized, earned by reason of an investment in equities in excess
of the yield which would have resulted from investments such as
bonds, mortgages and other fixed income securities. The purpose of
this fund shall be to provide a supplemental benefit on a variable
annuity basis, for Articles I and II, as determined by the trustees.
The fund shall be jointly administered by two trustees, who shall be
the Mayor or his representative on the Police Pension Board and the
Association designee on such Board. Deadlocks between the two trustees shall be resolved by arbitration by (arbitrator to be selected) ; or
if he fails or is unable to serve, by the arbitration provisions of this
Collective Bargaining agreement.
It is also agreed that the City and the Association shall jointly
sponsor and support appropriate legislation to expand within a reasonable scope the present permissible limits on investments.
The calculation to determine the amount to be paid over to the
separate fund shall be made annually, not later than 30 days after the
close of the fiscal year for which payment is due, and payment shall
be made within 30 days thereafter.
ANNUITY FUND
Payment of the $1.00 per day contribution to an Annuity Fund established by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, the terms of which
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were agreed upon in the prior collective bargaining agreement, are to
be made each 28 days by the employer.
WELFARE FUND
For the term of this agreement, the City shall make an annual contribution of $190 per patrolman to the Health and Welfare Fund of
the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association. Payments of the contributions are to bo made each 28 days by the City.
VESTED PENSION
The City will prepare, submit, and support legislation to amend the
present law so as to provide a vested pension interest for all patrolmen
after 15 years of service in the Police Department, to become payable
on the anniversary date of what would have been the patrolman's 20th
year of service. Any patrolman desiring to avail himself of the retirement option under the terms of this section shall give 30 days
notice of such intent.
APPEALS BEFORE MEDICAL BOARD
A patrolman shall have the right, at his own expense, to have his
personal physician consult with the Departmental medical board after
the examination and interview of the employee, but before the Departmental board completes its record and makes its recommendation.
Present practice regarding filing of medical statements and documentation shall continue.
OVERTIME PAY
Ordered overtime of an emergency nature, authorized by the Police
Commissioner or Chief Inspector shall bo compensated by cash payment at the rate of time and one-half for each hour so worked in
excess of 40 hours. For the period October 1, 1968 to December 31,
1969, ordered overtime of a non-emergency nature shall be compensated by compensatory time off at the rate of time and one-half for
each hour so worked in excess of 40 hours.
On and after January 1, 1970, all ordered overtime after 40 hours
in any week shall be compensated for either by cash payment or compensatory time off, at the rate of time and one-half, at the sole option
of the employee.
In order to preserve the intent and spirit of this agreement on
overtime compensation, there shall be no re-scheduling of days off
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and/or tours of duty. This restriction shall apply not only to the
retrospective crediting of time off against hours already worked but
to the anticipatory re-assignment of personnel to different days off
and/or tours of duty.
INTEREST

The Association's demand for interest was dropped on the basis of
the two following conditions:
1. The Association did not waive its right to sue or arbitrate for
payments past due.
2. The OCB will conduct an intensive study of the problem citywide, to correct or improve it, and will submit a report within
a reasonable time, which may be made public. A memorandum
detailing OCB investigation on this matter will be submitted
by the chairman of that office to all parties herein concerned.
It is agreed that implementation of the supplemental pension provision shall be handled as follows:
Calculation of the proceeds of the separate fund shall be based
on an assumption that the yield from investments such as bonds and
mortgages is 6%. Thus the proceeds to the fund shall be the difference
between 6% and the yield produced by the investment in equities.
This shall obtain from the first year of the plan after it becomes effective. At the end of the first year and for each succeeding year, the
formula for determining the proceeds to the fund shall be determined
by the trustees. If they cannot agree, it shall be determined by arbitration as provided in the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitration shall be predicated upon the general principles set forth as
applicable for the first effective years of the plan.
The following additional requests have been denied:
a. Night differential.
b. Unused vacation and terminal leave credited to beneficiary of
deceased member.
c. Other changes in overall pension system.

13

FIREFIGHTERS CONTRACT
RECOMMENDATIONS
ARGEST IN THE NATION, the New York City Fire Department
exceeds in size the next three largest together. It spans the five
boroughs; patrols the rivers and 650 miles of waterfront. It employs
over ten thousand firefighters, and supporting administrative staff of
almost 2,000. Fire house companies throughout the city number 390,
with 740 pieces of fire fighting equipment, and 8 fire boats. Last year,
the Department responded to 172,000 alarms; extinguished 100,000
fires; and engaged in a wide variety of other activities including fire
education, fire prevention inspections, and related emergency and
maintenance work.
Foremost, the job of the Department and the firefighters each day
is to protect 8 million citizens and almost one million buildings and
other structures, with a real estate valuation of $32.5 billion. In doing
so, the fireman battles flame, smoke, heat and exposes himself to
collapsing walls, crumbling beams, and avalanches of brick and concrete. Lately, in addition, he faces still another danger. It is a danger
that arises from the city's hard-core slum areas, where buildings
deteriorate and are abandoned faster than they can be rehabilitated
or torn down, and where frustrations, resentment and anger is bred
among those living in poverty. The combination has produced a
marked increase in fires and alarms; and an ominous rise in violence
directed at the firemen. Thus far in 1968, 700 incidents of assaults on
firemen have been reported, compared to 250 all last year. The rate of
false alarms has risen startlingly too. 48,000 last year, compared to
only 12,000 in 1957. In the same span the number of actual fires has
almost doubled. With each alarm, equipment must move, men must be
committed, and exposure to danger is probable.
Last year, 2,162 firemen were injured in the line of duty and six
lost their lives.
But what confronts the fireman, confronts our city and our public
officials as well. The Mayor, the Fire Commissioner and other agency
heads are grappling with these symptoms of the "urban crisis", as
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they inaugurate the long range programs needed as root cures. And
these cures, so vitally needed, become more expensive each year. The
same is true for the needs of the employees. As living costs swirl
upward, and as firemen see industrial wages rise and other benefits
grow, they and other city employees demand to keep pace. In short, the
increased occupational demands on the firefighters is nothing more
than one part of the "crisis of our cities"; the unquestioned need for
firefighting services is unquesionably more expensive; and the personal
and family needs of the firemen are no different from those of their
neighbors.
Of course, any consideration to improve the pay and benefits of
firemen because of these circumstances must be balanced by due consideration of the ability of the City and the taxpayers to pay the bill.
The blunt fact is that the demands of the employees for increased pay
and benefits and the resistance of the taxpayers and the City to further
costly expenditure, though apparently inconsistent, are equally meritorious. Both views are legitimate and understandable and must be
reconciled as best we can, if a responsible determination is to be made.
In our view, an efficient, modern fire department manned by employees who are paid decent, honorable wages and Avho work under
good conditions is essential to the public welfare. As an essential
service, its essential cost must be met. And if, as we believe, the public
wants the best in fire fighting service, it must assume its duty to bear
the increased cost, provided the increase is responsible and directly
related to the services rendered. We arc confident that our recommendations meet this test.
The issues between the City and the Union, originally over 90 in
number, were divided into the following three categories:
1. Wages, Pension, and Contract Term.
2. Economic Demands.
3. Non-Economic Demands.
We are pleased to report that direct negotiations between the
parties, with our assistance, produced successfully negotiated settlements or disposition of all the non-economic items, including in the
case of those settled, the precise language to be included in new contract. The intensive negotiations and mediation also served to sharply
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narrow the number of issues in the other two categories. On these, we
have decided to exercise our authority to make recommendations for
settlement and disposition.
SETTLEMENT OF NON-ECONOMIC DEMANDS
The following contract clauses, on the subjects noted, were agreed to
by the parties and shall be incorporated in the new collective bargaining
agreement; or where noted, are binding understandings, which are to
be carried out without inclusion in the contract.
ASSIGNMENTS TO SUPER PUMPER OPERATOR
(intra Departmental Procedure)
The Department will establish an objective procedure for employees
with the required qualifications,* using a departmental wide competitive written examinaion with a weight of fifty (50) per centum, a
practical examination with a weight of twenty-five (25) per centum,
and seniority with a Aveight of twenty-five (25) per centum, to fill
vacancies in the job of super pumper Operator. The vacancy shall be
filled by the most successful candidate determined by the above procedure only. The life of the list of successful candidates shall be four
(4) years.
The foregoing procedure shall not commence until the end of the
Diesel course given by the Board of Education (referred to in the
"Required Qualifications") which first begins after signing of this
contract. Until then, vacancies shall be filled on a temporary basis,
subject to the promulgation of the list.
ADD AS LAST SENTENCE TO ANNUITY FUND
"Payments of this contribution are to be made each twenty-eight days
by the Employer".
ADD TO MEDICAL PLAN
"There will be an annual reopening during the term of this contract
for active employees to exercise their choice among plans."
* The
from
1.
2.
3.

"Required Qualifications" are as follows, and are to be set forth in a memorandum
the City to the Union :
Firemen First Grade.
Possess a Class I Chauffeur License.
Background, experience and education in the field of diesel engine operation, maintenance and repair, or Completed Diesel course for Marine personnel as given by Board
of Education, Evening Trades Division, or One (1) year experience in the Super
Pumper system.
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ADD TO VACATION AND SICK LEAVE
"Employees annual leave shall be changed to sick leave during a period
of verified hospitalization or if seriously disabled but not hospitalized
while on annual leave. Procedurally, provided the employee is hospitalized or seriously disabled as set forth above, this plan shall be administered as is the present sick leave program for employees while on a
tour of duty. The decision of the Department in such matters shall be
final."
PARKING
Settled in basis of a memorandum from the Commissioner to the
Union, endorsed by Mr. Haber, stating Department's "intent to make
available without liability to the City, city-owned property adjacent
to, near or part of fire houses, as parking facilities for the personal
cars of employees. Where such property is available for this purpose,
and so designated, the City is not obligated to improve it nor to maintain it for parking. This property is to be no longer available for
parking when a different use is to be made of it by the City.''
MESSENGER DUTY
"Messenger duty to and from Department headquarters, known as
division messenger duty, presently performed in the PM period by
four limited service firemen using spare chief's cars shall be extended
to include the AM messenger duty; and shall utilize limited service or
light duty men.''
TRANSPORTATION
"The Department recognizes its responsibility to provide transportation to and from fires and in emergencies. When transportation is not
made available, and an employee is authorized to use, and uses his
personal car, he shall be paid $1.75 for that use."
VACANCIES
"In filling vacancies, the Department recognizes the importance of
seniority (measured by time in the Department) provided the senior
applicant has the ability and qualifications to perform the work involved. However, the Department's decision is final."
FORM BP-84
The present use of form No. BP-84 is changed as follows:
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The BP-84 shall be filed by those to whom it now applies upon an
employees return to duty provided that the information required
thereby is given to the officer on duty by telephone promptly, but not
later than 24 hours following the onset of the employees' disability.
In the event that after one year from the date of this contract it is
determined by the Department that this procedure has engendered
abuses, the Department may return to the practice followed prior to
the adoption of this procedure."
VACATIONS

"All employees shall have the right with the approval of the Company
Commander or Commanders involved to make mutual exchanges in
full or in part of vacation time within a company or adjoining companies. Present single companies shall be paired by the Department
and the foregoing procedures shall obtain between the paired companies. ''
INCLEMENT WEATHER

"When the THI reaches 78, or the chill factor reaches 15, regularly
scheduled outdoor activities will be called off. In addition, on Saturdays and Sundays multi-unit drills will be called off when the temperature drops to 25° Fahrenheit. There shall be no change in present
practice in regard to rain and snow. These limitations shall not apply
in unusual conditions, as determined by the Fire Commissioner, the
Chief of Department or Assistant Chief on duty."
WORK CREDIT

"Runs and workers shall be credited to the relocated working company. ''
HOSPITALIZATION—LINE OF DUTY INJURY

"The City will prepare, submit, and support legislation to amend the
present law so as to provide semi-private hospital accommodations for
employees injured in the line of duty.''
ADD TO HEARINGS AND EXAMINATIONS

"The employee shall have the right, at his own expense, to have his
physician consult with the Departmental Medical Board after the
examination and interview of the employee, but before the Departmental Board completes its record and makes its recommendation.
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Present practice regarding filing of medical statements and documentation shall continue."
FACILITIES
"All quarters shall have adequate heating, hot water, sanitary and
sanitation facilities. If not, notice shall be given to the Department of
this condition. If not corrected by the Department within a reasonable
time, it may be the subject of a grievance at Step III of the grievance
procedure."
SAFETY STANDARDS
"The Department shall establish minimum safety standards for
vehicles, consistent with the standards of the State Motor Vehicle
Bureau for comparable vehicles, and shall have annual inspections to
insure the maintenance of these standards."
The MPO or chauffeur shall be able, in the presence of the house
watchman, to notify the Company Officer of defects in the apparatus;
so that an inspection of the apparatus may be undertaken and a recording of the officer's findings be made in the Company Journal, pursuant
to Chapter 13.2.6 of the Regulations.
All other non-economic demands were dropped by the Union.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANEL ON
ECONOMIC DEMANDS
OVERTIME AND PREMIUM PAY
Article III, of the former contract shall be continued in the new
contract, with the following new sentence added to, and at the end
of Section 3 (b) thereof:
"On and after January 1, 1970, all such overtime after 40 hours
in any week shall be compensated for by cash payment at the rate
of time and one-half.''
TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENTS
Paragraphs (a) and (b) under this heading in the former contract
shall be continued in the new contract. In addition, there shall be the
following provision:
"Effective January 1, 1969, whenever a Fireman is assigned to
the duties of a higher rank for more than two hours in any tour,
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he shall be paid in cash for the entire period of such assignment
at the rate of a Lieutenant. The intent is that the Department
shall have 2 hours to obtain an officer qualified in the higher rank.
If not, the Fireman assigned shall continue in the assignment of
the higher rank and shall receive Lieutenant's pay for that rank
for all the time in it."
LENGTH OF SERVICE INCENTIVE

Paragraph III (2) is amended to read as follows:
"Effective October 1, 1968 Longevity pay shall be paid as follows:
First Grade Fireman
who has completed 5 years ... $100.00
First Grade Fireman
who has completed 10 years ... additional $100.00
First Grade Fireman
who has completed 15 years ... additional $100.00
First Grade Fireman
who has completed 20 years ... additional $100.00
The adjustment after the 5th and 10th years shall not be computed
as salary for pension purposes until after completing 20 years of
service.
The adjustment after the 15th and 20th year shall not be computed
as salary for pension purposes until after completion of 25 years of
service.
SECURITY BENEFIT FUND
The contract clause shall read:
"Effective October 1, 1968, and for the term of this agreement the
Employer shall make an annual contribution of $190 per employee
to the Security Benefit Fund. Payments of this contribution are
to be made each twenty-eight days by the Employer."
EMERGENCY SERVICES

Excused time as accorded to all other city employees shall be equally
granted to firemen, including the retroactive application of days off
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granted as a result of the 1966 transit strike, as well as days off
granted in observance of the funerals of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
and Senator Robert F. Kennedy.
The retroactive excused time, totalling seven days which is due
to each Fireman, shall be taken during the term of this contract. All
compensatory time covered under this section shall be taken subject
to the exigencies of the Department.
All other economic demands, which were not dropped* during
negotiations, are denied.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONTRACT TERM, WAGES, PENSION
CONTRACT TERM
The term of the contract shall be two years, October 1, 1968 through
September 30,1970.
PENSION
Section 1—The City and the Union agree to sponsor mutually
agreed-upon legislation in the 1969 session of the State Legislature to
provide certain improvements in pension benefits as listed below.
Section 2—Notwithstanding the provisions of this Article the
provisions of such legislation shall be deemed to have implemented
and shall supersede the provisions of this Article, and no rights shall
accrue under the provisions of this Article different from or in addition
to the rights accruing under such legislation. If such legislation is
adopted, any dispute concerning the interpretation and/or application
of the provisions of this Article, shall not be subject to the disputes
adjustment or grievance procedures set forth in this Contract.
Section 3—In the event of ordinary disability any member who
retires for such cause shall be entitled to 1/40 of his final salary for
each year of service in excess of twenty years or for the fractional
part of any year thereof.
* The Union's demand for "Interest", under Article XXII of its Demands was dropped on the
basis of the two following conditions :
1. The Union did not waive its right to sue or arbitrate for payments past due.
2. The OCB will conduct an intensive study of the problem city-wide, to correct or improve it, and will make a report within a reasonable time, which may be public. A
memorandum on what the OCB will do will be sent by its Chairman to the parties.
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Section 4—In the event of accidental disability, a member would
be entitled to a pension of three quarters of his final salary plus a
refund of his contributions without interest either in a lump sum or
annuity form. Members contributions shall be exclusive of the increased take home pay.
Section 5—If a member has completed his minimum service requirement, his rate of contribution shall be discontinued. Such rate
of contribution shall be determined after the increased take home pay
rate has been deducted from the required rate.
Section 6—With respect to terminations after the effective date
of this amendment, where the return of the members contributions in
a lump sum or annuity form is made, interest from July 1, 1969 at
the rate prescribed by the Pension Law shall be included provided
the cost estimated by the City's Actuary of granting interest shall not
exceed $70,000 per year.
Section 7—The City and the Union agree to cause to be paid over
to a separate fund, established within the present Fire Department
Pension Fund, the firemen member portion of the proceeds of the
annual yield and capital appreciation realized or unrealized by reason
of investment in equities, in excess of the yield which would have resulted from investments such as bonds and mortgages which the Pension Fund is currently purchasing.
It is further agreed that the maximum permissable amount be
so invested as equities without undue impairment for the Article IB
Fund by conversion from Fixed Income to Equities. The purpose of
this fund shall be to provide a supplemental benefit on a variable
annuity basis for Articles I and IB firemen, as determined by the
trustees. The fund shall be jointly administered by twro trustees, who
shall be the Mayor or his representative on the Fire Department
Pension Board and the Union designee on such Board. Deadlocks
between the two trustees shall be resolved by arbitration by Eric J.
Schmertz, or if he fails or is unable to serve, by the arbitration provisions of this Collective Bargaining agreement.
It is also agreed that the City and the Union shall jointly sponsor
and support appropriate legislation to expand within a reasonable
scope the present permissable limits on investments.
The calculation to determine the amount to be paid over to the
separate fund shall be made annually, not later than 30 days after the
23

close of the fiscal year for which payment is due, and payment shall
be made within 30 days thereafter.
WAGES
Parity in compensation between firemen and patrolmen has been a
historic practice for 80 years. We find realistically that it should be
maintained. Accordingly, effective October 1, 1968 and October 1,
1969 the Firemen shall receive the salaries as presented in the following schedule:
ANNUAL SALARIES OF FIREMEN
October 1, 1958

Fireman, First Grade

October 1,1969

$10,325

$10,750

Second Grade

9,646

10,071

Third Grade

9,095

9,520

Fourth Grade and
Probationary

8,874

9,299

This represents, in the first year, an increase of 5% plus the
differential,* and 4% in the second year. It is thus relatively equivalent
to current wage settlements elsewhere in the public and private sector.
It brings the New York City firemen immediately up to virtually the
level of similar employees in those surrounding suburban areas and
in those other cities where wages have exceeded New York City. And
after the start of the second year of the contract, the New York City
firemen's wages will rank with the highest in the nation. We believe
this is as it should be. There can be little dispute with the conclusion
that the largest City, with a fire department and firefighters of the
first rank, should pay wages and benefits of the first rank as well.
* See reference in the police negotiations recommendations.
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ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The New York City negotiators have requested the "overall panel"
consider one other matter—the question of granting the city Housing
Authority patrolmen, Transit Authority patrolmen and Correction
Officers the same salary increase as granted to Policemen and Firemen.
We have been informed these three unions have also requested we do
so. We have also been advised Housing Authority patrolmen now have
three (3) days more vacation than do city police, and Correction Officers
have some additional benefit.
The question of the maintenance of so-called parity between these
three unions and police and fire has been a long time problem among
all groups. We have been informed parity was established during the
previous city administration between 1964 and 1966, and continued in
the contracts negotiated by the present administration. The panel has
not discussed the substance of negotiations with the Housing Authority
Patrolmen, the Transit Authority Patrolmen, the Correction Officers,
nor with the New York City negotiators. Time does not permit our
checking into this matter. We do not have the basis of information
to upset the present "parity" between the groups and thus we can not
and will not make such a recommendation. This whole question would
involve a complete "job classification survey" we neither have the
time nor the facility to do so. We recommend this be done.
Since we do not have the information upon which to base a fair
conclusion to upset the existing salary parity, we recommend it be
maintained, however with this recommendation is coupled a recommendation that Housing Authority patrolmen give up the three (3)
extra vacation days, and an adjustment be made of the difference in
the Correction Officers' benefits.
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Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Transportation Checkers, Receivers &
Clerical Workers, Local 161, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America
Award

and
Philadelphia Transportation

Company

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated January 31, 1967 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Award, as
follows:
1. With the installation of the computer, the Company
had the right to abolish the job of Garage Clerk.
2. Under Section 407 of the contract the Company
properly transferred certain duties previously
performed by the Garage Clerk to the job of
Storekeeper.
3. The addition of new duties to the job of Storekeeper constitutes a "material change in the
content of an existing job classification" within
the meaning of Section 407. Therefore, the Company is directed to re-evaluate the job of
Storekeeper in accordance with the contractual
job evaluation plan.
4. The Union's claim that TWU personnel are performing work which belongs to the Storekeepers, is
denied.
5. The Union's
claim that A-Payroll
personnel are
\N ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
performing the bargaining unit work in violation of Section 1007 of the contract, is denied.

DATED: June ^T 1968
c-^ *^ , ,

Eric /J'. Schmertz
Chairman

V

f

DATED;
K. M. Gore
Concurring in 1,2,3,4,5
Dissenting from 1,2,3,4,5

DATED:
James Wilson
Concurring in 1,2,3,4,5
Dissenting from 1,2,3,4,5

Case No. 1430 0012-68

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'

Transportation Checkers, Receivers &
Clerical Workers, Local 161, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America

'
'
'
'

t

and

'

Philadelphia Transportation Company

'

1

Opinion of
Chairman

In accordance with Section 202 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated January 31, 1967 between Philadelphia
Transportation Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company"
and Transportation Checkers, Receivers & Clerical Workers,
Local 161, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, hereinafter referred to
as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Chairman
of a tripartite Board of Arbitration to hear and decide a dispute relating to the abolition of the job of Garage Clerk.
Messrs. James Wilson and K. M. Gore served as the Union
and Company arbitrators respectively on the Board of Arbitration.
A hearing was held in the offices of the American Arbitration Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on April 17,
1968 at which time representatives of the Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared. The
parties were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Board

of Arbitration met in executive session on June 3, 1968 following which the hearings were declared closed.

- 2 The Company installed a computer which undisputedly took
over certain significant duties performed by the Garage Clerk.
The job of Garage Clerk was then eliminated.

It is undisputed

that remaining duties were assigned to bargaining unit
Storekeepers.

The Company contends that all the remaining

duties were so assigned.

The Union claims that certain Garage

Clerk duties were also taken over by non-bargaining unit supervisory personnel (A-Payroll).

And further, because of the

additional duties imposed on the Storekeepers, some of the
proper functions of the Storekeeper are being improperly handled by production employees of the Transport Workers Union.
The Union claims that all three results - the assignment
and performance of Garage Clerk duties by Storekeepers and by
A-Payroll personnel; and the alleged TWU encroachment - are
violative of the contract.

The Company denies that any Garage

Clerk work was transferred to or is being performed by the APayroll.

It asserts that the transfer of the residue of the

Garage Clerks' work to the Storekeepers was in accordance with
the contract, and that TWU members are not doing Storekeeper
work.
I deny the Union's claim that the Company had no right to
transfer duties from the classification of Garage Clerk to that
of Storekeeper.

Section 40.7 of the contract clearly permits

the Company to do so.

Among other things, its express language

allows for the transfer of work within existing classifications.
However, when such transfers are effectuated, they must comply with the requirements of that Section.

So, though the

- 3 Union may not complain about a transfer of duties from one
classification to another, it may complain if the transfer has
resulted in the establishment of a new job, because of the
addition of new duties.

And by consequence the Union is entit-

led to a review of the wage rate of the job affected under the
contractual job evaluation plan.

In short, though the Company

may transfer duties from one job classification to another, it
may do it only if it also meets its full responsibilities under
Section 407 „

Thus where, as here, one job is abolished and at

least some of its duties transferred to another, the wage rate
of the surviving classification is subject to a new job evaluation if the result of the addition of duties creates a new
classification within the meaning of Section 407.
In the instant case I am persuaded that the transfer to the
Storekeepers of certain work previously performed by the Garage
Clerks, is significant enough to require a new evaluation, as
mandated by Section 407 of the contract.

This is so whether

the transferred work amounts to no more than one hour each day,
as contended by the Company; or three hours and possibly five
at some locations, as alleged by the Union.

Either way the

transferred duties are of sufficient significance to constitute
a "material change in the content of an existing job classification," warranting a re-examination and a re-evaluation of the
Storekeeper wage.

Accordingly, though the Company acted within

its contractual rights in transferring work from the classification of Garage Clerk to that of Storekeeper, it must now evaluate the latter in accordance with the job evaluation plan.
There is not sufficient evidence in the record to support

- 4a finding that work properly within the jurisdiction of the
Storekeepers has been taken over by TWU personnel.
The practice has been for Storekeepers to issue tools and
other equipment to the TWU production men,

Also however, at

times, and at many installations, the TWU men have direct
access to the store room and have obtained tools and equipment
on their own without going through the Storekeeper.
practice continues.

This latter

Though the Union claims it is solely be-

cause the Storekeepers are too busy with their newly assigned
work, I am not persuaded that it is not also a perpetuation of
the dual practice which obtained even when the Garage Clerk
classification existed.

In short, I am not satisfied that the

TWU personnel are doing anything now which they have not done
previously.

Also when the Storekeeper checked tools and equip-

ment in and out for the TWU personnel, he maintained certain
inventory records.

There is no evidence nor indeed a claim by

the Union that the TWU men are performing any such clerical
duties.

Rather the argument is that the tool rooms are being

inefficiently managed because the Storekeeper is occupied with
other duties.

If the Company chooses to run its tool rooms

that way, it is not for the Union to complain, unless the
Storekeeper is held responsible for loss of tools and equipment„
But the evidence clearly shows that he is not so responsible.
So the mere fact that there is direct access to the store room
by TWU personnel, as disruptive to efficiency and conducive to
loss as it may be, does not mean that TWU members are performing
work that belongs to the Storekeeper.

- 5 However, so that misunderstandings and misinterpretations
may be avoided I think every effort should be made to afford
the Storekeepers sufficient time to issue and receive tools
to and from the TWU men, especially at those large Company installations where several Storekeepers are on duty and where
the traffic in and out of the store room is extensive.

I

would hope that the Company would give careful and positive
consideration to this recommendation in the interest of reasonable application and recognition of duties traditional to
Storekeepers.
The Company argues that supervisory A-Payroll personnel
have performed no duties after the abolition of the Garage Clerk
classification that they did not perform prior thereto.

Based

on the record I conclude that a distinction must be made between
the nature of the work and its quantity.

I agree with the

Company's assertion that the supervisory employees are not now
performing any type of work which they did not perform when the
Garage Clerk job was in existence.

The fact is that so far as

the nature of the work is concerned, supervisory personnel are
doing only what they did before, some of which was handled
jointly by the Garage Clerk and the supervisors.

Neither had

exclusive jurisdiction; rather their work duties overlapped.
So as far as the type of work is concerned, I do not find that
the A-Payroll is performing work which previously was exclusively within the Garage Clerk's jurisdiction.

Yet I am convinced

that at certain installations at least, the quantity of such
work performed by supervisory employees has increased as a

- 6direct result of the abolition of the Garage Clerk job.

A-

Payroll personnel are doing more of the same type of work they
previously performed, because there is no longer a Garage Clerk
to do some of it as well.
The question that remains is whether the increase in quantity of work performed by the A-Payroll as a result of the
abolition of the job of Garage Clerk, is violative of Section
1007 of the contract which reads:
The Company will not weaken the existing bargaining
unit by transferring jobs or work presently performed within the bargaining unit to the "A" Payroll.
The parties disagree on the interpretation of this section.
The Union interprets it as an absolute prohibition against the
performance of any bargaining unit work by the A-Payroll.

The

Company argues that it means that bargaining unit work may not
be assigned to the A-Payroll if the effect is to weaken the existing bargaining unit.
If I accepted the Union's interpretation I would hold that
any transfer of work from the bargaining unit to the A-Payroll
including an increase in quantity, would be proscribed and that
phase of the Union's grievance in the instant case would be upheld.

Under the Company's interpretation, the Union's grievance

would be sustained only if the quantity of work transferred to
A-Payroll constituted a weakening of the bargaining unit.
I find this contract section to be ambiguous.

Logically

it is subject to either of those two contrary interpretations.
As worded it could well mean that bargaining unit work may be
performed by the A-Payroll so long as the unit is not weakened

- 7 thereby.

Contrarywise the performance of bargaining unit work

by A-Payroll could be construed under this section as an irrebuttable example or agreed upon definition of an act that
weakens the bargaining unit.
It seems to me that the Company's interpretation is more
plausible.

If the intent was to ban the performance of any

bargaining unit work by the A-Payroll, Section 10077 could have
easily said soc

It could have simply provided that the Company

will not transfer work from the bargaining unit to the A-Payroll.
But Section 1007 is not so unequivocal.

The phrase that "the

Company will not weaken the existing bargaining unit" though
inartfully written and positioned, must therefore have some
meaning and intent.

I believe it was intended to have a limit-

ing effect on what otherwise would have been an absolute prohibition against the transfer of bargaining unit work to the
A-Payroll.

It contemplates, I think, those situations where

some work may be done by the A-Payroll which would normally have
been performed by the bargaining unit, but which is of such
minor quantity or significance as to have no effect on the unit
if handled by supervisory personnel.

For example, if a small

quantity of bargaining unit work, perhaps a few hours a week,
could not fit into existing bargaining unit classifications,
and did not itself constitute a full day's work for a bargaining unit employee, its performance by the A-Payroll would be
non-prejudicial to the bargaining unit.

To cover that circum-

stance at least, is I believe a purpose for Section 1007.„
Such a circumstance is present in the instant case.

The

additional quantity of work taken over by the A-Payroll would

- 8 not approach enough to keep a Garage Clerk fully occupied if
that classification was restored.

And to add it to the existing

and new duties of the Storekeeper, would only compound the
Union's justifiable concern about the new duties required of
those employees.
What is then to be done with this relatively small extra
quantity of work which remained after the bulk had been properly transferred within the bargaining unit (and therefore not in
a way to weaken it) from the Garage Clerk to the Storekeeper?
Put another way the critical questions are: Is the bargaining
unit weakened when this work is handled by the A-Payroll, and
would the bargaining unit be strengthened if this work was returned to the unit?
answer them.

To ask the questions, I believe, is to

Neither the handling of the work by the A-Payroll

nor its return to the unit would, in my view, have any effect on
the strength or weakness of the bargaining unit.

The quantity

of work taken over by the A-Payroll was so small in comparison
to the portions transferred to the Storekeepers and taken over
by the computer, that no material effect on the bargaining unit
would be sustained whether the A-Payroll people did it or not.
The fact is that the bargaining unit was not weakened by the
transfer of that particular work to the A-Payroll but was weakened by the installation of the computer.

The computer is the

proximate cause of the elimination of the bargaining unit job
of the Garage Clerk.

But the installation of the computer was

not violative of Section 1007.

Nor was the unit weakened by

the int£a-unit transfer of most of the remaining work from one
jj,p,b
unit/to another. What remained, and what in the form of quan-

- 9 tity was taken over by the A-Payroll was de minimus at most in
its effect on the bargaining unit.

And if it was transferred

back to the unit it could neither restore the Garage Clerk's
job, nor cure the damage to the unit which resulted from the
installation of the computer.
Accordingly, what additional quantity of work is now
handled by the A-Payroll personnel as a result of the abolition
of the job of Garage Clerk, is not a violation of Section 1007
of the contract.

Eric/3. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Transport Workers Union of Philadelphia
Local 234 AFL-CIO

and
Philadelphia Transportation Company

Award
of
Arbitrators

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties and dated January 15, 1965, as extended, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
Parties, Award, as follows:
1. There was not just cause for the discharge of
Ronald Brown. He shall be reinstated.
2. He shall receive no back pay from the date he
began working for the Yellow Cab Company to the
date of his reinstatement.
3. He shall receive back pay from the date of his
discharge to the day he commenced work for
Yellow Cab less any money he earned in gainful
employment during that period.

DATED:

September h

1968

Eric/a. Schmertz
Chairman

DATED:

September

1968

Joseph Donate
Concurring in 1,2,3
Dissenting from 1,2,3

DATED:

September

1968

Arthur W. Wilkens
Concurring in 1,2,3
Dissenting from 1,2,3

Case No. 14 30 0303 68

.
In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Transport Workers Union of Philadelphia
Local 234 AFL-CIO
and
Philadelphia Transportation Company

'
t
'
'
t
'
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Opinion
of
Chairman

In accordance with Article II of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated January 15, 1965, as extended, between
Philadelphia Transportation Company, hereinafter referred to
as the "Company," and Transport Workers Union of Philadelphia,
Local 234 AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union,"
the Undersigned was designated as the Chairman of a tripartite
Board of Arbitration to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Ronald
Brown and if not, to what remedy is he entitled?
Messrs. Joseph Donato and Arthur W. Wilkens served respectively as Union and Company designees to said Board of Arbitration.

A hearing was held in the offices of the American Arbi-

tration Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on July 11,
1968 at which time Mr. Brown, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared.
Full opportunity was afforded all concerned to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

Board of Arbitration met in executive session in New York City
on August 28, 1968, following which the hearings were declared
closed.
There is a threshold question concerning the reason or

- 2 reasons for the grievant's discharge.

The Union contends that

it is limited to the charge that the grievant was under the
influence of intoxicants when and while on duty on March 16,
1968.

The Company agrees that it so charged the grievant. But

also, in the alternative, that if he was not under the influence
of intoxicants, he had nonetheless been drinking and his condition was so unsatisfactory as to be violative of Rule 5 of the
Rules for Employees, which, together with his prior disciplinary record (including several suspensions and a gratituitous
reinstatement following a discharge) primarily for poor attendance, constitutes just cause for his discharge in accordance
with the well recognized rule of progressive discipline.
The written notification of the Company's position regarding its termination of the grievant is set forth in a letter
dated March 26, 1968 in reply to the Union's grievance.

Its

text, which I consider significant in resolving the threshold
question, reads in its entirety as follows:
This grievance protests the discharge of operator
R. Brown for being under the influence of intoxicants
and unsatisfactory performance of duties.
While on duty Mr. Brown was contacted by two
supervisory persons who adjudged him to be under the
influence of intoxicants, immediately relieved Him
from duty and returned him to the depot. At the
depot Mr. Brown was observed by his depot superintendent who also determined that he was unfit for work
and therefore was discharged.
The discharge of Mr. Brown was proper and is
hereby sustained.
The Company asserts that the first paragraph of that letter
stating that the grievant was discharged "for being under the
influence of intoxicants and unsatisfactory performance of duties"

- 3 (emphasis added), clearly establishes the alternative positions
of the Company in justification of its action.

Specifically

the Company says that the phrase "unsatisfactory performance
of duties" relates to the grievant's condition on March 16,
1968 if it was something less than "under the influence of
intoxicants" plus his prior disciplinary penalties.
The Union advances a different interpretation.

It con-

tends that the phrase "unsatisfactory performance of duties"
refers solely to the charge that the grievant was under the
influence of intoxicants.

Or in other words, because in the

opinion of the Company the grievant was under the influence
of intoxicants, the performance of his duties on March 16, 1968
was unsatisfactory.

It is the Union's position that the Com-

pany's reliance on Rule 5 together with the grievant's prior
disciplinary history is merely an after thought, upon which
the Company now wishes to rely in the event that it cannot
prove that the grievant was under the influence of intoxicants
that day.

There is no dispute that under Section 202(h) of

the contract, the discharge is automatically sustained if it
be found that the grievant was "under the influence of intoxicants."
For two reasons I conclude that the reason for the grievant's discharge relates solely and exclusively to his physical
condition on March 16, 1968.

I am not satisfied that the

Company, at the time of and as a basis for the discharge, relied upon or incorporated the grievant's prior disciplinary
record.

Nor am I persuaded that the Company discharged him

for any reason other than its belief that he was under the

-

- 4influence of intoxicants that day and because, as a consequence
thereof, he was unable to perform his duties satisfactorily.
My first reason is based on a well established rule of
evidence.
Company.

The burden of proof in a discharge case is on the
In my view not only must the Company prove its

substantive case by clear and convincing evidence, but it must
assume a similar burden in proving its procedural position,
if that be in dispute as well.

Here it is.

The letter of

March 26, 1968 is by no means clear on whether or not there
was an additional reason for the grievant's discharge other
than being under the influence of intoxicants.
agraph of that letter is ambiguous.

The first par-

The phrase "unsatisfact-

ory performance of duties" can just as well relate to the
effect of being under the influence of intoxicants as it can
to a lesser condition from the use of alcohol, coupled with a
prior disciplinary record.

It seems to me that if the Company

intended to rely upon the second reason as well as the first,
it could and should have stated so, explicitly and unequivocally in the letter of March 26.

By not doing so the Company

has left the matter in considerable doubt, and therefore has
not met its burden of showing that there was more than one
reason for the grievant's termination.
Secondly, the balance of the March 26 letter supports the
Union's interpretation of why the grievant was fired.

It re-

cites events that took place only on March 16, stating that
representatives of the Company adjudged the grievant to be
under the influence of intoxicants, and that a depot superintendent (also that night) determined the grievant to be "unfit

- 5 for work and therefore was discharged."

(Emphasis added).

Only one interpretation can be placed on this paragraph. It
is that the grievant was discharged because he was unfit for
work on March 16, 1968 resulting from his condition of being
under the influence of intoxicants.

In my view the second

paragraph which attributes his unfitness for work to the influence of intoxicants, is a more detailed explanation of the
first paragraph.
In short, the relation between his lack of fitness for
work and being under the influence of intoxicants as set
forth in paragraph 2, is the same as and is explanatory of
the relationship between the phrase "under the influence of
intoxicants" and "unsatisfactory performance of duties" in
paragraph 1.
So, the Company could have relied on alternative reasons
for the grievant's discharge, and might well have established
just cause on the basis of the grievant's use of alcohol, but
short of his "being under its influence," when weighed with
his prior disciplinary record.

But I am unable to conclude

that it did so in this case.
The issue then is narrowed to whether on March 16, 1968
the grievant was under the influence of intoxicants.

I am in

full accord with the definition of that condition as advanced
by the Company and as enunciated in several prior arbitration
awards - namely "a sufficient use to impair the faculties,
physical or mental reactions."
However, based on the evidence advanced by the Company,
I am not satisfied that the grievant's condition on March 16,
1968 equalled this definition.

No doubt he had been drinking,

- 6 His breath smelled of alcohol, though not overwhelmingly so.
He admits to some extensive drinking on the day before which
was his day off, and to some beer drinking up to but not beyond 12 noon on March 16, which was 12 hours before he was
scheduled to report to work that day.
drinks closer to his starting hour.

He may have had some

But there is no evidence

in the record to prove that allegation.

The Company speculates

that because it took him about an hour to get from his home to
work, a distance requiring usually only 15 minutes, he must
have stopped off for some drinking.

But this is mere surmise

without any evidence of the fact, and hence fails to meet the
standard of proof required of the Company in such cases.

More-

over, no matter how intolerable and potentially damaging may
be an alcoholic breath on a bus driver (which to my mind is
clearly a disciplinary offense), it does not mean that the
driver is "under the influence of intoxicants," because alcohol
on the breath is not synonymous with "the impairment of the
faculties, physical or mental reactions."

Obviously it de-

pends upon the quantity of alcohol consumed and its physiological effect on the consumer, not whether his breath smells
from alcohol.

Both a small and large amount of alcohol can

produce an alcoholic breath, but the former may not necessarily result in the impairment of the faculties.

So the issue

is further narrowed to whether or not the Company has met
its burden of showing that on March 16, 1968 the grievant's
faculties, physical or mental reactions were impaired„
Based on the evidence I cannot conclude that they were.
No blood test or breathometer test was taken to ascertain the

- 7 quantity of alcohol in the grievant's system.

Though his

clothing was disheveled and his tie missing, his explanation
that it resulted from an altercation with a fellow employee
just prior to reporting for work, is plausible and acceptable.
It is substantially supported by other testimony and not refuted by the Company.

The same is true as an explanation of

his loss of part of the money given him by the dispatcher.
The evidence that his eyes were "glassy" on March 16, as
testified to by supervisory personnel who were sent to observe
him, specially for signs of intoxication, after he drove his
bus from the depot to his starting point, is not determinative
because it was freely conceded that the grievant's eyes were
equally glassy at the arbitration hearing.

And I am satisfied

that he was not under the influence of intoxicants that day.
Also under the careful observation of two supervisory
persons seeking evidence of his intoxication, the grievant
successfully passed certain fundamental tests.

He negotiated

the aisle of the bus without any noticeable staggering or abnormal gait and did as well walking up and down the sidewalk
after he left the bus.

That he was uncharacteristically bois-

terous to the two supervisors in complaining about the unclean
condition of the bus and that he dropped one of his change
coins and made no effort to recover it, is of course suspicious,
But these, to my mind, albeit suspicious, in the face of the
balance of the record are just not enough to prove that he
was under the influence of intoxicants within its established
meaning.
I have no quarrel with the Company's decision to remove

- 8 him from the bus that night.

Certainly if there is any doubt

about a driver's condition or his ability to perform his
duties, the Company must act prudently and not run any risk
which would endanger the riding public.

Therefore if he had

been relieved of his duties that night and deprived of that
day's work and pay, I might well have adjudged the Company's
action reasonable and have upheld that limited action.
that is not what the Company did.

But

Rather, it decided he was

under the influence of intoxicants, and discharged him for
that specific reason.

Though no doubt it was satisfied that

such was the grievant's condition, the evidence upon which its
conclusion was based is just not adequate as proof.

According-

ly the grievant's discharge is reversed and he shall be reinstated.
However, I find reason to deny him full back pay.

Some-

time after his discharge he took a job as a taxi driver with
the Yellow Cab Company.

Though he worked only part time, he

said he could have, on his own initiative, worked full time
in that capacity.

Since cab driving is reasonably related

to bus driving, I believe that the grievant, under the circumstances, had a duty to mitigate the damages to the fullest
extent possible.

I would not require him to take any job,

but cab driving is appropriate for mitigation and I find no
justification for his failure to work full time.

Accordingly,

the grievant shall receive no back pay from the time he began
working for Yellow Cab to the day of his reinstatement.

For

the period from his discharge to the date he began work with
Yellow Cab he shall receive back pay, less any money he earned

- 9 in gainful employment during that period,

Eric I: Schmertz
Chairman

In the Matter of the Arbitration Between
Local 815 International Brotherhood of

Teamsters
Award

and
Polychrome Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated July 15, 1965, as extended, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties,
Awards as follows:
The Company erred when it applied the June 1st
wage rate to the vacation pay of those employees
who took vacations on and after July 1, 1968.
The new and higher wage rate effective July 1,
1968 is the rate at which vacations taken on and
after that date should be paid. Those employees
affected shall be made whole for the difference.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: September
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF

1968

On this
day of September, 1968, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

/
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In the Matter of the Arbitration Between

'

Local 815 International Brotherhood of
Teamsters

'
'
i

and
Polychrome Corporation

'
i

i ',' • f }j '

Opinion

'

In accordance with Paragraph Sixth of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated July 15, 1965, as extended, between
Polychrome Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local 815 International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was
designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue:
Has the Company correctly paid employees for their
vacations for 1968. If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on August 21, 1968 at which time representatives of Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly
as the "parties,"

appeared and were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath

and filed certain post hearing data and statements.
On July 1, 1968 a wage increase went into effect.

The

Union claims that vacations taken on and after July 1 are to
be paid for at the new and higher wage rate which went into
effect on July 1.

The Company claims that all vacations taken

any time during the prescribed vacation period (between June 15
and November 15) are to be paid for at the wage rate that obtained as of June 1 of that year.

- 2 The disagreement of the parties stems from their divergent interpretations of Paragraph Seventh (Vacation) of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, the pertinent parts of which
read:
Employees covered by this Agreement shall be granted
vacations with pay subject to the following terms
and conditions:
(A) Employees who have had continuous employment with the Company shall be granted a
vacation with pay pro-rated in accordance
with scheduled working hours per day as
follows: If on June 1 of the contract year,
an employee
Has been in the employ of the Company
for a period of .... months, but less
than .... year(s) will receive ....
vacation with pay at the then established rate.
The parties disagree as to what the phrase "the then established rate" modifies or refers.

In the Company's view

that phrase, based on the entire reading of the aforesaid provision means the rate in existence on June 1.

It concludes

therefore that a wage increase effective July 1 would not be
applicable to vacation pay for those vacations taken on or
after July 1.

Contrarywise, the Union interprets the phrase

as referring to when the employee receives his vacation entitlement.

And therefore though the Union concedes that vacations

taken before July 1 would be paid at the rate then prevailing,
those vacations taken on or after July 1 should be paid for at
the rate which prevails when the vacation is received; which
in 1968 would be at the higher rate effective on and after
July 1.
Though there is no doubt that June 1st is at least a date

- 3 of eligibility for vacationsj the balance of the critical wording of Paragraph Seventh is manifestly ambiguous.

Logically

and reasonably it is subject to either interpretation advanced
by each party.

Grammatically the phrase "the then established

rate11 could just as well mean the wage rate which coincides
with the date on which an employee takes his vacation as it
could to the date of June 1.

Neither the remaining language

of Paragraph Seventh nor any other clause in the contract
serves to clarify or resolve this ambiguity.
In such event the classical approach is for the Arbitrator
to look to practices of the parties under the ambiguous contract clause for evidence of intent or interpretation.

In

this case the evidence of practice, on the two previous occasions when a similar factual situation presented itself,
supports the Union's position herein.

The record indicates

that in 1965 and in 1962, the only prior years in which wage
increases went into effect on July 1, the Company paid for
vacations taken on and after July 1 at the higher wage rate
which went into effect on that date.

The Company questions

whether two instances constitute a past practice.

Under the

circumstances of this contractual relationship I am persuaded
that they do.

Ordinarily a past practice requires a consistent

and unvaried condition for an extended period of time.

Here

the practice was unvaried because it obtained to the only
possible instances in which the problem arose - namely in the
only years in which the wage rates changed on July 1.

There

were no other occasions and hence no practice to the contrary.
For the same reason, in my judgment, the years 1965 and 1962,

- 4 as the only times at which the similar application of Paragraph Seventh of the contract was required, must per force
constitute a sufficiently extensive period of time to meet
the definition of a past practice.
The Company argues that any practice in 1965 and 1962
contrary to its position in this arbitration was simply a mistake, and should not therefore be binding on or prejudicial
to the Company's case in this arbitration.

I must reject

this argument on well settled grounds of contract interpretation.

Where the contract language is clear, a contrary uni-

lateral practice by one party may be halted by notice and adherence thereafter to the explicit contract terms.

And any

previous contrary practice, if by mistake, would not be prospec tively binding.

But that is not the rule where the con-

tract language is unclear or ambiguous.

In such event the

manner in which the language has been applied will serve as a
basis for its interpretation, and if the Company, as here,
has applied that language consistently in one manner, it may
not later totally avoid the consequence by the claim of mistake.
The Company also argues that the Union's

interpretation

of Paragraph Seventh would lead to a grossly inequitable
application of vacation benefits.

It points out that employees

would receive two different rates of pay for their vacation
depending upon whether the vacations were taken before or
after July 1.

It asserts that Paragraph Seventh should not

be interpreted in a manner which would provide less vacation
money for those taking their vacations in June and more vaca-

- 5 tion money for those receiving their vacations after July 1.
There is no doubt about this result.

But if it is inequitable

it is merely the practice which the Company itself followed
and undertook in 1965 and 1962, and as such is a reflection
of the contract bargain which the parties negotiated in Paragraph Seventh of the contract.

The Arbitrator's task is to

interpret and apply the contract as intended and negotiated
by the parties.

If an inequity results, it is a product of

what the parties themselves bargained.

A change is for nego-

tiation, not for arbitration.
But the Company's interpretation of Paragraph Seventh
gives rise to inequities of similar magnitude.

It would mean

that an employee who took his vacation subsequent to July 1
would receive vacation pay in an amount less than what he
would have earned had he remained at work.

It would mean that

he would not enjoy his basic rate of pay while on vacation.
Consider also the following inequity under the Company's interpretation.

Employees A and B work in the same job classifica-

tion at the same wage rate for the same 12 month period.

Em-

ployee A takes his vacation before July 1 and is paid at the
June 1 prevailing rate.

On and after July 1 he is at work

earning the new and higher wage rate.

Employee B takes his

vacation after July 1, and is paid for it at the rate which
obtained as of June 1.

The mathematical result is obvious.

Because Employee B earned less money during his vacation than
Employee A earned while at work, and because while Employee A
was on vacation, he and Employee B received the same amount of
money, at the end of a full year's employment, Employee A will

- 6 have received gross wages greater than Employee 3. Clearly
therefore, it is just as inequitable for employees similarly
classified at the same wage rate, who work for the same period
of time, to receive different gross amounts of pay, as it is
for employees to be paid for their vacations at the rate of
pay obtaining when the vacation is taken.
The Company points out that it is not uncommon for contracts to provide for vacation pay at rates less than the
wage rate prevailing when the vacation is taken.

I agree.

An example is a calculation based on a percentage or average
earnings of the prior year, which of course may be significantly less than the wage or earnings of the year in which
the vacation is taken.

But in that instance the contract

language is explicit on the point.

It expressly provides for

the method under which vacation pay is to be calculated.

It

makes clear that vacation pay is to be on a basis other than
the wage rate which exists at the time that the vacation is
taken.

In other words, in my experience, when the rate of

vacation pay differs from the rate prevailing at the time that
the vacation occurs, it is so provided by precise and explicit
contract language.

But absent such language the presumption

has been that employees shall enjoy the same basic wage rate
while on vacation as they would earn had they been at work.
And in the case of an ambiguous vacation clause - as is present here - where a clear and explicit exception to the general presumption is not prescribed, that presumption must
prevail.
Accordingly the Company erred when it applied the June 1
wage rate to the vacation pay of those employees who took

- 7 vacations on and after July 1, 1968.

The new and higher wage

rate effective July 1, 1968 is the rate at which vacations
taken on and after that date should be paid.

Those employees

affected shall be made whole for the difference.

Eric Jr. Schmertz
Arbitrator

0'
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 5398, AFL-CIO
Award

and
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated March 31, 1963 as extended, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties,
Awards, as follows:
1. Under the contract language in effect between
the parties, especially Article 8 Section 8
and Article 4 Section 3, the Arbitrator has
no alternative but to rule that the claims set
forth in phases one and two of grievance #67-6
dated March 8, 1967, are not arbitrable.
2. In disposition of the claim in phase three of
the grievance, the Arbitrator finds that the
job scoring submitted by the Company, increasing the "Education" factor from the first degree
to the second degree and reslotting the job of
Grinder-Balancer in Labor Grade 5 is correct.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: May 21, 1968
Case No. 14 30 0758 67

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 5398, AFL-CIO
Opinion

and
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc.

In accordance with the Arbitration Provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated March 31, 1963 as extended, between Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., hereinafter referred
to as the "Company" and United Steelworkers of America, Local
5398, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the
Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute relating to the grievance of Thomas E. Gibson,
#67-6 dated March 8, 1967.
A hearing was held at the Company plant in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania on April 24, 1968 at which time Mr. Gibson, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of
the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," appeared. Full opportunity was afforded all concerned to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses„

The parties expressly waived the

Arbitrator's oath.
The issue, as stipulated by the parties is:
1. Is the grievance as set forth by the Union
arbitrable under the terms of the Agreement
between the Company and the Union?
2. If so what shall be the disposition of
Grievance #67-6 on the merits?
Grievance #67-6 reads:

- 2 REQUEST FOR BACK PAY DUE TO IMPROPER
OF LABOR GRADE
Code #54-243

CLASSIFICATION

Grinder-Balancer

While reviewing my job description, I discovered that
for the Education factor I have been given only one
degree. The fact that my labor grade is 6 implies
more than one degree in this area. Jobs throughout
the plant in lesser grades have as many as 3 degrees
for the Education factor. Given the proper rating
in Education the job automatically falls into Labor
Grade 5. Subsequently, my job has been improperly
classified since the issuance of the original job
description.
This is not a contract violation, but an error on
the part of management, since management issued the
original job description, before the initiation of
the contract itself. Therefore, "the five days
prior grievance procedure for retroactive moneys"
does not apply in this case. The error should be
corrected, the job placed in Labor Grade 5, and the
difference in wages paid retroactive back to 4-6-56,
when this error originated.
Over the past four years there has been a substantial
change in job content, but no change in wage rate. I
believe that this change in content places the job in
Labor Grade 40

Thomas E, Gibson
The foregoing grievance covers three distinct and separate
allegations of contract violations by the Company.

One part of

the grievance, hereinafter referred to "phase one" contends
that the Job Evaluation of Grinder-Balancer was improperly
scored with respect to the "Education" factor, prior to the
signing of the first Collective Bargaining Agreement between
the parties„

The grievant claims that, had the Education

factor been scored in the second degree at that time, instead
of the first degree, his job would have been slotted in Labor
Grade 5.

The Union contends that because of this error the

- 3 grievant is entitled to a retroactive pay adjustment from
April 6, 1956 to the date of the grievance0
Another part of the grievance, hereinafter referred to as
"phase two" concerns itself with general alleged errors in
scoring and changes in job content which the Union claims
occurred or continued after the parties entered a collective
relationship and which the Union traces back to May, 1963.

As

a remedy the Union seeks, on behalf of the grievant, retroactive
pay from the date of the alleged change in job content to the
date of the grievance.
And thirdly, hereinafter referred to as "phase three" the
grievance claims a change in job content of a substantial nature
resulting specifically from the introduction of a StewartWarner Electronic Indicator during 1963, justifying rescoring
the job to Labor Grade 4.
Material to the claims set forth in phases one and two of
the grievance are Article 8, Section 8 and Article 4, Section 3
of the contract.

The provisions of those contract clauses and

the time limits set forth therein are clear and unequivocal. As
part of the Collective Bargaining Agreement they are known to
the parties and need not be recited herein.
With respect to phase one of the grievance, the Company,
through the testimony of the grievant, established that through
successive Collective Agreements, without exception from the
first contract to the current Agreement, no issue was raised
by the Union or the grievant concerning the alleged error in
job scoring.

Further, even though the grievant was a member

- 4of the negotiating committee in 1960 and participated in negotiating changes in other jobs and their labor grades in his
own department he did not call to the Company's attention the
allegations contained in phase one of the instant grievance,
nor did he make the scoring of his particular job an issue in
any of the negotiation periods thereafter.
Procedmrally, the same is true with regard to the claim
in phase two of the grievance.

The record shows that neither

the grievant nor the shop committee in office at the time of
the alleged change in job content, made any attempt to file a
grievance claiming a substantial change in job content, though
the right to do so was clearly a part of the contract then in
effect between the parties.

In short, neither the grievant

nor the Union complied with the clear and explicit time limits
set forth in the contract with regard to filing complaints
over job evaluations and changes in job content.

From the time

that the grievant and the Union learned of the factor evaluations and the changes which they allege, there was full and
adequate opportunity for a grievance to be filed within the
time limits prescribed.

Yet no grievance was initiated with-

in those time limits; but rather long after those limitations
had passed0
Therefore based on the contract language in effect between the parties, especially Article 8 Section 8 and Article
4 Section 3, the Company has established a prima facie case of
the non-arbitrability of the claims set forth in phases one
and two of the grievance.

Based on the record, the Union and

the grievant have not offered evidence which would rebut that

- 5 prima facie case.

Therefore I have no alternative but to rule

that the claims set forth in phases one and two of the grievance are not arbitrable.
In connection with the introduction of the Stewart-Warner
Electronic Indicator, it is the position of the Company that
no substantial change in the job content of the job GrinderBalancer occurred within the meaning of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and therefore the Company was not obligated to
initiate any action or remedy.

Without determining whether a

substantial change in job content took place with the introduction of that machine, I can find no fault with the Company's
theory of its responsibility.

If the Union or grievant, at

that time, deemed that a substantial change in job content had
taken place, either or both had the contractual right to grieve
or request review of the job by the Company, without awaiting
action on the Company's sole initiative.

In view of the

Company's position that no substantial change had occurred, it
was for the Union, rather than for the Company, to raise the
question and place the disagreement in issue.

Therefore the

Company cannot be blamed for any lapse of time in reviewing the
job when the Union had the right during that time to demand a
review or to grieve, but failed to so act.
The evidence demonstrates however, that when the Union
finally asked for a review of the job, the Company complied.
And as a result of that review the Company rescored the job of
Grinder-Balancer from Grade 6 to Grade 5 by increasing the
Education factor from the first degree to the second degree.

- 6 As a consequence the Company made a retroactive adjustment in
the grievant's pay at that time in accordance with the requirements of the Collective Agreement.

Considering that adjust-

ment; the record presented by the parties in this case; my
observation of the job, undertaken at the request and with
representatives of the parties; and the contract provision
that the Company is not required to make an award beyond five
days after the date a grievance is filed; I am satisfied that
the Company's evaluation of the Grinder-Balancer

job was proper

and in accordance with the administrative procedures of the
job evaluation plan provided for by the terms of the Collective
Agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

;
r

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'

American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists, AFL-CIO

'
'
i

and

'
t

Progress Broadcasting Corporation, Inc.
(Radio Station WHOM)

Opinion

'
'

In accordance with Section 8 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated February 27, 1968, between Progress
Broadcasting Corporation, Inc. (Radio Station WHOM), hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and American Federation
of Television and Radio Artists, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred
to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the sole
Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute concerning the propriety of the suspensions of three employees, Hipolito Vega,
Freddie Baez and Rafael Diaz Gutierrez.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on August 23, 1968, at which time Messrs.
Vega, Baez and Gutierrez, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievants," and representatives of the Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared.
Full opportunity was afforded all concerned to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
parties filed post hearing briefs and the hearings were declared closed as of September 4, 19680
The grievants have been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury
on two counts of alleged violations of the "Payola" provisions
of the Federal Communications Act.

At the time of the indict-

ment they held various positions as announcers with the Company.

- 2 There is no dispute over the fact that the indictments relate to allegations of illegal acts committed by the grievants in their employment capacity.
The Company suspended them without pay, pending the
outcome of their trials on the criminal charges.

The pro-

priety of those suspensions is the issue in this arbitration.
I find no violation of the contract.

The grievants were

not discharged, so Section 15 of the contract is not applicable.
Nor am I persuaded that Section 15 ousts the Company from
authority to impose suspensions.

Clearly, that section lim-

its the circumstances under which the penalty of discharge
would lie, but I do not find in it any limitation on the
Company's right to impose lesser penalties, provided, of
course, such lesser action is supported by just cause.
Nor is a suspension improper because it is not disciplinary.

It is well recognized that a suspension may be imposed

where no misconduct is involved or alleged; such as where an
employee for reasons beyond his control loses his competence;
is too ill or disabled to work regularly; or fails to maintain professional credentials for a job- which requires them.
So in this case, the suspension of the grievants cannot be
overturned either under the limitations of Section 15 or merely because the Company deems them non-disciplinary.

What is

crucial is whether the suspensions were for just cause.
I am persuaded that they were.

In so ruling it should

be crystal clear that the grievants1 guilt or innocence of
the criminal charges is not part of this arbitration and no
judgment on that question is either made or to be inferred.

- 3Also, it should be clear that the question of just cause
for discharge under Section 15 of the contract, or the propriety of the suspensions based on the truth of the criminal
charges are also outside the scope of this case, simply because
only the discharge of the grievants or reliance by the Company on their criminal culpability as justification for the
suspension, would place those questions in issue.

Neither

circumstance is present here.
Rather I find that faced with criminal charges against
three of its employees for alleged acts interwoven with their
jobs as announcers, the Company acted reasonably and realistically when it sought to protect its reputation and advertising business without prematurely judging the grievants or
prejudicing their cases in the criminal proceeding.
Only by suspending the grievants could this be accomplished.

For if they were discharged, the substantive as-

pects of the indictment would have to be relied upon to
justify it.

To do so would require the Company to make a

determination of culpability, possibly prejudicial to the
grievants1 defense in the criminal case, and contrary to the
Company's expressed hope that they be found innocent.
To retain the grievants in active employment would have
been manifestly difficult at that time.

The indictments for

alleged payola violations arising not from outside activities,
but from the very jobs on which the grievants would continue
to work, created a demonstrably precarious situation for the
Company.

Though the grievants may be innocent, and are en-

titled to that presumption in the criminal proceeding, it

- 4would be naive to conclude that their effectiveness or usefulness as announcers was not impaired, at least temporarily.
Unfavorable publicity, and a loss of confidence by those who
place commercials with the Company would have assuredly followed as a logical and probable consequence if the grievants were
then retained in their jobs.

Indeed the evidence reveals one

piece of adverse publicity - an elaborate news article reporting the accusations, in the Spanish language press.

(The Com-

pany broadcasts primarily to the Spanish speaking community).
And I do not think that the Company needed to wait for more
unfavorable reactions or a definitive loss of business before
it acted,,

I am persuaded therefore that at the time it was

both manifestly risky to the Company's image and business and
patently inconsistent with normal employment practices to permit the grievants to continue working at the very tasks out of
which the payola charges arose.

The weight of arbitration de-

cisions under similar and relevant circumstances, support this
view.

And I am in agreement.
Imposition of the suspension as a protection was not only

appropriate, but prudent, because it preserved the grievants1
re-employment rights; obviated prejudice which might result
from a discharge on the merits, thereby upholding the presumption of innocence; while at the same time allowing the Company
to protect its legitimate interests and status.

Nor technically,

were the suspensions necessarily of permanent damage to the
grievants either professionally or economically.

If convicted

and discharged, and if practicable, or if discharged under
_ Section 15 of the contract irrespective of the outcome of the

- 5 trials, the grievants could challenge the discharges under
the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract.

If

acquitted, the Company stated they would be reinstated, and
the same I think would have been true if the prosecution was
dropped.

And if upon reinstatement

the Company refused to

grant back pay for the time lost, as was its position at the
time of the hearing, the grievants through the Union, would
have the right to seek back pay by grievance and arbitration,
placing in issue at that time the question of whether the loss
of backpay is a proper consequence of the Company's prerogative to suspend.
All the foregoing relates to the propriety of the Company's action at the time it was taken. However, one most compelling factor arose thereafter, of which I do not think the
Company was aware when it imposed the suspensions, but which
all parties fully recognized at the time of the arbitration
hearing.

It is that because of the congestion of the court

calendar, many months and possibly years will elapse before
the criminal charges against the grievants come to trial. This
factor, albeit beyond the control of the parties, has the
realistic effect of transforming what began as ordinary suspensions into suspensions of such length and magnitude as to
border on constructive discharges.

For during the extended,

and unreasonable period of time while the grievants await
their trial, they will receive no pay; will not practice their
skills; and because of the circumstances will have great difficulty in achieving comparable employment elsewhere.
this without having been adjudged guilty or innocent„

And all
Be-

- 6cause of this factor I have decided to make the strongest
possible recommendation, which if I had the authority to do
so, would be in the form of a directive to the Company. But
I trust that the Company will respond affirmatively to this
recommendation, because I am confident it has a sense of
fair play; and recognizes that my recommendation is based
on fundamental concepts of due process.

My recommendation

is also based on my judgment that much of the heat of the
circumstances, present when the suspensions were imposed, has
now dissipated with the passage of time.

The adverse public-

ity and potential loss of business which were then present,
should, in my view, be minimized or totally obviated if the
grievants are now quietly returned to their jobs,and if the
parties handle the reinstatements with responsibility and
good sense.
Accordingly, with all the persuasive power at my command,
I ask that the Company now reinstate the three grievants to
their former positions.

In fairness to the Company, and in

consideration for its willingness to accept the recommendation,
the reinstatements shall not include back pay.

Clearly, this

recommendation is without prejudice to the right of the Company to terminate the grievants if they are convicted of the
criminal charge.
Unless this recommendation is followed, I am fearful
that the Company's ordinary right to suspend, which I upheld
as proper at the time it was exercised, will be so distorted
by the gross delays in bringing the criminal cases to trial,
that the fundamental concepts of due process and the presumption

- 7of innocence to which the Company itself subscribes, would
be dealt a grievous blow.

Eric 3. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers
Union, Local 42, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America
Award
and
Quincy Market Cold Storage and Warehouse
Company - Gloucester Division

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated June 6, 1966 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The Union's complaint about the rule referred to in the notice to all warehouse
employees dated August 4, 1964 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: October
STATE OF New York

COUNTY OF

1967
) ss.:

)

On this
day of October, 1967, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'
i

Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers
'
Union, Local 42, International Brotherhood1
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
'
and Helpers of America
'
i
and
'
Quincy Market Cold Storage and Warehouse
Company - Gloucester Division

Opinion

'

In accordance with Article XVIII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated June 6, 1966 between Quincy Market
Cold Storage and Warehouse Company, hereinafter referred to
as the "Company," and Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers
Union, Local 42, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was selected as
the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated
issue;
What should be the disposition, under the contract
dated June 6, 1966 between the Company and the Union,
of the dispute with respect to the rule referred to
in the attached notice to all warehouse employees
dated August 4, 1964?
A hearing was held at the Company office in Gloucester,
Massachusetts on September 7, 1967, at which time representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared. Full opportunity was afforded
the parties to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's oath.

The parties expressly waived the

The parties filed post hearing briefs

and the hearings were declared closed on October 13, 1967.
The disputed rule referred to in the foregoing issue

- 2 was promulgated by the Company on August 4, 1964 and posted
as a notice to all warehouse employees.

It read:

August 4, 1964
TO ALL WAREHOUSE EMPLOYEES:
EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY - No warehouse employee
of Quincy Market Cold Storage & Warehouse Company
will be allowed to work on their own time (Saturdays, Sundays, Vacations, etc.) on Quincy Market
property servicing trucks either inbound or outbound, NOR will they be allowed to have any direct
contact with any merchandise as to count that
arrives or leaves these properties by boat.

Rowe Sq. Bulletin Board
Rogers St. Bulletin Board
E. Glou. Bulletin Board
This rule placed a limitation on certain work which
Company employees had been performing in their spare time for
private trucking and stevedoring companies.
The Company is engaged in the operation of four cold
storage warehouses in Gloucester.

Merchandise, primarily

fish and other sea food products, arrives at or leaves these
facilities by trucks owned and operated by private trucking
companies.

Additionally two Company installations, the ware-

houses at Rowe Square and East Gloucester have dock side facilities owned by the Company at which ships arrive to load
and unload merchandise, and the warehouse at Railroad Avenue
adjoins rail

facilities.

Except for palletized loads, which account for only a
small portion of truck shipments to and from the warehouse,
the loading and unloading of trucks at the Company's loading

- 3 platforms, is the responsibility of the private trucking
company, and is performed by the truck driver.

In unloading,

he counts merchandise and brings it to the tail gate of his
truck.

There it is picked up by Company employees who again

count it on behalf of the Company and take it into the warehouse for storage.
ure is followed.

In loading the truck the reverse procedThe Company employees count out the mer-

chandise and deliver it from storage to the tail gate of the
truck.

The driver then counts it on behalf of the trucking

company and loads it into the truck.
To assist him in performing his work on behalf of his
trucking company, the driver often hires a helper known as
a "lumper" or "city man."

Prior to the promulgation of the

rule, Company employees, outside of their hours of regular
employment with the Company, on week-ends, holidays and while
on vacation, often worked as lumpers for and on behalf of the
truck driver.

The rule now prohibits such work.

The merchandise that arrives and departs by ship to and
from the Company docks at the Rowe Square and East Gloucester
facilities is unloaded or loaded by three stevedoring companies „

Lumpers are also employed by the stevedoring com-

panies.

They help move this merchandise from dock side to

trucks and visa versa.

Prior to the promulgation of the

rule, Company employees were permitted to work as lumpers for
this type of work, again during their off hours, on week-ends
and holidays, and during vacations.

The rule permits them

to continue to perform this type of work so long as the mer-

- 4chandise involved is neither delivered to nor unloaded from
any of the Company's installations.

For example, a ship may

arrive with merchandise to be unloaded and placed in a truck;
and then transported to some location other than any of the
Company installations.

In other words, that merchandise is

neither destined for nor taken out of storage from the Company.
The Company has no objection if its employees are hired as
lumpers on that work during their own hours.

Additionally the

rule does not prohibit Company employees, again on their own
time, from driving fork lift trucks on behalf of a stevedoring company to transport merchandise that is delivered to or
removed from a Company installation, so long as the employee
does not count or check the merchandise on behalf of the
stevedoring company.
In short, the rule permits employees to continue as lumpers where counting or checking on behalf of the truck driver
or stevedoring employer is not involved, even if the merchandise
may come from or be destined to a Company installation; and
they may work as lumpers on merchandise not destined for or
removed from the Company's storage.

What they may not do, as

the rule states, is to "servic(e) trucks inbound or outbound
(which requires counting of merchandise) nor ....have any direct
contact with any merchandise as to count that arrives or leaves
',.•>.. by boat." (Emphasis and parenthetical statement added).
The Company justifies the rule on several grounds.

Primar-

ily it claims that the rule is designed to prevent a conflict
of interest.

It points out that a Company employee working

- 5regularly for the Company, and then during his off hours for
a truck driver or stevedore, will in both capacities count
merchandise for both employers.

In the Company's view this

may open the door to collusion between the employee and his
casual employer which may result in a deliberate erroneous
count favorable to the trucking or stevedoring company.

Addi-

tionally, the Company asserts, its employees, anxious to obtain lumping work, may, in their primary employment with the
Company, give preferential and favorable service to those
truck drivers and stevedores who do or will employ them as
lumpers.

This, suggests the Company, leads to customer dis-

satisfaction among the trucking and stevedoring companies
which service the Company installations„

Also the Company

alleges that its employees were reluctant to work overtime
for the Company because they preferred to use those hours
working instead as lumpers, for which they gained greater compensation.

And therefore, prior to the promulgation of the

rule, the Company faced some difficulties in obtaining overtime work from its own employees.

Procedurally, the Company

advances the argument that the Union, through its representatives, accepted the rule when originally discussed and promulgated; and by waiting over three years to file a grievance
(during which time, in 1966, a new contract was negotiated),
accepted or acquiesced in the rule while it was in effect.
The Company concludes that because the Union failed to complain "promptly," as required by the grievance provisions of
the contract, it is now too late.

- 6The Union contends that the rule is unreasonable.

It

asserts that the Company's reasons for putting it into effect
are purely speculative because not a single instance of conflict of interest or an erroneous count can be pointed to in
the nine years before the rule was inaugurated.

It denies

any favorable treatment to or coersion of truck drivers who
offer or fail to offer employment as lumpers.

It argues that

the Company has no right to legislate the manner in which employees spend their own time, and that to deprive them of the
opportunity to work as lumpers during hours and days when they
are not working for the Company, unfairly encroaches on their
right to supplement their incomes.
I am persuaded that both from the standpoint of the
reasonableness of the rule and the Union's right to object,
the principle

of laches is applicable.

The rule was discussed with the then Union stewards in
July 1964, and posted on August 4 of that year.

It is clear

that the rule was discussed by the Union representatives with
the employees, and that the posted notice came to the attention
of the employees.

It is equally clear that the employees work-

ed under and in accordance with the restrictions set forth in
the rule from the time it was promulgated to the present. Indeed, on at least two occasions, the work of an employee inconsistent with the rule, ceased or was stopped forthwith.

So

it is manifest that the Union and the employees knew of and
understood the rule and worked in accordance with it without
formal objection until the instant grievance was filed in
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Though some employees complained, neither they

nor the then stewards, nor the Business Agent, filed a grievance during the almost three years from the inception of the
rule.

And in 1966 a new Collective Bargaining Agreement was

negotiated between the parties and still no complaint or objection to the rule was raised by the Union.

To my mind this

is a pattern of acceptance or at least acquiescence.
I cannot accept the Union's assertion that its stewards
lacked the authority to file a grievance.

The contract clear-

ly vests the stewards with the power to settle disputes.

Ob-

viously, in order to settle a dispute a steward must first
object to an existing condition.
the right to grieve.

His right to object means

That they did not in the instant case

leads to only one conclusion, and the evidence presented
supports that conclusion.

It is that though a few employees

grumbled about the rule, the majority did not, and the Union
officials found nothing unreasonable or onerous about it.
And even on the assumption that the stewards lacked the authority to grieve, they certainly could and should have made
known any substantial complaints to the Union's Business Agent,
who undisputedly had the authority to grieve formally.

It

appears that this was done, but that the Business Agent chose
not to contest the Company's action.

Either way however,

whether the Business Agent was so apprised or whether the
stewards and the employees neglected to so notify him, the
result is the same - an acceptance or tolerance by the employees and the Union representatives, without formal objection, of the rule for almost three years.

Certainly if the

- 8 rule represented a serious problem to the employees and the
Union it would have become an issue in the 1966 contract negotiations.

That it did not, and indeed was never raised dur-

ing those negotiations, suggests that the rule and its effect
was at most of minor significance or consequence.
It is well settled in industrial relations that disputes
should be resolved expeditiously.

Indeed the grievance pro-

cedure of this contract directs the prompt settlement of disputes.

The purpose is obvious; matters should be disposed

of while they are fresh, before they fester and become exaggerated out of proper proportion, and before memories and
evidence fade.

When a complaining party delays his complaint

for an extended period of time he lulls the other side into
believing that the situation is acceptable. For him to delay
too long is to estop his right to complain.
here.

Such is the case

The Union should have complained promptly, or at least

by no later than the 1966 contract negotiation.

When it did

not, especially after the execution of the 1966 contract, the
Company had every right to believe that the rule was accepted
if not totally acceptable.

And because of the inordinate de-

lay of almost three years, it would be unfair to the Company
to permit the Union to now object.
To my mind, the delay by the Union is also indicative of
the reasonableness of the rule.

For if the rule was grossly

unfair, or a serious burden to the employees, or an onerous
encroachment on their rights as individuals outside of their
employment by this Company, I am sure that a strenuous objection by the employees and the Union would have been formally

- 9 entered soon after the rule was inaugurated.
Based on the evidence before me I am persuaded that the
rule is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
abolish all lumping work.

It does not

It permits the employees to con-

tinue working as lumpers on merchandise where counting and
checking are not involved.

So it only cuts into a portion of

the lumping work performed prior to August 1964.

Based on

the evidence presented by the Union it has not been established that those employees who did the lumping work have suffered any real diminution in outside earnings.

In fact the evi-

dence indicates that they are earning as much now as lumpers
as they did before the restrictions were imposed.

Moreover,

it is well settled that an employer may promulgate a rule
designed to avoid a conflict of interest even before an act
of conflict of interest has been committed.

For example, an

employer need not wait until a theft, a disclosure of a trade
secret, or a sale of a competitor's product has been engaged
in by one of his employees before he can promulgate a rule
prohibiting such conduct.

Rather, he may do so on a preven-

tive basis, if the circumstances suggest the realistic possibility of such a problem.
I find the instant set of circumstances analagous. Clearly a conflict of interest between the trucking concern and
the Company could arise in connection with the quantity or
type of merchandise delivered to or taken from the warehouse.
For an employee to serve in a dual capacity, first checking
the goods for the Company and then later in the day checking
the goods out for a trucking concern, may well open the door

- 10 to temptation and a conflict of interest.

That this has not

yet occurred is immaterial; because the possibility of its
occurrence is not far fetched.

And I find nothing unreason-

able about the Company acting to protect itself.

The same

is true in connection with Company employees favoring or ignoring truck drivers who, respectively, hire or fail to hire
Company employees as lumpers.

And the Company's position with

regard to overtime, sustained by one evidentiary example that
stands unrebutted by the Union, is equally logical and justified.
But what about the right of an individual to engage in
any work of his choosing during his own free hours?
to this question is also well settled.

The answer

So long as the outside

work does not conflict with, or directly or adversely affect
the primary employer, aniiemployee is generally permitted to
use his free time as he wishes.
exceptions.

But this case involves the

The disputed rule restricts the employee's free

time only when he uses it in a manner which may reasonably
conflict with the security or interest of the Company.

In-

deed the direct connection between the proscribed work and
the Company's business could not be more obvious.

The work

proscribed by the rule takes place on the Company's properties,
and involves merchandise going into and coming out of the
Company's warehouses.

Hence the rule conforms to those well

settled circumstances under which an employer may restrict the
outside activities of his employees.
For all the foregoing reasons the Union's complaint
about the rule referred to in the notice to all warehouse

- 11 employees dated August 4, 1964 is denied,

Eric/j. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, Local 103, AFL-CIO
and

'
i
'
'
i
'
1

Award

Radio Corporation of America

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated June 19, 1964 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the Parties, Awards as follows:
The Company, which has the burden of doing so, has
not established to my satisfaction that the grievant committed the offense charged. Therefore it is
immaterial whether the grievant has convinced me of
his innocense. Accordingly, I am unable to conclude
that the grievant engaged in gambling on Company
premises in violation of a Company rule. Therefore,
Mr. Mealo shall be reinstated with full seniority
and back pay less his earnings in gainful employment,
if any, during the period since his discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: March
1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss .
)

On this
day of March, 1968, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 14 30 0281 67

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, Local 103, AFL-CIO

and

Opinion

Radio Corporation of America

In accordance with Article 8 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement dated June 19, 1964 between Radio Corporation of
America, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local
103, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the
Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Was the discharge of John Mealo for just
cause? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the office of the American Arbitration Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on Wednesday,
January 10, 1968 at which time Mr. Mealo, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Union and
Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties,"
appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded all concerned to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses
The Company filed a post hearing brief and the hearings were
declared closed on February 12, 1968.
To ferret out suspected gambling on numbers within the
plant, the Company placed a New Jersey State police officer,
Investigator Thomas B. Gallagher, as an undercover agent within the plant, posing as an employee.

As a result the grievant

was arrested and charged with the crime of conducting a lottery

- 2in violation of the laws of New Jersey and discharged by the
Company for violation of a Company rule prohibiting gambling
on the premises.

A trial on the criminal charge resulted in

the grievant's acquittal.

The propriety of his discharge is

the subject of this arbitration„
There is no dispute between the parties about the need
or reasonableness
in the plant.

of the Company's rule against gambling with-

Indeed it is well settled that because of ob-

vious damaging effects, this Company, as any, has the right
to protect itself against such practices on its property. What
is in dispute is whether the grievant committed the offense
charged, and if so whether the extreme penalty of discharge
was warranted.

Of course the latter question need not be

answered unless the grievant's guilt is established.
In my view the nature of the issue in this case necessarily involves the standards of proof in the arbitration of disciplinary disputes.

The parties recognize, I am sure, that

this arbitration is not a criminal proceeding.

Hence the

grievant's acquittal of the criminal charge is not res adjudicata to this proceeding.

And because the outcome of this

arbitration may involve the grievant's job, but not his liberty, it cannot be argued that the arbitration places him in
technical double jeopardy.

In this, and in other similar cases

before me, I have studied the standards of proof required by
arbitrators and I am satisfied that there is no universally
accepted rule.

Some arbitrators, who view the penalty of dis-

charge as "industrial capital punishment" require the employer
to establish the employee's culpability, for which he was dis-

- 3 charged, "beyond a reasonable doubt," the standard required
in criminal matters.

Others, making a distinction between

prosecution for a crime and just cause for discharge, make
their determination on a less demanding standard, such as "a
preponderance of credible evidence."
tor is among them, are more pragmatic„

Others, and this ArbitraIf discharge is a

proper penalty for the offense, they will uphold that penalty
if they have been persuaded, by clear and convincing evidence
that the employee committed that offense.

However, in reaching

a judgment on an employee's culpability, this Arbitrator,
quite frankly, considers the nature of the offense.

Clearly,

certain acts, for which discharge is proper, are less serious
than others, for which the same penalty may be imposed.

For

example, a discharge for inability to perform satisfactory
work; or for excessive absenteeism and tardiness; or even for
insubordination, fighting or intoxication is not as socially
condemning as a discharge for an offense that parallels a
crime, such as theft or gambling.

While in the latter situation

the discharge, if upheld, does not result in a criminal penalty to the employee, it does stigmatize him in a manner seriously prejudicial to his future employability.
Therefore, though this Arbitrator does not require that
an employer meet his burden of proof in discharge cases "beyond
a reasonable doubt," he thinks that the evidence advanced in
cases where the charge, if upheld, may be construed by the public and especially by other potential employers, as criminal
in nature, ought to approximate that result.

It should be

manifestly clear and convincing, leaving no plausible room for

- 4 a different conclusion.
It seems to me that this requirement is especially fair
in cases where, as here, the Company has employed police
officers as undercover agents to gather evidence against employees to be used for both purposes - a criminal charge and
discharge.

I do not quarrel with the Company's right to use

undercover agents in this manner.

But the exercise of that

right, especially because it is unknown to the employees under
surveillance, requires that the employees be protected by the
traditional safeguards of due process.

In other words if the

undercover police officer is collecting evidence of a crime,
and that evidence is also made available to the Company for
purposes of disciplining an employee, the standard to be met
in deciding whether an employee committed the act for which
discipline was imposed should come very close to the standard
which the state must meet in proving his guilt of the crime.
It is in this regard that I consider the Company's case
against the grievant to be faulty.

Its case is based on the

observations and testimony of Investigator Gallagher.

As a

police officer, serving as an undercover agent and working in
the classification of stock boy, Gallagher stated that he saw
the grievant accept money from three employees and make written
notations on a card which he carried in his shirt pocket.

He

testified that he overheard one of the employees tell the
grievant to play a certain number.

Thereafter Gallagher, to-

gether with other police officers and a Company security officer,
armed with a search warrant, conducted a "raid" and found certain cards and slips with number notations thereon, in the
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This is the extent of the evidence ob-

tained by Gallagher and the police against the grievant.
Considering that either in a criminal prosecution or in
a disciplinary case it is not for the accused or the grievant
to go forward to show his innocense, but rather that the burden is on the accuser to prove the guilt, I am surprised at
the inconclusive nature of the evidence obtained.
There is nothing in the record to show that unless the
authorities moved quickly, the evidence of the alleged misconduct would have disappeared. Indeed, because of the type
of offense with which the grievant was to be charged, I see
no reason why a more thorough, more conclusive, and less
questionable investigation could not have been maintained.
Mr. Gallagher conceded that he did not see what the grievant
wrote on the card after receiving money from the three employees.

He did not attempt to place a bet himself„

So far

as the record in this case is concerned, he neither interrogated nor obtained a statement from those three employees or
any other employee which would incriminate the grievant.

He

offered no evidence which would connect the bet cards found
in the grievant's tool box with the money handed to the grievant by the three employees.

His statement that one employee

asked that the money be placed on a specific number, is denied
by the grievant, and not corroborated by any other testimony
or evidence.
This is not to say that the grievant's explanations are
believed.

Rather it is to say that the evidence obtained by

Gallagher, and his testimony, are not sufficiently conclusive

- 6 as to render the grievant's story impossible or even improbable.
The Company suggests that if the grievant is to be believed, he or the Union on his behalf, should have offered
testimony by other employees in support of the grievant's
claim that the money he received from them was repayment of
loans or as contributions

to various plant-wide collections.

And that he should have produced the cards on which he kept
those records.

No doubt if the grievant or the Union on his

behalf had done so, it would have added considerable support
to the grievant's defense.

The point however, is that the

grievant need not meet the burden of attempting to establish
his innocense, unless the Company has first met its burden of
showing his guilt„

It seems to me that rather than require

the grievant to prove all the elements of his defense with
testimony by employees that they did not place bets with him,
it was for the Company to introduce evidence showing not just
that other employees gave the grievant money, but that they
did so for that proscribed purpose.
I believe that Mr. Gallagher's investigation, upon which
the Company relies, should have included a good deal more information or evidence from or about those employees which would
implicate the grievant in a betting scheme.
The inclusiveness of the Company's case obtains also to
the betting cards or slips found in the grievant's tool box.
He concedes they are records of bets but asserts that they are
bets that he alone made outside the plant over an extended
period of time and not a record of bets placed with him by
other employees.

- 7 Again though I am by no means convinced of the veracity
of his story, I cannot conclude, based on what has been presented by the Company, that it is wholly implausible or improbable.

Again, though the grievant has not convinced me of

his innocense - it is not his burden to do so -, the Company
has not convinced me of his guilt.
The Company suggests that because the grievant admittedly lied at the third Step of the grievance procedure when he
first claimed that the bet cards found in his tool box were
planted there as a frame-up - only to admit later that they
were his, I should not believe his testimony in this arbitration.

It seems to me the Company asks again that the case

turn on whether the grievant has established his innocense by
telling the truth, rather than on whether the Company has proved its case against him.

I have indicated that the grievant's

defense does not convince me of his innocense.
guilty.

He may well be

But his guilt cannot be determined by any failure on

his part to prove his innocense.

Rather it must be shown by

the evidence offered by the Company in support of its assertion that he engaged in gambling within the plant.

The Com-

pany's case could and should have been better, especially
with its use of a trained undercover agent.

Based on the

standard of proof previously referred to, which I consider
warranted in cases where the offense charged parallels a
crime, the Company's case falls short of resolving significant
doubts in my mind about the grievant's guilt, even if his own
explanation has not convinced me of his innocense.

In that

circumstance, absent a clear and convincing case in support

- 8of the Company's position, I am unable to uphold the grievant's discharge no matter what might be my personal predilections regarding his defense.

And if the discharge cannot be

upheld, the grievant's return to work must be ordered.

Also

even if, based on those predilections, I felt that substantial
justice would be better served if the grievant's reinstatement was directed without making him whole for the time lost,
there is neither basis in the record, nor in the contract,
nor in the general law of arbitration for me to so act.
Accordingly, Mr. Mealo shall be reinstated with full
seniority and back pay less his earnings in gainful employment
since the period of his discharge.

Eric 4. Schmertz
Arbitrator

NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'

Local 8-190, Oil, Chemical & Atomic
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO

'
'
r

and

'
i

Reichhold Chemicals, Incorporated

Award

!

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated May 1, 1967 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The discharge of Robert Foreman is reduced to a
disciplinary suspension to run from the date of
his discharge to the date of his reinstatement.
Therefore, he shall be reinstated with full seniority but without back pay.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November
1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss .
)

On this
day of November, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case #68-88
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In the Matter of the Arbitration between
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Local 8-190, Oil, Chemical & Atomic
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO

'
'
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and
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Reichhold Chemicals, Incorporated
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In accordance with Article IV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated May 1, 1967 between Reichhold Chemicals,
Incorporated, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and
Local 8-190, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the
Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue;
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Robert Foreman? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New Jersey State
Board of Mediation on November 12, 1968, at which time Mr.
Foreman, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred
to jointly as the "parties," appeared,,

Full opportunity was

afforded all concerned to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly

waived the Arbitrator's oath.
The grievant was discharged for leaving the plant during
scheduled working hours without approval of his supervisor.
The

Company charges that this was in violation of Plant Rules

3, 4, 5 and 12 and certain posted bulletins reiterating one
or more of those rules.

Also the Company contends that the

grievant1s act followed at least one oral warning to him on
the subject.

- 2 Specifically, on Friday, August 23, 1968, the grievant,
who was working as a Utility Man in the back of the plant,
went across the street to a tavern and had a sandwich and a
beer.

The supervisor, unable to find him in the plant at that

time, sent the Union Shop Steward to look for him, and he was
found in the tavern.

Upon his return to the plant he was dis-

charged forthwith.
I find that the grievant violated Plant Rule 3 which
reads:
"No employee shall leave the plant without punching out his time card"
and the pertinent part of Rule 4 which provides:
"No employee shall leave the plant during his scheduled working hours without approval of his supervisor . . . . "
There is no factual dispute that the grievant went to
the bar during regular working hours and did so without punching his time card or obtaining the approval of his supervisor.
I am not convinced, however, that he violated Rule 5 or
Rule 12 within their meaning and intent.

I do not find that

the action was a "deliberate falsification of his time card,"
or any other record, within the meaning of Rule 5.

Nor was

he "inattentive to the duties and responsibilities of his job,"
again within the scope of that language in Rule 12, simply because the period of time involved was during the regular coffee
break, when he would ordinarily be allowed to relax and turn
his attention away from his job duties for a few minutes„
I am persuaded that violations of Rules 3 and 4 may be
grounds for summary discharge.

Clearly, employees should not

- 3be led to believe that they can violate Rules 3 and 4, once
or perhaps twice with only a penalty of a warning or suspension, before they would be subject to discharge.

Such viola-

tions involve deliberate misconduct and need not be tolerated
once and then possibly again before the discharge penalty
can be imposed.

This is true of course, where such rules

are reasonably related to the nature of the jobs involved;
are disseminated to the employees or posted so that they come
to the employee's attention; are uniformly and even-handedly
applied to all the employees similarly situated.

In the in-

stant case, these tests appear to have been met0
However, though I find that the grievant not only breached Rules 3 and 4, and that by his own admission knew he did
so, there are certain extenuating or mitigating circumstances,
peculiar to this situation which lead me to conclude that a
disciplinary penalty less than discharge is appropriate in
this case.
The grievant did not leave the plant during a period of
time when he would be actively at work.
break.

He left during a coffee

I have no doubt that he went to the tavern because

there he could obtain an alcoholic drink.

But the Company dis-

charged him not for drinking beer during working hours, but
only because he left the plant without authorization.

There

is no evidence that his departure to or period of time in the
tavern substantially exceeded the normal coffee break.

Also

there is evidence, unrefuted by the Company, that the grievant
did this on a fairly regular basis, and with the approval or
knowledge of an employee with some apparent supervisory author-

- 4ity, albeit not his supervisor.

The grievant worked with a

Mr. Alfano who generally instructed the grievant on the work
to be performed„

At times Alfano telephoned the grievant at

home and referred to himself as the grievant's "boss," in leaving messages with the grievant1s wife.

The grievant testified

that Alfano knew and approved of his visits to the tavern on
prior occasions for the purpose of obtaining food and coffee
for both of them.

The Company did not offer the testimony of

Mr. Alfano in refutation.
For these reasons, together with the fact that the grievant 's personnel record is completely devoid of any written
warnings or prior disciplinary actions, I have decided to reduce the discharge to a disciplinary suspension to run from the
date of the discharge to the date of his reinstatement.
Let it be clear, however, to the grievant and to all other
employees, that future violations of Plant Rules 3 and 4
(without necessarily excluding violations of any other plant
rules) may subject them to summary dismissal. And the grievant is especially warned that any further misconduct on his
part, of whatever type, may well constitute grounds for his
discharge.

Eric/T. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
United Steelworkers of America
Local 4559, AFL-CIO
and
Rex Chainbelt, Inc., Worcester
The Roller Chain Division

Plant of

'
i
'
'
i
'
i
'
'

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated May 1, 1965 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
1. The Company did not violate the contract when
it agreed with the postal department and implemented that agreement that the postal department would pick up parcel post and mail
each day at the Company plant.
2, The Company did not violate the contract when
it assigned inner or intra-plant trucking of
parcel post and mail to John Olson.

Eric f. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February / 1968
STATE OF New York/
COUNTY OF

)ss. :

On this / day of February, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 1130-0214-67

!

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'

United Steelworkers of America
Local 4559, AFL-CIO

'
'

and
Rex Chainbelt, Inc., Worcester Plant of
The Roller Chain Division

'
i

Opinion

'
'

In accordance with Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated May 1, 1965 between Rex Chainbelt, Inc.,
Worcester Plant of the Roller Chain Division, hereinafter
referred to as the "Company," and United Steelworkers of
America, Local 4559, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issues:
1. Did the Company violate the contract when it
agreed with the postal department and implemented that agreement, that the postal department would pick up the parcel post and the
mail each day at the Company's plant? If so,
what should be the remedy?
2. Did the Company violate the contract when it
assigned certain inner or intra-plant trucking
activities to employee John Olson, these activities being the moving of certain parcel
post from the shipping room in the shipping
department and certain mail from the mail room
in the office to an area in the office vestibule? If so, what should be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Worcester, Massachusetts on November 15, 1967 at which time representatives of the Union and
Company, hereinafter referred to collectively as the "parties,"
appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded the parties to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.

- 2 I am satisfied that the Company's arrangement with the
United States Post Office is "sub-contracting" within the
meaning and intent of Article I Section 6(b) of the contract.
In my judgment that section relates to the performance of
work normally assigned to the bargaining unit, by persons,
groups or organizations outside of the bargaining unit.

I

am not persuaded that a sub-contracting arrangement need
necessarily be evidenced or supported by a written sub-contract and/or a consideration flowing from the Company to the
party performing the work.

Hence, because the pick up of the

mail by the Post Office at the Company plant, (instead, as
had been the practice, of having a bargaining unit employee
truck the mail and parcel post from the plant to the Post
Office) is the assignment to a non-bargaining unit organization of work previously within the bargaining unit's jurisdiction, I equate it with a "sub-contract" as that word is
used in Article I Section 6(b) of the contract.
In my prior decision, Case L 41595 BOS L-35-64, I interpreted the manner in which I thought Article I Section 6(b)
should be applied.

So I need not repeat that analysis here.

In that case I sustained the Company's right to sub-contract
even though certain bargaining unit employees were not working a full week.

In the instant case and for the same reasons,

I sustain the Company's discretionary right to arrange with
the postal department the delivery of mail from the plant to
the Post Office.

In this present matter, so far as the record

shows, all bargaining unit employees were working a full week,

- 3 and the arrangements with the Post Office did not reduce
anyone's employment to less than a full week.

I stated in

the prior case that I would overturn a sub-contract arrangement if it was an abuse of the Company's authority.

I did

not find an abuse in that case nor do I find an abuse in the
instant case.
The Company's reason for entering into the arrangement
with the postal service was bona fide.

It was designed to

and in fact did, reduce the Company's overtime cost by $1600.
It did not adversely affect the regular work week of any of
the bargaining unit employees.

No one suffered a diminution

in regular hours; nor was anyone laid off; nor was any employee's recall from layoff impeded as a result.

Accordingly,

I am satisfied that the Company had a legitimate reason for
making an arrangement with the postal service and that it
had good reason to deem the arrangement advisable.

And I find

nothing in the record which would support a view that the
Company took the action to punish bargaining unit employees
or that its action was an abuse of its managerial prerogative.
Having sustained the arrangement with the Post Office,
I find no reason not to sustain the natural consequences of
that arrangement.

When the grievant, Richard E. Hutchinson,

together with his regular duties as a truck driver delivered
the mail and parcel post to the Post Office, he did so on an
overtime basis.

The agreement with the Post Office made the

overtime work by the grievant unnecessary, because the postal
service picked up the mail at the plant.

As there is no

contractual guarantee of overtime work, I find no violation

- 4of the grievant's rights by the elimination of that work,
despite the fact that he had worked the overtime for several
years.
The Company's arrangement with the Post Office had
another normal consequence.

Because the mail was picked up

by the postal service at the plant between 5 and 5:15 each
afternoon, the collection of the mail and parcel post within
the plant and its assemblage at one location for pick up by
the postal service could be achieved on the shift during
which that pick up time fell.

In other words, because there

was no longer a need to transport the mail to the Post Office,
the intra-plant collection of the mail could be put off until
between 4:30 and 5 P.M.

(There is no dispute that it took

about 15 minutes to complete.)

Consequently, the Company

shifted the task of collecting the mail and parcel post from
the grievant who worked the first shift to Mr. Olson who worked the second.

Neither the grievant's job classification as

a truck driver-outside, nor that of Olson as a welder, with
intra-plant trucking duties, makes mention of the collection
of mail and parcel post within the plant.

Though the grievant

did it for a number of years, I find that the natural result
of the Company's right to arrange pick up of the mail by the
postal service, which divested the grievant of his overtime
work, makes also proper a re-arrangement of the 15 minute
assignment of mail collection within the plant.
As a practical matter, having upheld the Company's right
to arrange pick up of the mail by the Post Office, and its

- 5right to terminate the overtime work of the grievant, the
balance of the grievant's previous assignment to collect mail
within the plant, on a straight time basis, becomes essentially de minimus.

And since the grievant continued in full em-

ployment, without loss of straight time hours or wages, the
transfer of the remaining task to collect the mail and parcel
post within the plant to Mr. Olson on the second shift was
not only a logical consequence of the new arrangement with
the Post Office, but in no way prejudiced the grievant.
In short, absent a specific reference in the grievant's
job description to the collection of mail within the plant,
his practice of having done so is overturned by the consequences which flowed from the Company's proper arrangement
with the Post Office and by the proper elimination of the
grievant's overtime work of delivering mail from the plant
to the Post Office.

EricXJ. Schmertz7
Arbitrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Building Service Employees International
Union, Local 32B, AFL-CIO
and

Award

Rockefeller Center, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated January 1, 1966, as extended,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties,
Awards as follows;
Retroactive to January 1, 1968, the weekly wage
of Tour Guides shall be increased by $7.00 and
the weekly wage of the Ticket Sales Clerks shall
be increased by $12.00. The minimum wages for
these classifications shall be increased by the
same amount.
The Union's demands for a uniform allowance; a
regular work week Monday through Friday; and
premium pay for work performed on Saturdays and
Sundays, are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:

April

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

1968
)ss.:
)

On this
day of April, 1968, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

I

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Building Service Employees International
Union, Local 32B, AFL-CIO
and
Rockefeller Center, Inc.

'
»
'
'
i
'
i
'
i

Opinion

In accordance with Paragraph 23 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated January 1, 1966, as extended, between
Rockefeller Center, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the
"Employer," and Building Service Employees International Union,
Local 32B, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union,"
the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide certain disputes between the Employer and Union, arising
out of Paragraph 24 (Reopenings) of the contract.
A hearing was held at the office of the American Arbitration Association on April 11, 1968 at which time representatives
of the Union and Employer, hereinafter referred to jointly as
the "parties," appeared. Full opportunity was afforded the
parties to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's

oath.
The demands of the Union, which the parties were unable to
resolve in direct negotiations under the Reopening provision
of the contract, relate to wages, uniform allowance and premium pay.

These demands are on behalf of the Tour Guides and

the Ticket Sales Clerks (Cashiers) employed on a full time basis
by the Employer.

Specifically the Union seeks an $18.00 a

- 2 week wage increase for the Ticket Sales Clerks and $12.CO a
week wage increase for the Tour Guides.

No matter what wage

increase is ultimately granted, the Union asks that the wage
scale for the two classifications be equalized.

The Union

also seeks a monetary uniform allowance to compensate the employees in both classifications for certain apparel which they
purchase at their own expense.

And finally, the Union seeks

a regular work week of Monday through Friday with pay at the
rate of time and one half for work performed on Saturdays and
Sundays0
There is no dispute between the parties, and Paragraph 24
of the contract so provides, that any changes in wages and
terms and conditions negotiated under Paragraph 24 or determined by arbitration shall be effective retroactive to January 1,
1968.
Wages
I am in agreement with the Union's argument that the wage
scale paid by this Employer to the employees involved should
be comparable with that paid similar employees at Lincoln Center.
Though the Employer and Lincoln Center are separate entities,
the similarities between the two and the mutuality of identity
cannot be overlooked.

Both are leading institutions of enter-

tainment and culture; directed and supported, in part at least,
by those with a community of interest; and both have maintained commendable conditions of employment for their employees
for which, quite justifiably, both have enjoyed a highly favorable reputation.

- 3 In short, though there are some significant differences
between the two institutions, the similarities and the identification of one with the other are such as to make wholly
incongruous marked differences in pay rates between employees
of one as compared to those similarly situated at the other.
I am persuaded that a comparison between the Tour Guides and
Sales Clerks at the Employer with those performing similar work
at Lincoln Center is much more relevant to this proceeding than
a comparison between the former and other institutions cited
at the arbitration hearing by the Employer.
Recently the management of Lincoln Center increased the
weekly pay of its Tour Guides to an average of $100,00 and
those selling tickets to $120.00.

The Guides and Sales Clerks

at the Employer receive $93.00 and $88.00 a week respectively.
Critical, however, is the question of whether the Tour
guides and those selling tour tickets at both institutions perform similar work justifying equal pay.

Based on the record I

am persuaded that there is a similarity of job duties between
the Tour Guides but not between the Sales Clerks.

The Guides

at both institutions carry out essentially the same service.
They guide visitors through the buildings on informational
tours.

Therefore, I think it fair and proper that the weekly

wage of the Tour Guides of the Employer be increased by $7.00
to bring it to the level of what is being paid, on the average,
to the Tour Guides at Lincoln Center.
However, the work performed by the Sales Clerks at Lincoln
Center goes significantly beyond that performed by those at
the Employer.

Whereas at Lincoln Center those employees are

- 4qualified, by former experience, as Tour Guides, and can fill
in in that classification when needed, such is not the case
at the Employer.

Sales Clerks at the latter institution are

neither experienced nor qualified as Tour Guides and hence do
not possess the flexibility and interchangeability of those
at Lincoln Center.

Moreover, and most significant, the per-

sonnel at Lincoln Center perform, as an important and integral
part of their job, certain duties as dispatchers - a task not
at all performed by the Sales Clerks at the Employer„
For these reasons I do not find a similarity of work between the Sales Clerks at the Employer and those who, among
other duties, sell tour tickets at Lincoln Center.

And there

is no basis, therefore, for an equal weekly wage.
However, I am impressed with the Union's argument that
the wage of the Ticket Sales Clerks at the Employer should be
equalized with what the Employer will be paying the Tour
Guides.

While the duties of the two classifications differ, it

appears to me that both have an equal degree of responsibility.
The Sales Clerk sells a variety of tour tickets; handles money;
and meets and deals with the general public with the same
frequency as does the Tour Guide.

Moreover the record indicates

that the Sales Clerks' duties and responsibilities have grown
over the years.

It seems to me that each plays a comparable,

albeit different, role in servicing the large volume of visitors
who tour the Employer's buildings.

These factors, in my judg-

ment, weigh conclusively in favor of equalizing the pay between these two classifications.

Accordingly, I deem it fair

and equitable that the weekly pay of the Ticket Sales Clerks

- 5 be increased by $12.00 to accomplish this end.
Therefore, retroactive to January 1, 1968, the weekly
wage of Tour Guides shall be increased by $7.00 and the weekly
wage of the Ticket Sales Clerks shall be increased by $12.00.
The minimum wages for these classifications shall be increased
by the same amount.
Uniform Allowance
I conclude that the Union's demands for a monetary uniform
allowance is moot.

The additional blouse(s) purchased by the

Employee at her own expense will shortly be replaced by a new
type uniform paid for by the Employer.

So this expense will

be discontinued and a monetary allowance to cover it is therefore unwarranted.

Also the type of shoes which the employees

will wear while on the job will be identical with a regular
lady's shoe, commonly found in any lady's wardrobe.

Hence it

may be used by the employees both off and on the job, and I
do not find it either unreasonable or unduly burdensome to
require, during the life of this contract, that the employees
continue to buy those shoes.

Accordingly, the Union's demand

for a monetary uniform allowance is denied.
Premium Pay and Work Week
I cannot find merit to the Union's assertion that the Tour
Guides and Ticket Sales Clerks should work a regular work week
of Monday through Friday.

Manifestly, the nature of the work

performed, namely guiding visitors through the buildings and
selling tickets for that and for other types of tours, is a
seven day a week undertaking.

Clearly, as much if not more

- 6 of this work must be performed on week-ends as on week-days. The
service relates to an entertainment attraction, and the general
public looks forward to it as much on week-ends as on weekdays.

Therefore, though the employees are entitled to a work

week of five consecutive days those days cannot be confined
to the period Monday through Friday.

Premium pay for work on

Saturdays and Sundays is granted when the normal operations of
an employer are generally closed down on those days.
week-end work is unusual and generally unexpected.
the case here.

So that

That is not

It is both usual, expected and indeed necessary

that tickets be sold and tours undertaken on Saturdays and
Sundays as on any other day.

Consequently I consider it both

unrealistic, economically unsound and an unwarranted variation
from a condition of employment known and made known to the employees when hired, to limit the regular work week to Monday
through Friday with premium pay for Saturdays and Sundays.
Accordingly, the Union's demands in this regard are denied.

Eric/ft.Schmertz
Arbitrator
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EXHIBITS MARKED IN EVIDENCE

Employer's Exhibits;
1.

-

Letter, Poletti Freidin to Industrial
Commissioner Catherwood, dated September
26, 1967.

-

Chart 1, Wages and Conditions of Employment
At The Roosevelt Hospital and Non-Profit
Hospitals Under Contract with Local 1199

2B

-

Chart 2, Wages and Conditions of Employment
at The Roosevelt Hospital and Non-Profit
("Big 6") Hospitals Not Under Union
Contract.

3

-

List of Roosevelt Hospital Pharmacists name, wage and date of hire

4

-

5

- Chart 4, Annual Cost of Differentials
Between 1199 and Roosevelt Hospital Wages
and Benefits, Showing Whether Gain (or Loss)
to Employee

6

7

Chart 3, Comparison of Wage and Benefit
Provisions in Loral 1199's Association
Contracts with Roosevelt Hospital Practice,
Showing Whether Gain (or Loss) to Employee

-

-

Chart 5, Pay History of Roosevelt Hospital
Pharmacists
Cover Page and Pages 6 - 9 as marked of Report
of City Bar Association Committee re Local
1199 Strikes in 1966 at 5 Voluntary Hospitals

Union's Exhibits:
A

-1

Demands of Local 1199 for Terms and
Conditions of Employment of Roosevelt
Hospital Pharmacists

B

-

Preliminary Memorandum of JEocal 1199,
dated September 27, 1967

Bl

C

-

-

Additional Memorandum of Local 1199, dated
October 17, 1967, as corrected by letter,
Sipser, Weinstock, to Arbitrators, dated
November 17, 1967
Chart, Civil Service Pharmacists
Negotiations, dated March 20, 1967

D

-

Agreement, Local 1199 and Nassau-Suffolk
Pharm. Society, for October 1, 1966
through September 30, 1968

E

-

Agreement, Local 1199 and 3 N.Y.C. Drug Store
Association, same duration as Un. Ex. D.

F. -

Supplemental Agreement, Local 1199 and NonAssociatuen Drug Stores, same duration as
Dn. Ex. D

G

-

List of Roosevelt Hospital Wages and Working
Conditions, dated September 28, 1967

H

-

List of Mt. Sinai Hospital Pharmacists

I

-

N.Y.C. Salary Increment Scales, datdd 3 -65

J

-

N.Y.C. Pay Plan for Pharmacists, for July 1,
1966 through June 30, 1969, with undated
cover memorandum from Deputy Mayor

K

-

Chart, Wages to which Roosevelt Hospital
Employees Would Be Entitled If Employed
by N.Y.C.

L

-

Letter, Roosevelt F<-pital Executive Vice
President to All employees, dated
December 29, 1966.

M

-

N.Y.C. Civil Service Pharmacists Fringes

N

-

N.Y.C. Leave Regulations

O

-

Summary of Benefits Provided by Local 1199
Benefit Plan

Pi -

Booklet, Local 1199 Pension Plan

P2 -

Amendments to Un. Ex. Pi

Q

-

Booklet, A Choice of Health Plans for
N.Y. C. Employees

R

-

List of Union Shop Agreements
Pharmacists.

covering

REPORT OF ARBITRATORS

On August 30, 1967, the Industrial Commissioner
of New York State, Martin P. Catherwood, made and issued
an Order pursuant to Section 716 of the New York Labor Law
directing that the dispute concerning the negotiation of a
Collective Bargaining Contract between Roosevelt Hospital
and Local 1199, Drug and Hospital Employees Union A.F.L.C.I. O., be submitted to Arbitration by the New York State
Board of Mediation in accordance with its Rules and
Regulations.

His Order stated that Local 1199 had been

certified as the Collective Bargaining representative for
an appropriate unit of licensed Pharmacists, by the Order
of the New York State Labor Relations Board dated June 15,
1967, employed at the Hospital.
Subsequent thereto, and pursuant to this Order,
and on September 6, 1967, the Chairman of the New York State
Board of Mediation, Vincent D. McDonnell, appointed as
Arbitrators to hear and determine, on behalf of the full
Mediation Board, the negotiation of a Collective Bargaining
Contract between the parties, the following:
Thomas E. Fitzgerald
Francis E. Rivers
Eric J. Schmertz
Prior to attending the Arbitration Hearings
the Counsel for the Hospital wrote to the Industrial
Commissioner that although he would participate in the
proceedings he reserved the right to contest the propriety
of this Order to arbitrate, contending as he did, that the
only dispute possible between the Union and the Hospital
was whether the Union was the duly designated bargaining
agent of a majority of the Pharmacists, and contending
further that such dispute was not arbitrable under Section

716 of the New York Labor Law.

This legal question,

as advanced by the Hospital, has been the subject of
litigation in the courts and is not a matter before or
within the jurisdiction or authority of this Board of

The parties, by the testimony of witnesses and
by exhibits submitted and received, presented evidence
before this panel of Arbitrators on September 28, October
18 and 3lst, and November 17, 1967, following which they
exchanged and submitted Briefs and reply briefs.
Subsequent thereto the Arbitrators met in a number of
executive sessions to consider the evidence and make
an award.
Article 75 of the New York Civil Practices Law
and Rules, and the Rules and Procedures of the New York
State Board of Mediation together with the standards for
the arbitration of disputes under Section 716 of the
Labor Law liave governed the Arbitrators as to their
procedural and substantive decisions in the Hearings
and in the Award.
Apart from the Hospital's legal position,
referred to above, and not before this Board, the
dispute concerning the negotiation of a Connective
Bargaining Contract between the parties involves a
number of Demands and answers which constitute the
issues for determination by the Arbitrators.

These

demands for the various subjects desired to be covered
in the terms of the Contract awarded, together with the
respective answers of the Union and of the Hospital,
were presented by counsel for each of them either
orally at the Hearings, or in exhibits marked for
evidence, or in the briefs submitted.

These demands and corresponding answers are
as follows:
1.

RECOGNITION: Demanded by Union Opposed by Hospital

2.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF CONTRACT,
REfrROACTIVITY, AND DURATION:
Dispute as to dates and periods.

3.

UNION SECURITY:

4.

CHECKOFF: Dispute as to text of provision

5.

NO STRIKE, NO LOCKOUT: Dispute as to
text of provision

6.

PROBATIONARY PERIOD: Dispute as to length

7.

SENIORITY RIGHTS;

8.

HOURS OF WORK: Agreed

9.

WAGES: Dispute as to amount

Demanded by Union
Opposed by Hospital

Demanded by Union
Opposed by Hospital

10.

OVERTIME: Dispute as to condition
precedent

11.

HOLIDAYS: Dispute as to details

12.

VACATION: Dispute as to details

13.

COFFEE BREAK: Dispute as to length

13a. TIMS OFF FOR CASHING CHECKS:
Demanded by Union Opposed by Hospital
14.

SICK LEAVE: Dispute as to details

15.

BEREAVEMENT: Dispute as to details

16.

MATERNITY: Agreed

17.

WELFARE AND INSURANCE PLAN:
Each wants its own plan.

18.

PENSION PLAN: Each wants its own plan

19.

PROFESSIONAL CLAUSE: Dispute as to
details

20.

PAST PRACTICES: Dispute as to wording

21.

MANAGEMENT RIGHTS: Demanded by Hospital
Not answered by Union

22.

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES: Dispute as to
details

23.

.ARBITRATION: Dispute as to details

24.

HIRING HALL: Demanded by Union
Opposed by Hospital

25.

SUPPER MONEY: Demanded by Union
Opposed by Hospital

26.

SEVERANCE PAY:

Demanded by Union
Opposed by Hospital.

The decision made by the Arbitrators upon each
of the issues hereby created, have been embodied in the
terms of the Award which appears below.
The process followed by the Arbitrators to
reach these decisions has been to make a finding of
the facts upon all the oral testimony and arguments,
exhibits and briefs presented, and then to resolve them
in accordance with the Standards adopted by the New York
State Board of Mediation to govern any Arbitration
Proceedings under Section 716 of the New York Labor Law.
h

A copy of the resolution adopted by the New York State
Board of Mediation, which created these standards, is
as follows:
Standards to be Considered by
Arbitrators in Determining Matters
Arbitrated under Section 716 of the
Labor Law of New York State, as duly
adopted by the State Board of Mediation
of New York.
The arbitrator or arbitrators shall be
guided by the following standards in their
reception of evidence and in arriving at a
final arbitration decision in matters referred
to them pursuant to this Section 716 of the Labor

Law:

1. The interest and welfare of the public.
2.

Comparison of the wages, hours and

conditions of employment of the employees involved
I

in the arbitration proceedings, and the wages, hours
and conditions of employment of employees doing the
same, similar or comparable work or work requiring
the same, similar or comparable skills and expenditures
of energy and effort, giving consideration to such
factors as are peculiar to the industry involved.
3.

Comparison of wages, hours and conditions

of employment as reflected in non-profitmaking
hospitals and residential care centers in other
comparable areas.
4.

The security and tenure of employment

with due regard for the effect of technological
changes thereon as well as the effect of any
unique skills, required training and other
attributes developed in the industry and
required for the job.
5.

Economic factors of the respective

parties which are relevant to the arbitration
decision.
6.

Such other factors not confined to the

foregoing which are normally or traditionally
taken into consideration in the determination of
wages, hours and conditions of employment through
voluntary collective bargaining arbitration or
otherwise between the parties or in the industry.
The work done by the Counsel for the parties
in presenting evidence and arguments in support of their
respective positions deserves high commendation for its
thoroughness and competence as well as for its relevance
to these controlling Standards.

The conclusions reached

by the Arbitrators were greatly aided thereby.
The factual situation as shown in the record, to
which these Standards had to be applied included relevant
data about the employment and working conditions of
Pharmacists in comparable private and public institutions
and in business as follows:

voluntary and proprietary

hospitals, municipal hospitals and other city agencies,
and Association and non-Association Drug Store proprietors,
a majority of which units had contracts covering the
Pharmacists with Local 1199.
We think it would be of dubious usefulness to
articulate precisely all of the reasons impelling the
Arbitrators in each instance to decide that the particular
result reached was merited by weighing the facts on the
scale of the Standards.
In reaching these results, however, our decisionmaking process, to find and accept a result which
constituted the balance of the equities as well as of
the realities, was not only fact-finding in nature, but
also took into account a theory advanced in substance by
the Union. It was that because the role of these
Arbitrators is the statutory substitute for the strike
weapon in negotiations, the award should reflect our
best judgement on what terms the parties themselves
would have negotiated.
In view of these premises the statement of the
Award will be confined to a presentation of the te^t of
the awarded provisions of the Contract, without an
accompanying expression of the rationale underlying any
of the decisions.
The specific terms of the Award follow.

T H E

A W A R D

The undersigned Arbitrators, having been
duly wworn, and having heard and considered all the
proofs and allegations of the parties, and after having
duly deliberated, make the following Award in the dispute
concerning the negotiation of a Collective Bargaining
Contract between Roosevelt Hospital and Local 1199 Drug
and Hospital Employees Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O.:
A.

The following Clauses, designated Article I to
Article XXIII inclusive, shall constitute the
Collective Bargaining Contract between the Hospital
and the Union:

ARTICLE It RECOGNITION

The Hospital hereby recognizes the Union as
the sole and exclusive representative of
all full-time and regular part-time licensed
Pharmacists (excluding the Director of
patient supply services and the assistant
chief Pharmacist), employed now or hereafter
by the Hospital.

ARTICLE II: EFFECTIVE DATE OF CONTRACT, RETROACTIVITY,
AND DURATION

1. The effective date of this Contract shall
be the date of the making of this Award,- but
as to Wages only the obligations of the
Contract shall be retroactive to August 30,
1967, (the date of the Order of the Industrial
Commissioner submitting this dispute to
Arbitration by the New York State Board of
Mediation).

2.

This Contract shall be in full force and

effect and shall be and jeeemain operative and
binding upon the parties hereftso and their
successors and assigns from the effective date
as above fixed, up to and including the 30th
day of September 1970, with the provision
however, that it may be reopened for purposes
of wage negotiations only on January 1, 1969,
and with the further provision that such wage
negotiations shall commence sixty (60) days
before January 1, 1969.

ARTICLE III : UNION SECURITY
1.

All employees of the Hospital covered by

this Contract who, on the effective date of
this Contract, are members of the Union in
good standing shall during the terms of th^s
Contract as a condition of continued employment
maintain their membership in the Union in good
standing by tendering the periodic dues
uniformly required as a condition of retaining
membership in the Union.
2.

All employees covered by this Contract on

its effective date who are not members of the
Union shall become members of the Union thirty
(30) days after the effective date of this Award,
and shall thereafter and ufcfcil the termination
of this Contract, as a condition of continued
employment, maintain their membership in the
Union in good standing by tendering the periodic
dues uniformly required as a condition of
maintaining membership in the Union.

3.

All new employees who are hereafter hired

by the Hospital as Pharmacists shall become
members of the Union thirty (30) days after
the beginning of their employment and shall
thereafter and until the termination of this
Contract, as a condition of continued employment
maintain their membership in the Union in good
standing by tendering the periodic dues uniformly
required as a condition of maintaining membership
in the Union.

ARTICLE IV: CHECKOFF:
Upon receipt of a voluntary written
assignment, which shall be irrevocable for
a period of not more than one (1) year, the
Hospital shall deduct from the compensation
due said employee each month, the regular
monthly dues as fixed by the Union; and
such deduction shall be made on the nearest
pay-day of the employee after the fifteenth
(15th) day of the month for the preceding
month, and shall thereafter be remitted to
the Union.

ARTICLE V: NO STRIKE
1.

NO LOCKOUT

The Uni6n and the employees shall strictly

adhere to every provision of Section 713 of
the New York Labor Law.

Therefore, neither

the employees covered by this award nor the
Union nor any other persons shall engage in
or induce or encourage any strike, work stoppage,

slowdown or withholding of goods or services
by such employees or other persons at the
Hospital, provided, however, that nothing
therein shall be construed to prohibit
publicity, other than picketing, for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public
that a grievance or dispute as defined in
Section 716 of the Labor Law exists at the
Hospital, as long as such publicity does
not have the effect of inducing any persons
to withhold goods or services at the Hospital.
2.

The Hospital shall not institute,

declare or cause any lock-out of employees
covered by this AWARD.
3. Any dispute arising from the
interpretation, application, and/or
meaning of this Article shall be directly
subject to the Arbitration Article appearing
hereinafter in this Contract.

ARTICLE VI:

PROBATIONARY PERIOD

Newly hired employees shall be considered
probationary for a period of ninety (90) days
from the date of hiring exclusive of absences
for any cause, and may be discharged at will
by the Hospital during the probationary period,
ARTICLE VII;

1.

SENIORITY RIGHTS

The Hospital will recognize and apply

to all employees covered by this Contract
the principle of seniority in all matters
pertaining to the job.

2.

Seniority shall be based upon the total

length of employment with the Hospital.
In the event an employee is duly laid off
such lay-off shall be in inverse order of
an employee's seniority.

Employees laid off

shall be placed on a preferential list from
which ^vacancies or new openings shall be filled
and in filling of vacancies or new openings,
employees shall be re-hired in the inverse
order of their lay-off at a salary which shall
not be less than that received by them at the
time of lay-off.

ARTICLE VIII: HOURS OF WORK
The work week for all employees shall be
forty (40) hours per week spread over five (5)
eight (8) hour days.

ARTICLE VIV:
1.

WAGES
The minimum salary which the Hospital

agrees to pay for a forty (40) hour five (5)
day work week to the employees covered in
this Contract, with one (1) year or more
experience as a registered Pharmacist in a
Drug Store or Hospital, shall be One Hundred
and Eighty dollars ($180.00).

This rate of

pay shall oS^tunence from the date of retroacti^ity
as above provided and shall continue for the
duration of this Contract unless revised pursuant
to the provision for re-opening and modification
of wages contained herein.

2.

The present practice observed by the

Hospital of paying an extra Two dollars
($2.00) per day, Ten dollars ($10.00) per
week, to those registered Pharmacists
working a shift ending between 8:00 p.m. and
the following 6:00 a.m. shall be continued;
commencing the effective date of this Contract
and continuing until its expiration, unless
modified in accordance with the provisions
contained herein.

ARTICLE X: OVERTIME
All

work by such employees, including

a part-time employee, over and above eight {8)
hours in one (1) day and forty (40) hours in
any week shall be deemed overtime and shall be
paid for at time and one half the regular rate
of pay.

ARTICLE XI: HOLIDAYS
1.

Regular full-time employees covered by

this Contract shall be granted time off with
pay for the following recognized Holidays
each year during the term of this Agreement:
Washington's Birthday
Memorial Day
Independence Day
Labor Day
Election Day
Thanksgiving Day
Christmas
New Year's Day

2.

In addition to the above specified

Holidays employees are entitled to two (2)
additional days, to be called 'personal days',
but they may not accumulate beyond a calendar
year and all employees shall be entitled to
these personal days off only when he has
completed one (1) continuous year of employment.
3.

Should any of the aforenamed Holidays to

which an employee is entitled fall on a day
during his vacation, such employee shall, in
addition to his regular pay, be paid for such
holiday.

Should any employee be called in to

work on any Holiday to which he is entitled,
he shall, in addition to his regular day's
pay, be paid for such Holiday at the rate of
time and one-half his regular rate.

ARTICLE XII: VACATION
1.

Regular full-time employees embraced in

this Contract shall be entitled to paid vacation
each year during the term of this Agreement as
follows:
those who have had more than six
(6) months but less than one (1)
year employment: 2 calendar weeks
vacation; and those who have had
more than one (1) year of employment:
four (4) calendar weeks vacation.
2.

Part-time employees shall be entitled to

vacation with pay on the same basis as above
set forth, but pro-rata in the proportion that
their work hours bear to the full work week of
regular full-time employees.

3.

In April of each year, the Hospital

in conference with the employees and the
Union, shall work out a vacation schedule
for these employees which shall be posted
in an appropriate place not later than
April 30th each year.
4.

Any employee who resigns shall give the

Hospital two (2) weeks notice to entitle him
to pro rata vacation pay.

ARTICLE XIII: COFFEE BREAK
1.

Except as provided in the next paragraph

there shall be two rest periods or coffee breaks
in each working day, not exceeding fifteen (15)
•tminutes on each occasion as assigned by the
Hospital to each of the employees performing
a full day's work.
2.

On regular pay-days the coffee break

immediately following the employee's receipt
of his pay check shall be extended to twentyfive (25) minutes (rather than fifteen (15)
minutes), during normal banking hours to
enable employees to cash checks.

ARTICLE XIV: SICK LEAVE
The Hospital has stated that its present
practice is to give ten (10) paid days of
Sick leave to each regular full-time employee
embraced in this Contract and having less than
five (5) years employment; and twenty (20) days
of paid Sick Leave to each such employee after

five (5) years of employment; with each such
employee having the right to accumulate paid
leave for sick days up to ninety (90) days.
Continuance of this practice of the
Hospital in regard to payment of sick leave
to these employees is embodied in this AWARD
and made an obligation of the Hospital under
this Contract.

ARTICLE XV: BEREAVEMENT
In the event such employee is kept from
work because of death in the immediate family,
(which includes a parent, spouse, child, sister
or brother of such employee), the employee shall
receive a bereavement leave with pay for the
three (3) working days following the day of
death.

ARTICLE XVI; MATERNITY
In the event the wife of such employee
gives birth on a regular working day, the
husband with a minimum of six (6) months on
the job shall have one (1) day off with pay.

ARTICLE XVII; WELFARE AND INSURANCE PLAN
The Hospital having stated that it has in
existence at present, and covering all of its
professional type employees, a Welfare and
Insurance Plan, continuance of the present
Welfare and Insurance Plan as to the employees
embraced in this Contract is hereby made an

obligation of the Hospital under this AWARD
and embodied as a term of this Contract.

ARTICLE XVIII: PENSION PLAN
The Hospital having stated that there is
existing a Pension Plan by which it covers all
of its professional type employees including
the registered Pharmacists, continuance of
this present Pension Plan as to the employees
embraced in this Contract is hereby made an
obligation of the Hospital under this AWARD
and embodied as a term of the Contract.

ARTICLE XIX; PROFESSIONAL CLAUSE
The Hospital agrees to continue to provide
to the Pharmacists all new technical information,
literature, periodicalsaand other matters related
to the professional conduct of the Pharmacy
Department of the Hospital and make same freely
available to the Pharmacists.

ARTICLE XX: PACT PRACTICES
The Hospital, only for good cause and where
not inconsistent with the terms of this AWARD
or a Contract between the parties, may discontinue
or change past practices cohering these Pharmacists,
and the Union shall have the .right to grieve and
Arbitrate whether there was good cause for the
discontinuance or change of the particular past
practice.

ARTICLE XXI; MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
1.

The management of the Hospital and the

direction of the working forces are vested
exclusively with the Hospital.

The Hospital

retains the sole right to hire, discipline,
discharge, lay off, assign, and promote, and
to determine or change the starting and quitting
time and the number of hours to be worked; to
promulgate rules and regulations; to assign
duties to the work force; to recognize, discontinue or enlarge any department or division;
to transfer employees within departments, to
other departments, to other classifications and
to other shifts; to introduce new or improved
methods or facilities; to re-classify positions
and carry out the ordinary and customary
functions of management whether or not possessed
or exercised by the Hospital prior to the issuance
of this award, subject only to the restrictions
and regulations governing the exercise of these
rights as are provided in this AWARD.
2.

The Union recognizes that the Hospital

may introduce a revision in the method or
methods of operation, which will produce a
revision in job duties and a reduction in
personnel in any department.

The Union agrees

that nothing contained in this Award shall
prevent the implementation of any program
and of the work force reductions of any
program to be hereafter undertaken by the
Hospital.

3.

The Union, on behalf of the employees,

agrees to cooperate with the Hospital to
attain and maintain full efficiency and
maximum patient care and the Hospital agrees
to receive and consider written constructive
suggestions submitted by the Union toward
that objective.

ARTICLE XXII: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
Section A
Step 1:

In the first instance and within

a reasonable time from the occurrence of a
dispute, grievance or complaint, the same
shall be taken up for disposition between
the grievant and/or his Union representative
and his immediate supervisor.
Step 2:

If the Dispute, grievance or

complaint is not settled in step 1, as
described above, then within five (5)
working days from the date of the
presentation by the grievant, the same
shall be put in writing and taken up for
disposition between the grievant, a
representative of the Union and the
Administrator of the Hospital or his
designee.
Step 3:

If said dispute, grievance, or

complaints, are not sattled within five (5)
working days after completing this Step 2
meeting, the matter may be submitted to
Arbitration under the Arbitratition procedure
provided herein.

Section B;
All time limitations herein specified
shall be deeraed to be exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays, and Holidays, and all time limitations
above provided may be extended by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE XXIII: ARBITRATION
1.

Such unresolved dispute, grievance, and

complaints may be referred by the Union or
the Hospital for Arbitration to an Arbitrator
designated by the American Arbitration
Association.

Such reference to Arbitration

must be prompt and timely.

The Arbitration

shall be subject to Article 75 of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules and to the Rules
and Procedures of the American Arbitration
Association.
2.

The AWARD of the Arbitrators hereunder

shall be final and binding on all the parties
hereto.
3.

The fees and expenses of the American

Arbitration Association and of the Arbitrator
in connection with such Arbitration shall be
borne equally by the Union and the Hospital.

B. DEMANDS REJECTED FOR INCLUSION AMONG TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
It is FURTHER AND FINALLY AWARDED as
follows:
The demands made herein that the Contract
include provisions which require the Hospital:
(1) To hire new and/or additional
employees through the Union Hiring
Hall (Demand 21, Union Ex. A).

i•

(2) To pay Supper Money (Demand 20,
Union Ex. A)
(3) To provide Severance Pay (Demand 18,
Union Ex. A)
are each and every one DENIED.

Thomas E. Fitzgerald/ ARBITRATOR

-^f
^M'S

!/r»

Francis E. Rivers, ARBITRATOR

Eric J./Schmertz, ARBITRATOR

New York, New York,
// March, 1968.

STATE OP NEW YORK )
: SS.
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

On this

// day of March, 1968

before me personally came and appeared Thomas E.e.
Fitzgerald, Francis E. Rivers and Eric J. Schmertz,
to me known and known to me to be the individuals
described herein and who executed the foregoing
instrument, and each of whom duly acknowledged to
me

that he executed the same.

Notary

Public

GENEVIEVE ROBERTSON
Notar- Public S'ale of New York
N°tan
N! 41-3305400
qualified in Queens County
.mission Expires March 30, 1969
Comrni

FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Lodge 186 International Association of
Machinists
and

'
i
'
*
'

F & M Schaefer Brewing Company

Award

"
i

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
There was not just cause for the suspensions of
Richard Judge and John Winner for the three days
of March 7, 8, and 11, 1968. The Company shall
make them whole for the time lost and the suspensions shall be expunged from their records.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November
1968
STATE OF New York
) ss> .
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of November, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case #68A/7260

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Lodge 186 International Association of
Machinists

and

Opinion

F & M Schaefer Brewing Company

In accordance with Article XXIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the F & M Schaefer Brewing Company,
hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Lodge 186
International Association of Machinists, hereinafter referred
to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company have just cause to suspend Richard
Judge and John Winner for the three days of March
7, 8 and 11, 1968?
A hearing was held in Baltimore, Maryland on October 17,
1968 at which time Messrs. Judge and Winner, hereinafter referred to as the "grievants," and representatives of the
Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded all con-

cerned to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.
tor's oath.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitra-

Post hearing briefs were filed and the hearings

were declared closed as of October 31, 1968.
The Company charges that the grievants took an unauthorized relief break on Saturday, March 2, 1968 during the third
shift on which they worked as machinists.

Their respective

three day disciplinary suspensions were for this alleged misconduct.

- 2 The third shift runs from 11

P.M. to 7 A.M.

The griev-

ants are the only machinists assigned to that shift, and
they work without a machinist supervisor.

Indeed the shift

is largely unsupervised - the only supervisor in the plant
during that time is the foreman of the clean-up crew.

During

the shift, normal relief periods are taken for 15 minutes between 1 and 1:15 A.M0 and between 5 and 5:15 A0M.

The lunch

period is for 1/2 hour, normally between 3 and 3:30 A.M0 It
is undisputed that these periods of time may be delayed in
the event of machine break-down during production or for
emergencies.

In addition, the uncontradicted evidence in-

dicates that it is not uncommon for employees on the third
shift to delay these periods in order to work through or complete a job assignment.

And in such event, it has not been

uncommon for the employees to "tack" the first 15 minutes
relief period on to the half hour lunch period0
The grievants were found by the Maintenance Foreman, who
unexpectedly visited the plant, lounging in the Machine Shop
at about 4:05 A.M.

On the ground that this was not a regu-

lar relief period, the grievants were deemed to have been
improperly away from their work assignments, and were disciplined with suspensions of three days.
The grievants' defense and that of the Union on their
behalf, is quite simple.

It is that the grievants worked

through the first 15 minute relief period; that also because of a work assignment they continued at work until 3:30
and did not begin their lunch period until that time; and
merely tacked the half hour for lunch and the first 15 minute

- 3 break together for a 45 minute break between 3:30 and 4:15
A.M.

And thus it was proper for them to be on a relief break

at 4:05 A.M. when found in the Machine Shop by the machinist
foreman.
The evidence is contradictory.

But despite the Company's

view otherwise, I am disposed to find the grievants1 story to
be plausible.

Or at least its plausibility is not overturned

by the evidence and testimony offered by the Company; in a
case where, because discipline is involved, the Company has
the burden of proving the charges against the grievants by
evidence that is clear and convincing.
The work sheets disclose that the grievants did not
start their lunch break until 3:30 A.M.

The evidence also

indicates that the 15 minute relief breaks are not normally
entered on the work sheets.

Therefore the work sheets would

not disclose whether the grievants had either taken or worked
through the first 15 minute break or whether, if they had
worked through it, it was tacked on to the lunch period, extending that break to 4:15 A.M.

But at least the record of

the lunch period coincides with the testimony of the grievants,
and is contrary to the Company's assertion that the grievants,
or at least Winner was at lunch at 3 A.M. when he was allegedly contacted by the clean-up foreman to perform some work on
a No. 2 Soaker.

And it contradicts the Company's assertion,

based also on information from the clean-up foreman, that
Winner interrupted his lunch period for only about 5 minutes
(from 3 A.M. to 3:05) for this work and immediately returned
to resume his lunch.

But the clean-up foreman did not testify

- 4at the arbitration hearing, and accordingly, his information,
upon which the Company so strongly relies, is in the record
only on a secondary basis.

And as between it on one hand

and the official work sheets and direct testimony of the
grievants on the other, the latter must be given more weight.
Moreover, the grievants testified that an electrician
who was in the plant on an overtime basis, worked with them
when the first relief break between 1 and 1:15 A.M. was worked through.

Yet the record discloses that the Company de-

cided to discipline the grievants without any inquiry made
of this electrician.

Though the electrician could have been

produced as a witness by the Union in support of the grievants' explanations, he also could have been asked to testify
by the Company in connection with its case.

With the burden

on the Company, the absence of his testimony in no way diminishes the direct testimony of the grievants.

But by its ab-

sence, the Company's case on that point remains inconclusive
at best.
So, it is not whether I believe the grievants1 explanation,
but whether the Company's case to the contrary has been established clearly and convincingly to my satisfaction.
not,

It has

and therefore the Company has failed to meet the tradi-

tional burden in disciplinary cases.
Of course if there is laxity with regard to what relief
and lunch breaks are taken on the third shift, it is due in
part at least to the absence of supervision.

Unless supervision

is provided or unless the third shift of employees are notified
explicitly and unequivocally that they are to take their breaks

- 5 at regular stated intervals except in unusual circumstances
such as break-down and emergencies, variations can be expected.

And unless the Company expressly proscribes those

variations, it cannot discipline employees for making changes,
especially when there has been a practice to do so.

If the

Company wishes to tighten upj it may, with appropriate notice
and instructions.

Thereafter, discipline would be justified

for unauthorized variations.
done so on the third shift.
been posted for other shifts.

But the Company has not yet
Specific times for breaks have
But a similar posting for the

third shift was long ago removed and disregarded.
For all the foregoing reasons I am not persuaded that
the grievants misconducted themselves when they were found
on a relief break at or about 4:05 A.M. on March 2, 1968.
Accordingly, the three day suspensions imposed on each of them
is reversed, and they shall be made whole for the time lost.

Eric/J. Schme
Arbitrator

T

In the Matter of the Arbitration Between '
Local Lodge #1680 of District Lodge #64
International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers
and

'
'
'
'

AWARD

r

G. T. Schjeldahl Company, Packaging
Machinery Division

'
'

In accordance with Article 8 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated May 1, 1966 to May 1, 1968 between G. T.
Schjeldahl Company, Packaging Machinery Division, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local Lodge #1680
of District Lodge #64 of the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, hereinafter referred to as
the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide disputes between the Union and Company relating to grievances #67-19, #66-28 and #67-11.
A hearing was held in Seekonk, Massachusetts on January 12, 1968 at which time representatives of the Union and
Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties,"
appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded the parties to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath0

Having duly heard and considered the proofs and allegations of the parties, I render the following AWARD:
Grievance #67-19
Grievance #67-19 was withdrawn by the Union without prejudice.
Grievance #66-28
Grievance #66-28 was settled by and between the

parties as follows:

- 2Without establishing a precedent and without
prejudice to the positions of either party, the
Company shall pay J 0 Marques, A. Mikulis, P. Eve,
E. Benjamin and AeCrombie for five hours at the
rate of time and one half, for Saturday, October
15, 1966.
Grievance #67-11
The parties stipulated the issue for determination
as:
1. Is Grievance #67-11 arbitrable?
2. Is the Company entitled to assign machine
wiring to Assemblers, Maintenance men and
Maintenance Electricians? If so, is the
Company obligated to grant the financial
remedy sought in the grievance by the
grievants, i.e. the overtime pay lost?
The grievance is not arbitrable,, Precisely the
same substantive dispute was the subject of a grievance in late 1964. Under the grievance procedure
of the contract, a Third Step answer by the Company
is "accepted as final" unless the grievance is withdrawn or submitted to-arbitration by the Union. In
November 1964 the Company's Third Step answer stated,
in significant part, that machine wiring was "assembly work (to be) done by Assemblers."
Thereafter the Union neither withdrew the grievance
nor submitted it to arbitration0 Because that
grievance in 1964 involved the identical issue as
grievance #67-11, and similarly, was posed in a
manner requiring an interpretation of the same
sections of the contract, I find that the Company's
answer then not only disposed of the 1964 grievance,
but is equally dispositive of the instant grievance
#67-11. The effect of my ruling is not only that
grievance #67-11 is non-arbitrable, but that the
Company's position in 1964, namely that the work
of machine wiring belongs to the Assembler classification, is binding now on both the Union and the
Company.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

- 3 -

DATED: January
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

1968
),
)'

On this
day of January, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case No. 1130 0301 67

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
_

,

:

„

_

„

.

,

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

^

'
!

Local 1604 U. A. W.

'
i
'
i

and
Scovill Manufacturing Company

Award

T

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated October 16, 1966 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
Grievance #1274 is granted only to the extent of
one half an hour's pay. The Company did not violate the contract or the rights of maintenance men
when it did not assign to them work performed on
the Lobeck and Rod machines by a lineman and a
temporary lineman or production employee on November 19, 1966. However the work performed by the
lineman in bolting the billet mold in place, as a
replacement for the graphite mold, should have been
assigned to a maintenance man. Since that work took
one half an hour the Company shall compensate the
maintenance man who would have been assigned that
work, one half an hour's pay at his appropriate rate.
All other aspects of grievance #1274 are denied.
Grievance #1276 is denied in its entirety.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 1, 1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

) .
) * "

On this 1st day of November, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case # 1230 0129 67

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 1604 U. A. W.
Opinion

and
Scovill Manufacturing Company

In accordance with Article X of the Collective Bargaining Agreement effective October 16, 1966 between Scovill
Manufacturing Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company,"
and Local 1604 U. A. W., hereinafter referred to as the "Union,"
the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide disputes which are the subjects of Union grievances
#1274 and #1276.
Hearings were held at the Company plant in Waterbury,
Connecticut on February 15 and June 6, 1968 at which time
representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred
to jointly as the "parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was

afforded the parties to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was

expressly waived and the parties filed post hearing briefs.
Grievance #1274 claims that certain work performed on
the Lobeck and Rod machines on November 19, 1966, respectively
by a non-bargaining unit lineman and a "temporary lineman"
(or production employee) should have been assigned to bargaining unit maintenance personnel„
Grievance #1276 is substantively similar.

It claims that

bargaining unit maintenance employees, rather than a lineman,
should have been assigned certain work on the Lobeck machine
on November 21, 1966.

- 2 More specifically, the work involved in grievance #1274
was the removal, dismantling, cleaning, and checking the
face plates and alignment of a graphite mold on the Lobeck
machine, and the installation, as a replacement, of a billet
mold; and the placing and positioning of a mold and dies on
the Rod Machine preparatory for its use the next Monday.
The specific work with which grievance #1276 is concerned was the disassembling, cleaning and readjusting of the
container on the Lobeck machine.
With regard to grievance #1274 the parties expressly
stipulated that the issue before this Arbitrator is whether
the disputed work falls within the category of production/
maintenance or experimental/development.

If the former,

there is no dispute that it properly falls within the maintenance man classification„

If the latter there is similarly

no dispute that it may and was properly assigned to linemen
or others outside of the maintenance crew.

This stipulation

was not expressly applied to or withheld from grievance #1276,
but it is obvious to me, and I am sure apparent to the parties, that because of the similarities between the two grievances, this stipulation applies to that grievance as well.
The stipulation is quite logical.

It is consistent

with Article II Section 4 of the contract which reads:
Working supervisors and linemen regularly perform
as part of their whole job, tasks which are similar in nature to work performed by bargaining
unit employees,
and the manner in which this section has been applied with
regard to development or experimental work on one hand and

- 3 regular maintenance and production work on the other.

The

parties recognize that both linemen and maintenance men
possess the mechanical skills to install, remove, dismantle
and clean various molds used on the Lobeck and Rod machines.
When those machines, together with the molds thereon, are
"on production," the maintenance work, including work on the
molds themselves, has been performed by the bargaining unit
maintenance employees.

On the other hand if the machines and

the molds are engaged in experimental or development work,
the maintenance duties, especially any work regarding the
molds, has been assigned to and performed by linemen and working supervisors.

The difference seems to be that when on pro-

duction, the maintenance work is of a routine nature, requiring for the most part, mechanical skills.

But when the oper-

ation is experimental or development, work on the molds is
only in part mechanical.

More important is the need for the

employee to appraise the manner in which the mold is functioning; diagnose any difficulties which arise; analyze the product
which is being produced; and in the course of dismantling,
cleaning or assembling the mold, to evaluate its condition
with regard to the product which it is designed to produce.
This latter work, more of a subjective nature, albeit
mechanical, has been assigned to linemen and working supervisors in accordance with Article II Section 4 of the contract.
Hence it is manifest that certain work performed by a lineman
may, as that section provides, be similar in nature to work
performed by bargaining unit maintenance men0

The difference

turns more on its purpose than on its actual detail, distinguish-

- 4ed by whether it is experimental/development or routine maintenance/production.
Of course it is quite clear that this also gives rise
to problems.

The nature of the Company's productivity is

such that machines and molds may be switched from production
to experimental, back and forth, several times over a relatively short span.

And though there is provision to adjust the

pay of the operators involved, so that they at least know
when an operation is experimental as distinguished from production, it is not so apparent to the maintenance men.

On

a given day the maintenance men may see work performed by
linemen which appears identical with work that they previously performed.

And they may not know, or more realistically

so far as the instant grievance is concerned, may dispute the
Company's determination that the work involved is experimental/development.
So while the theory of delineation between work assigned
to linemen if experimental, and to maintenance men if on production, is well understood and accepted, the basic distinction
of what constitutes production as distinguished from experimentation, is not at all clear and very much in dispute„
During the course of the hearings I stated the obvious
to the parties - namely that they should be the best judges
of into which category the various highly technical operations
fell.

And that disagreement would continue on a chronic

basis unless some understanding was reached on standards of
delineation.

Nevertheless, until and unless that is done,

disputes of the instant type must be decided by arbitrators,

- 5no matter how less familiar we may be than the parties, with
the esoteric nature of the work involved.
After careful study of the entire record before me, it
is my best judgment that the overwhelming bulk of the disputed
work in the instant case was experimental or development
rather than routine production or maintenance.

Therefore

with one small exception, the Company's failure to assign it
to bargaining unit maintenance men was not violative of the
contract.

Rather it was consistent with the language and

pracitce of Article II Section 40
The Lobeck and Rod machines are not in and of themselves
experimental.

But the molds used on those machines and the

alloy produced therefore; together with the purpose of that
product, may make the operation experimental or development.
On November 19, the Lobeck machine was using a graphite mold
which was different in size from previous graphite molds used
in routine production.

Moreover, and more significant in my

judgment, it was producing cupro-nickel, a new alloy.

The

evidence indicates that the operation experienced difficulties;
the product varied from acceptable standards and in general
there were "bugs" to be overcome.

By pointed example, the re-

moval of the mold (which in part, is the disputed work involved
herein) was made necessary by a leak in the operation of the
machine and mold.
In short, because the mold and alloy were new; the product unpredictable and more trouble-laden than normal; and
because the unstable nature of the operation resulted in leakage, I am satisfied that the Company's classification of the

- 6 work as experimental coincides with the actual facts of the
situation.

The question, however, is whether the removal,

cleaning and readjustment of the mold from the discontinued
experimental operation, constituted maintenance work of an
experimental nature, warranting its assignment to linemen. I
am satisfied that it is.
I do not think that the experimental or development
work ends merely because the operation is shut down and the
experimental mold removed.

It is true that the maintenance

men could have removed the mold and probably cleaned it and
possibly even adjusted it, as did the lineman.

But they

would not be responsible, as was the lineman, to analyze,
evaluate, and make certain subjective judgments about the
mold in the course of that work.

And because the mold was

being used in experimental work, those judgments were per
force an integral part of the mechanical work of removal,
cleaning and readjustment.

Or in other words, the disputed

work was a logical extension of or sufficiently closely related to the actual experimental runs, as to be considered
experimental or development also.
So I find nothing improper by the assignment or performance of that work on November 19 by a lineman.
There is less dispute between the parties in connection
with the Rod machine.

The evidence establishes that that

machine was to commence an experimental run on Monday, November 21.

It follows then, that the preparatory work necessary

to ready the machine for that run - establishing the installations of the molds, dies, rolls and tubes were themselves ex-

- 7 perimental.

It is undisputed that the individual assigned,

and technically classified and paid by the Company as a
"temporary lineman" had had previous experience with that
machine and that type of work.
men had not.

Contrarywise the maintenance

So I am satisfied that the disputed work on the

Rod machine was not denied the maintenance men in violation
of the contract.
However, one portion of work performed by the lineman
on November 19, I deem to be purely mechanical and properly
part of a maintenance man's job.

Indeed it was so conceded

by Company witnesses at the arbitration hearing.

It was the

one half an hour spent by the lineman in bolting the billet
mold in place as a replacement for the graphite mold on the
Lobeck machine.

This is maintenance man work; and easily

could have been assigned to one of the maintenance men who
were handling other maintenance duties on the Lobeck machine
at the same time.

And though of not great duration I am not

prepared to hold that one half hour of work is so de minimus
as to be overlooked.

Therefore the Company is directed to

pay whichever maintenance man would have been assigned that
work, one half an hour of pay at the appropriate rate for the
work performed by the lineman in bolting the billet mold into
place on the Lobeck machine.

Grievance #1274 is granted to

that limited extent, and all other aspects of grievance #1274
are denied.
I conclude that the work on the container on the Lobeck
machine performed by a lineman on November 21, 1966 was also
experimental or development.

Again a graphite mold was in-

- 8volved as part of the container.

The operation was marred

by casting problems and excessive downtime resulting from
"bugs" in the equipment.

Also an alloy new to the Company

was being cast - a 75% copper - 25% nickel composition which
proved troublesome in connection with temperature control
and slagging in the furnace.

Also there were design prob-

lems which required attention and appraisal.

So again,

while I have no doubt that the maintenance men could remove,
dismantle, and perform the other mechanical work attendant
to this mold and alloy, the nature of the actual work required subjective observations, appraisals and modifications;
so that the difficulties in the runs could be eliminated,
towards the end that this alloy could be manufactured on a
normal productivity basis.

Therefore I do not find fault

with the Company's decision to assign this work to a lineman
and not to the maintenance men.

And again, this is con-

sistent with the express contract provision of Article II
Section 4, which allows linemen to perform work similar to
that performed by the maintenance men.
The circumstances in both grievances before me are, in
my view, distinguishable from Union's grievance #10997 dated
August 2, 1965 upon which the Union relies in an effort to
show that work with a graphite mold on the Lobeck machine was
not experimental or development.

In the instant grievances

the graphite molds were of different size.
used wece also different.

The metal alloys

And per force the type of product

to be produced and the properties desired were different in
the instant cases from what was involved in August of 1965.

- 9 Accordingly grievance #1276 is denied.
It should be abundantly clear that my decisions on the
grievances before me relate solely to those cases and to the
circumstances of the work involved.

I cannot see how my de-

termination can have any precedential effect on work involving other machines or molds, at different points of time. What
is needed is not just an understanding that linemen may de experimental and development work, but rather some clarity as
to what constitutes experimental or development work as distinguished from normal production and maintenance; together
with some defined procedure for switching from one to the other.
It is not the role of this Arbitrator nor indeed do the specific grievances before me lend themselves to it, to attempt
that clarification.

Rather it is a matter for direct bargain-

ing between the parties.

Until and unless some clarification

and procedure are bargained, the general language of Article II
Section 4 which the parties have jointly placed in their
Collective Bargaining Agreement, may well continue to generate
circumstances

of dispute.

Eric^/J. "Schmertz
Arbitrator

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 282 International Brotherhood of
Teamsters

and

Award

John Sexton & Co.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated September 1, 1967 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
Robert Brown was not wrongfully discharged
under the terms of the contract.

Eric (0. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November
1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

sg

.

)

On this
day of November, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. A68 - 1465

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 282 International Brotherhood of
Teamsters

and

Opinion

John Sexton & Co.

In accordance with the Arbitration Provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated September 1, 1967 between John Sexton & Co., hereinafter referred to as the
"Company," and Local 282 International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was
designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue:
Was Robert Brown wrongfully discharged under
the terms of the contract? If so, to what
remedy is he entitled?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New York State
Board of Mediation on October 24, 1968 at which time Mr. Brown,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives
of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as
the "parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded all

concerned to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the

Arbitrator's oath.
The Company discharged the grievant for excessive absenteeism in violation of the Company rules.

The evidence confirms

the excessive and chronic nature of the grievant's absentee
record both before and after a medical leave of absence.

In

addition, this record failed to improve after he was formally
warned of its unsatisfactory nature.

- 2 It is clear that the grievant's absences were due principally to ill health.

He absented himself either because of

manifestations of illness or the need to visit the Veterans
Hospital for treatment„

It is equally clear that though he

presented a medical statement attesting to his ability to reassume his job following his medical leave of absence,
not fully recovered from his ailments,,

he was

He was still obliged

to return to the hospital for out-patient treatment on Tegular
working days, albeit with less frequency; and by his own admission he absented himself several days in August, 1968,
just prior to his discharge, because "he felt he needed a rest,"
Unfortunate as it may be, it appears to me that the
grievant's record of excessive absenteeism, which covers a
period from 1964 to the date of his discharge (excluding his
medical leave of absence), will not improve if he is returned
to work simply because he is not physically capable of reporting to or performing his job on a consistent basis.
It is well settled that excessive absenteeism, for whatever reason, including reasons of health beyond the employee's
control, is nonetheless grounds for termination.

An

employ-

er must be able to rely upon the regular attendance of his
employees.

If not, the absenteeing employee, following a

warning, and a reasonable opportunity to correct the circumstances giving rise to his absenteeism, may be discharged,
even though his record of absenteeism is not a matter of misconduct.

Such is the circumstance in the instant case, and

there is no basis upon which I can deny the Company its right
to invoke that well settled principle.

Moreover, I find it

- 3 makes no difference which set of Company rules were in effect
at the time of the grievant's termination, because I am satisfied that the discharge was not only consistent with the
foregoing general principle, but also in express or substantial compliance with the absentee provisions of both sets of
rules.

Eric J'f'Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Simmons Elizabeth Employees' Union,
Local #420, Upholsterers' International
Union of North America

and

Award
of
Arbitrators

Simmon s Company

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated October 13, 1967 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Award
as follows:
Grievances #2115, #2117 and #2137
1. The Company's action in disqualifying James Harris
from his job as sweeper and from any other available jobs to which his seniority might entitle
him, was proper. Grievances #2115 and #2117 are
denied.
2. The Company erred when it suspended James Harris
for two weeks. Because he was physically unable
to perform any available work within the plant,
he should have been disqualified and placed on
the Surplus Labor List. Accordingly, the suspension is expunged, and the Company's subsequent
action in disqualifying him and placing him on
the Surplus Labor List shall be made retroactive
to cover the full period of the suspension. Because he would have been and still is in an inactive employment status, even though the suspension is expunged, he is not entitled to back pay.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Chester Ja Micek
Concurring in 1, 2
Dissenting from 1, 2

Edward T. Tomalagave
Concurring in 1, 2
Dissenting from 1, 2

Grievance #2088
The termination of Gloria Thompson is upheld.
Grievance #2088 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz

DATED: October 31, 1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)sg .
)

On this 31st day of October, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: November
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

1968
)
) ""

On this
day of November, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Chester J. Micek to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: November
1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)
) °* "

On this
day of November, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Edward T. Tomalagave to me known and known
to me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 1330-0655-68

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Simmons Elizabeth Employees' Union,
Local #420, Upholsterers' International
Union of North America
and
S immon s C omp any

Opinion
of
Chairman

In accordance with Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement effective October 13, 1967, between Simmons
Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and
Simmons Elizabeth Employees' Union, Local #420, Upholsterers'
International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union," the undersigned was designated
as the Chairman of a tripartite Board of Arbitration to hear
and decide disputes relating to the Union's grievances #2115,
#2117 and #2137. Messrs. Chester J. Micek and Edward T.
Tomalavage respectively served as the Company and Union
designees to said Board of Arbitration.

The Union and Com-

pany, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," also
submitted for determination by the Undersigned as sole
arbitrator, the dispute involved in Union grievance #2088.
A hearing was held in Elizabeth, New Jersey on all four
issues, on October 25, 1968, at which time representatives
of the parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
waived.

The oath of the Arbitrators was expressly

Following the oral hearing the Board of Arbitration

on grievances #2115,#2117 and #2137 met in Executive Session.

- 2 Grievances #2115, #2117 and #2137
These three grievances are interrelated and can be dealt
with in the same discussion.

Each relates to Employee James

Harris, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant."

Grievance

#2137 challenges the propriety of a two week disciplinary suspension imposed on the grievant for excessive absenteeism.
Grievances #2115 and #2117 challenge the Company's act of disqualifying the grievant from both his regular job and any
other job in the plant which by seniority he might have
claimed, upon his return from the disciplinary

suspension.

Based on the evidence it is clear that the Company's
determination that the grievant was physically unable to perform either his regular job as a sweeper or any other job
based on his seniority, was proper.

The grievant claims that

he suffers from a back condition, related to an injury sustained in 1966, for which he received a Workmen's Compensation
settlement.

His record of absenteeism is attributed, in part

at least, and by his own admission, to that ailment.

His in-

ability to perform all the duties of his sweeper job or any
other assignment which he could claim based on his seniority,
is evidenced by his own admission to that fact, together with
a written statement from his personal physician.
When he reported* for work, on or about June 16, following the completion of a two week suspension, he stated to the
Company physician, who was prepared to examine him as required by the contract, that his back continued to bother him
and that he was unable to perform the lifting duties attendant
to the sweeper job.

A review by the Company of other jobs in

- 3 the plant, occupied by less senior employees, for which the
grievant might exercise his seniority, disclosed, without
dispute, that all required more physical effort than the duties
of a sweeper.

Also subsequently, the grievant produced a med-

ical statement from his own physician indicating that he was
able to return to work, but only for "light duty."

Based on

the grievant's own statement to the Company doctor; the unavailability of less strenuous workj and the written statement
of his personal physician, the Company determined that he was
physically unable to perform his regular job or any other available work, and disqualified him on physical grounds in accordance with Article II Section 2.14 (m) of the contract.

As a

consequence the grievant was placed on inactive status as part
of the Surplus Labor List in accordance with Article VII
Section 7.08 of the contract,
The evidence, especially the grievant's own statement,
and the medical report from his own physician, fully support the
action taken by the Company.

Accordingly the Company's action

is upheld and grievances #2115 and #2117 are denied.
Having accepted as factual the grievant's claim regarding
his back condition, the Company should also have accepted that
reason for the grievant's absences from work following a three
day disciplinary suspension which ended on May 17, 1968. The
record shows that he reported his difficulty with his back
to the Company nurse and personnel manager and that his absences either coincided with or immediately followed those
reports.

At the hearing the Company personnel manager stated

- 4that the grievant was suspended for two weeks because the
Company did not believe that his absences were due to the
alleged back condition.
But, as already indicated, the Company relied on that
condition in support of its action, only two weeks later, in
disqualifying the grievant from employment on physical grounds,
and I have held that that determination by the Company was
proper.

It is both logical and reasonable to me, that two

weeks earlier, when the grievant also complained about his
back, and stayed out of work his condition was no different
than the Company found it to be two weeks later, when it disqualified him from active employment.

Accordingly, I am con-

strained to hold that the Company erred when it disbelieved
the grievant's story about his back - only to believe it, and
act proper on that belief, two weeks later.
So rather than to impose a suspension, I believe the
proper action should have been to find him physically unable
to work at that time rather than to await his return from
the suspension to do so.

He should have been placed on the

Surplus Labor List as of the date his suspension began.
Therefore the suspension shall be expunged from his record
and his disqualification shall be made retroactive to cover
as well, the entire period of the suspension.

Obviously,

however, because he would have been, and still is, in an inactive employment status, he is not entitled to back pay
even though the suspension is expunged.

- 5 Grievance #2088
The Company terminated Gloria Thompson for failure to return certain medical forms as required, despite repeated
notices and requests and extensions of time to do so.
The evidence supports the Company's position. Mrs. Thompson was supplied with medical forms and instructed to return
them by a specific date0

She failed to do so.

Thereafter,

on February 15, 1968, she was notified by telegram to complete
and return the medical forms.
telegram was delivered.

There is no dispute that the

She failed to comply and after claim-

ing that the forms were in possession of her physician, was
given an extension of time to file them.
do so.

Again she failed to

Thereafter she reported that the medical forms had

been lost.

Her husband, also an employee, was provided with

a dmplicate set and she was afforded a further extension of
time to complete them.
filed.

Again they were neither completed nor

Her husband then reported that the duplicate set of

papers were also lost and he was given a third set for his wife
together with a further extension of time within which she was
to complete and file them.
After the passage of a reasonable period of time thereafter, when the forms were still not returned, the Company
terminated the grievant from its employ.
I find that the Company's action was proper.

Clearly

Mrs. Thompson was afforded every opportunity to comply with
the requirements that the medical forms be completed and filed.
Indeed the Company extended itself well beyond what it was required to do in order to accommodate her.

For her to ignore

- 6 the obligation to complete and file the medical forms; to disregard the several notices and requests by the Company; and
further, to fail to comply with these requests after the
Company twice, supplied duplicate forms, can only be construed
as gross indifference to her minimal responsibilities as an
employee.

Indeed I find that Mrs. Thompson's failure to

meet the reasonable requests of the Company after those requests were repeated several times and after extensions of
time were granted, constitutes a complete abandonment of her
interest in or claim to any employment status with the Company.
In short, by her own acts of omission she relinquished
her job.

Therefore her termination from the Company's employ

was proper and is upheld.

The Union's grievance #2088 is de-

nied.

Eric/J. Schmertz f,
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
_,
„
, _ , „ ,, _ , _ _ _ _

_

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'

Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union Local 8-438, AFL-CIO

'
'
T

and
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.

'
'
'
t

Award
and
Opinion

In accordance with Article VIII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated December 17, 1966 as extended, between
E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the
"Company," and Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union Local 8-438, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide a dispute between the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," relating to
Union Grievance #NP-766-67.
Hearings were held in New Brunswick, New Jersey on July 7,
1967 and May 3, 1968, at which time representatives of the
parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses,
The Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.
Union Grievance #NP-766-67 reads:
We B. Pavick Casey Sarnicki F.C. Spataro
protest the unfair action of the company (E.R8
Squibb and Sons) for creating what we feel is an
unsafe condition. This unsafe condition is created when an electrician who is working shifts in
area maintenance is unable to report for work.
When this happens, the area maintenance foreman
does not cover this opening by holding over or
calling in another electrician to complete the

- 2shift of two men. We feel that in many cases the
hazards of our work make it a necessity to have two
electricians present. This is especially true when
working in many areas which have little or no personnel in them. We are aware of our rights under
the contract concerning safety, however, we feel
it would be more practical to discuss and try to
settle this problem before an incident arises in
which we will be forced to invoke these rights.
Signed:
L. Fortenboher
Richard Buck
Robert Cherrington
Richard Pich

Harry Ericksen
T. Yanushefski
A. Bogush
P. Wanson

J. P. Baldesweiler
A. Hodokowski
A 0 Holz

Basically the Union's claim is that certain electrical
assignments, to be performed safely, require two qualified
electricians.

The Union contends that the Company has used

and may in the future use, a single electrician to perform
those assignments.

And rather than resist carrying out such

duties when or if directed to do so, thereby creating a potential disciplinary problem, the Union seeks an Award directing
the Company to use two electricians whenever such job assignments are made.

From the Union's standpoint, the problem seems

to arise, either actually or potentially, when the normal complement of two electricians on the second and third shift is
reduced to one by the absence of the other, usually because of
illness.

The Union claims that the Company has required the

single remaining electrician to perform work which may only be
performed safely by two, and is fearful of future similar
assignments.

As one remedy the Union demands that at least two

electricians be made available at all times on all shifts, holding over or calling in unscheduled electricians if absences reduce the complement below two.

- 3 The Company denies that it has made any unsafe assignments of work to the electricians.

It concedes that it has an

obligation under the contract to take all reasonable steps to
insure safe conditions of employment, and asserts that that
obligation has at all times been met.

It argues that the

Arbitrator has no authority to rule prospectively on future
work assignments which may be unsafe, because there is no evidence that the Company will or intends to order the electricians
to work under any such conditions„

And so far as past and

present assignments are concerned, the Company denies that the
Union has proved any of them to have been unsafe.

Therefore

the Company concludes that the Arbitrator should neither direct
that two electricians be assigned at all times to certain specific tasks, nor that the Company be required to fill as well
as schedule each shift with at least two electricians.
There is not enough evidence in the record for me to
judge, as alleged by the Union, that actual assignments previously made by the Company in connection with the "feeder;"
elevators; fans on building roofs; lamps in explosion proof
areas; work in tunnels and areas of isolation; lights located
in the air, above fermenters, on towers, and in the ether pit;
high voltage equipment; mechanical work with starter covers;
pumps underground in manholes; brushes and other parts on
moving machinery; and others expressly referred to by the
Union in this proceeding, are at all times unsafe unless performed by two electricians.

I can conceive of instances where

the work performed by a single electrician might well be unsafe and other times where he could do it singly without un-

- 4reasonable danger.

It seems to me that the circumstances of

each assignment when made, must be weighed, and a judgment
then made on the question of safety.

And while in many in-

stances at least two electricians might be necessary, I do not
think that a hard and fast rule can be promulgated requiring
two electricians at all times.

Nor am I able to judge from

the record whether certain jobs actually require two qualified
electricians, or in the alternative, might not be safely performed by a single electrician together with some other classified employee assisting.

For that reason as well, I am un-

able to conclude that a directive ordering the Company to
make two electricians available at all times, is warranted.
Nor do I think that the remedy requested by the Union that each shift be manned at all times by at least two electricians - meets the need.

Clearly, the Company has the right

to defer to a later time or shift certain electrical assignments which would require two electricians, when only one is
present on the job.

And so long as the Company makes no un-

safe assignments to a single electrician, the absence of a
second electrician from the second or third shift, is immaterial,
The determination of this case, in my judgment, should
be based on both the Working Conditions and Past Practices
clauses of the contract.

Under the former the Company concedes

its obligation to use its best efforts to maintain safe conditions of employment.

And under the latter the practices

followed shall continue unless contravened by the contract.
Manifestly past practices in compliance with the Company's
obligation to maintain safe conditions of employment are not

- 5 so contravened, but rather must continue to be followed.
Therefore, in that connection, it is my determination that the
Company shall continue to use two or more electricians on any
electrical assignment which would be unsafe if performed by a
single electrician.

And if on the second and third shift,

only one electrician is present, he shall not be assigned
tasks which would be unsafe unless performed by at least two
electricians.

The Company shall defer those assignments un-

til additional electricians are available, or if they must be
performed as a normal assignment on a shift where a single
electrician is in attendance, the Company shall hold over
or call in an additional electrician to participate,,
Obviously the foregoing determinatioiE in no way pass
judgment on whether certain specific assignments

previously

and presently made, or possible in the future, are or will
be safe if assigned to a single electrician.

The Company has

stated that it intends to make no unsafe assignments.

If it

does, or if the parties are in dispute over a specific assignment, the Union may of course grieve.

It should also be

clear to the Company that the well recognized exception to
the well settled rule that an employee must carry out a work
assignment, is where that assignment is dangerous.

So, put

bluntly, an employee who refused to perform a task which because of its unsafe nature has been improperly assigned to
him, would be immune to disciplinary action.

Also because

dealing with electricity involves some normal hazards, an
unsafe condition within the meaning of this Opinion and

- 6 Award is one which exceeds what an employee is reasonably expected to encounter and undertake as part of his job.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: May

1968

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF

)ss.)

On this
day of May, 1968, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSpCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration

Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 8-138 OCAW, AFL-CIO
and

Award

E. R. Squibb & Sons

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The five day disciplinary suspension of James
Metcalf is reduced to a formal written reprimand or warning. He shall be made whole for
his loss of wages.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August
1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF
On this
day of August, 1968, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 1330 0189 68

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 8-138 OCAW, AFL-CIO
Opinion

and
Eft R. Squibb & Sons

In accordance with the Arbitration Provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between E. R. Squibb & Sons,
hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local 8-138 OCAW,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the
following stipulated issue:
Was the suspension of James Metcalf for just
cause? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on June 11, 1968 at which time Mr. Metcalf,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives
of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as
the "parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded all con-

cerned to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.

The parties filed post hearing briefs.

But for one factor I would uphold the Company's action as
a proper application of the well settled rule of "progressive
discipline."

The grievant was suspended for five working days

because he committed certain admitted work errors.

In part at

least, these errors resulted from his failure to follow prescribed procedures and methods relating to the manufacture and
labelling of drug products.

Though the specific mistakes were

detected before the products left the plant and hence were not
of

substantial severity, it is obvious that neglect of pre-

- 2 scribed methods and procedures could, in any other instance,
lead to mistakes of great magnitude and danger to the consuming
public.

Also unlike other employees who made the same or sim-

ilar mistakes on or around the same time, and who received only
warnings, the grievant had been previously disciplined both by
a warning and a three day disciplinary suspension for previous
work errors of a similar type.
That these prior disciplinary penalties date back about
2-1/2 years does not, in my view, make them inapplicable to
the instant case.

There is nothing in the contract which

liquidates prior disciplinary penalties after a specific period
of time.

I agree with the Union that after an extended period

of time, a disciplinary penalty should be disregarded when an
employee's record has been otherwise maintained unblemished.
But I am not prepared to find that to be the case here.

Be-

cause the warnings and suspension of 1965 were in part at least
for the same reason as the five day suspension involved in this
arbitration -- for work errors arising from a failure to follow
prescribed methods and procedures -- the intervening period of
2-1/2 years is not so extensive as to render the prior record
inapplicable to the penalty presently imposed.

In short, there

being no dispute over the fact that the grievant made mistakes
resulting, in part, from a failure to follow prescribed procedures; and having been warned and suspended in 1965 for the
same reasons, the imposition of a five day disciplinary suspension would be both a logical and reasonable application of the
principle of progressive discipline.
The altering factor however is my agreement with the Union

- 3 that once an employee has been notified of the disciplinary penalty he is to receive, the Company thereafter, consistent with
due process, should not be permitted to impose a greater penalty even if it be substantively appropriate.
that this is what happened in this case.

I am convinced

The grievant was told

by a supervisor with authority that he would receive a "reprimand" for his work errors.

Thereafter he was actually penalized

with a five day disciplinary suspension.

I do not accept the

Company's assertion that "reprimand" includes or encompasses a
suspension.

One of the reasons that the theory of progressive

discipline is so well settled and accepted not only by unions
and management but also by employees, is because a distinction
is made between the penalties to be imposed and the terminology
used in describing these penalties.

The whole basis of the

theory of progressive discipline is that for certain offenses
an employee shall be disciplined on a progressively severe
basis leading ultimately to the final penalty of discharge, if
the earlier or lesser penalties did not prove to be rehabilitative.

In its application an employee receives a warning or a

reprimand before a disciplinary suspension.

And the latter be-

fore the penalty of discharge, except in cases where discharge
may be summarily imposed.

In other words, in the classical

application of the rule, a "reprimand" is different from a
suspension.

In my experience it has consistently meant a for-

mal warning, usually in writing but without time off from work.
Therefore, in the instant case I think it inconsistent for the
Company to argue that it merely applied the well settled rule
of progressive discipline (which provides for a distinct

- 4sequential and quantitative difference between a reprimand and a
suspension) while asserting at the same time that a "reprimand"
in this situation was synonymous with a disciplinary suspension.
Nor is there enough evidence to show that in this particular industrial relationship the parties have come to use or
accept the word reprimand to include the greater penalty of
suspension.

In my judgment the mere fact that notice of the

grievant's five day disciplinary suspension was printed on a
form headed or entitled "Reprimand" is not enough to bring the
former penalty within the umbrella of the latter.

There must be

more convincing evidence showing that the parties herein, by
practice and understanding have placed a special meaning on the
word "reprimand," thereby subjecting it to an interpretation
different from the manner in which it is classically applied.
That evidence is not present in the record before me in this case.
Accordingly, because the Company notified the grievant that
his penalty would be a reprimand, I find that the Company erred
when it actually penalized the grievant with a five day disciplinary suspension.

If the Company had not notified the griev-

ant that his penalty was to be a reprimand I would have upheld
the suspension as appropriate.

Therefore, the suspension is

reversed and changed to a formal written reprimand or warning,
and the grievant shall be made whole for his loss of wages.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Fabrikoid Works Employees' Association
and

Award

Stauffer Chemical Company

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated January 18, 1967 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The Company did not violate the contract in
filling jobs classified as Inspector on
May 1, 1967.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

1968

On this
day of February, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 67A6787

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Fabrikoid Works Employees' Association
and

Opinion

Stauffer Chemical Company

In accordance with Article XI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated January 18, 1967 between Stauffer Chemical Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and
Fabrikoid Works Employees' Association, hereinafter referred
to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the contract by filling
jobs classified as Inspector on May 1, 1967? If
so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on September 12, 1967 at which time representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared. Full opportunity was afforded
the parties to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's oath.

The parties expressly waived the

The parties filed post hearing briefs and

the hearings were declared closed on January 22, 1968.
I deny the grievance because I am not persuaded that
the grievants possess the qualifications to perform the jobs
they seek.

The jobs in question are those classified as

Inspectors, First Class.

They were filled by employees un-

disputedly qualified, but junior in seniority to the grievants.
The Union contends that the grievants are qualified to do the
work and should have been awarded the jobs because of their

greater seniority.
The most that the Union has established, if I was persuaded by all of its evidence and testimony, is that the grievants performed, and possess the qualifications to perform,
the work of the classification Inspector, Second Class.

But

no evidence was offered to show that the grievants had or
could perform the work of Inspector, First Class, or that
the work of the Second Class Inspector job is the same or
substantially similar to the work required of a Hirst Class
Inspector.

The establishment and existence of two separate

classifications, Inspector First Class and Inspector Second
Class, carries with it the presumption that the duties of
the former require greater skills and qualifications than do
those of the latter.

The Union's case fails to rebut this

presumption and accordingly I am unable to find that the
grievants, even if they possessed the qualifications to work
as Inspectors Second Class, are qualified for the jobs of
Inspectors First Class.
With the foregoing finding I need not decide whether the
contract entitles the senior employee to the promotion if he
is merely qualified to perform the job he seeks, or whether he
has a right to the job only if his qualifications are equal to
or greater than an employee with less seniority.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
District 15 IAM

and

Award

Target Leasing

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The grievants are entitled to, and the Company
shall pay them, a day's pay for April 9, 1968.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:

July

1968

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss .
)

On this
day of July, 1968, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case No. 1330 0338 68

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'

District 15 IAM

'
i
and

'
i

Target Leasing

Opinion

'
i

The above named parties designated the Undersigned to hear
and decide the following stipulated issue:
Are the grievants entitled to a day's pay
for April 9, 1968?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on June 27, 1968 at which time representatives
of the parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.
On April 9, Target Leasing, hereinafter referred to as
the "Company," was shut down in observance of the funeral of
the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The shut down was mutually

arranged by the Company and District 15 IAM, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," but the Union's agreement was not unconditional.

Its agreement was based on the express under-

standing that an entire F 0 & M. Schaefer Brewing plant, which
the Company services, would also be closed that day.

It turn-

ed out however, that though the Schaefer drivers did not work
that day, other Schaefer employees, namely the inside plant
personnel did work.

Consequently, the grievants and the Union

on their behalf, claim that because this condition, under
which they agreed to the Company's shut down, failed, they
were and should have been entitled to work on April 9 and seek
-

pay for that day.

- 2 Additionally the Union argues that absent any binding mutual understanding to the contrary, Article 7 of the applicable
contract guarantees a work week of five consecutive days of
seven hours per day, Monday through Friday.

And that on this

basis as well, the grievants are entitled to a day's pay for
April 9 which fell on a Tuesday.
I agree with the Company's argument that Article 7 does
not provide for such a guarantee.

Rather it is a traditional

work week clause which sets forth the normal or expected work
week.

There is no language therein which can be construed as

a guarantee.

Clearly, therefore, it allows for circumstances

under which the work week may be reduced for one or more employees.
work.

Layoffs may be effectuated when there is a lack of

Also, work may be suspended or curtailed in the event of

machinery or operational break downs and other emergencies beyond the Company's control which interfere with production or
operations.

Furthermore, of course, the plant may be closed

during a normal working day by a binding mutual agreement between the parties.
However, I find none of the foregoing circumstances present in the instant case.

The Company concedes that there was

work available for the grievants on April 9 even though the
Schaefer trucks which they service were not running.

Although

it was not essential that the available work be performed on
that day, I cannot conclude that there was a lack of work which
would justify a layoff.

No emergency existed which interfered

with the Company's capability to operate.

And though the

parties had mutually agreed to close the plant in observance

- 3of the funeral, the significant consideration for that agreement - namely the understanding that all employees at the
Schaefer plant would likewise observe the day, turned out to
be untrue.

In other words but for this consideration, the

Union and the grievants would not have agreed to the day off,
and presumably they would have worked.

So with the failure of

the condition upon which their agreement was based, the agreement itself failed and is not binding.

It is not enough

that the Company thought the entire Schaefer plant was to be
closed.

The responsibility for ascertaining the facts accur-

ately rested with the Company, especially when, based on
those facts, it obtained the Union's agreement to close down.
So I fail to see how it would be fair to hold the Union or
the grievants to that agreement when the facts upon which it
is based proved materially different.
The observance of Dr. King's funeral is of course laudable.

Yet my authority is limited to the contract between the

parties.

And under the contract, as applied to the circum-

stances of this case, I do not find that the Company had the
right to unilaterally close the plant on April 9, nor do I
find as binding, the initial agreement between the parties to
do so.
Accordingly the grievance is granted and the Company shall
pay the grievants a day's pay for April 9, 1968.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'
i

Newspaper Guild of Greater Philadelphia

'
i

and
Triangle Publications, Inc.

'
t
'
i

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties and dated September 23, 1966 and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties,
Awards, as follows:
The grievance is arbitrable.
The issue of "just cause for discharge" is not part
of this proceeding „
The resignation of Paul Huller was voluntary and not
violative of the contract. Therefore it is valid and
shall obtain. The Guild's grievance on his behalf is
denied.
The fees and expenses of the Arbitrator, and the administrative costs of the American Arbitration Association, shall be shared equally by the parties.

Eric /f. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: October '^1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss. :
)

On this *- 5» day of October, 1968, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executhe same.
Case No. 1430 0723
MAURiCC L.
Notary Public, Slate of New ^
No. 30-8839725
in Nassau County
30,

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Newspaper Guild of Greater Philadelphia
and
Triangle Publications, Inc.

'
i
'
'
i
'

Opinion

In accordance with Section 31 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated September 23, 1966, between Triangle
Publications, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Employer,"
and Newspaper Guild of Greater Philadelphia, hereinafter referred to as the "Guild," the Undersigned was selected as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute involving the Guild's
grievance on behalf of Mr. Paul Huller.
Hearings were held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on January 3,
February 7, March 20, May 1, May 17, July 10, July 12, July 22
and July 30, 1968, at which time Mr. Huller, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Guild
and the Employer, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded all con-

cerned to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The parties filed post hearing briefs

and the hearings were declared closed as of September 23, 1968.
I have given what I consider to be full and careful consideration to the stenographic record of the hearings, consisting of 923 pages; my own notes taken in the course of the
hearings; the large number of exhibits submitted by the parties;
and the thorough and well reasoned briefs of each side.

And

I have reached my conclusions and findings which I shall con-

- 2 fine herein to those matters I deem pertinent; and which I
choose to recite briefly, directly and to the point.
The grievance is arbitrable.

It claims that the griev-

ant's "resignation" is invalid and seeks his reinstatement
with back pay and full benefits.

The arbitrability of a

grievance does not turn on its merits.

It is not a question

of whether a contract provision has in fact been violated;
but rather whether there is a reasonable relationship

between

the grievance and the allegation of a violation of specific
contract clause(s).

To be arbitrable the grievance need

only meet the requirements of the arbitration clause of the
contract, namely "any dispute as to the interpretation of
any clause of this agreement or as to the carrying out of
any of its terms ...."
The instant grievance meets this test because, in pertinent part, it alleges violations of Sections 2 and 17 of
the contract, and substantively, is related, prima facie, to
those sections.
Also I am satisfied that well prior to the commencement
of the arbitration hearings, the Guild, by letter, and during
the course of the grievance meetings, made fully clear to
the Employer the nature of its grievance; the contract provisions which it deemed violated; and the remedy it sought.
So, if early in the processing of the grievance there was
any procedural defect, it was cured by the time the parties
jointly agreed to waive further "Joint Board" action and to
proceed instead directly to arbitration.

For these reasons

the Employer's contention that the grievance is not arbitrable
is denied.

- 3 The issue of "just cause for the grievant's discharge"
is not before me in this proceeding simply because the grievant was not discharged.

Unless an arbitrator is expressly

authorized by contract or by joint request of the parties, he
does not have the authority to render a declaratory judgment
on the question of just cause.
to that of review.

His jurisdiction is limited

He reviews the discharge action taken by

an employer and determines whether or not it was based on
just cause.

But until and unless discharge action has been

taken, the arbitrator has nothing to review.

Here, neither

the contract nor both parties authorized me to determine
whether there would have been just cause for the grievant's
discharge.

And of course the Employer did not and has not

initiated discharge action against the grievant.

Indeed, it

is the Employer's position that the grievant resigned; that
the resignation was voluntary and therefore valid.

For the

Employer to advance that latter position, and at the same time
contend that the Arbitrator has authority to find that just
cause exists for discharge, is to argue in mutually inconsistent directions.

Accordingly, because the question of "just

cause" is not before me I make no judgment on the Employer's
allegation that the grievant falsified his work reports and
expense accounts, or whether, even if true, it would constitute
cause for discharge.

And consequently it would be unnecessary

to afford the Guild an opportunity to meet or refute those
allegations.
It makes no difference whether I accept the grievant's
version of the meeting on August 10 when the Employer confront-

- 4ed him with the charges of falsification of records, or the
version advanced by Messrs. Williams and Hoover.

Either

way, and despite the Employer's disclaimer, I am persauded
that representatives of the Employer made it unmistakenly
clear to the grievant, either overtly or subtly, that he had
the choice of resignation or discharge.
wrong with this.

But I find nothing

As I see it, to offer the grievant that

choice in no way deprives him of his rights under the discharge provisions of Section 17 of the contract.
right to spurn the resignation suggestion.

He had the

If he did so,

all his rights, and those of the Guild, to challenge his discharge (if the Employer discharged him) would be fully preserved.

So I cannot see how a suggestion of resignation,

which the grievant could have rejected as well as accepted,
would put him in any more of a prejudicial position than if
he had been discharged without the choice.
Also where an employer believes it has good cause to
discharge an employee, I do not believe it is always in the
interest of that employee, or consistent with normal employment practices, for discharge to be the sole method of terminating his employment.

Clearly, as is the situation in the

instant case, he should retain the right to insist that his
termination be by discharge, so that its propriety may be
put to the test in the grievance procedure and arbitration„
But so long as he may exercise this right if he chooses,
it may also be in his best interest to be afforded and to
select another choice - that of resignation.

And provided

he may choose one or the other, a contract provision requir-

- 5 ing just cause for his discharge, is in no way violated.
Therefore, for the Employer in the instant case to inform the grievant that he had a choice of discharge or resignation, was not in and of itself violative of the contract.
What is critical however, is whether the circumstances allowed the grievant to make a free, rational and unfettered choice.
I answer this critical question in the affirmative.

No

doubt on August 10, when confronted by the Employer with
charges of misconduct, the grievant was stunned, distressed,
fearful and embarrassed.

And I believe that he may well have

experienced all of these emotions whether the charges against
him were true or false.

For to be discovered in a misconduct

may be just as traumatic as to be falsely accused.

And if in

response to the option made available to him, he resigned
then, I would have little trouble declaring the resignation
void, on the grounds that it was submitted during an immediate
and initial period of emotional stress and mental adversity.
But though there is much evidence indicating that the grievant
offered to resign at that point, and indeed it appears that
the Employer could have obtained his resignation then, the
Employer representatives urged him to "take 24 hours to
think it over and to discuss it with anyone he wished."
Also, I am not prepared to conclude that at the August 10
meeting, the grievant was coerced, intimidated, threatened or
unduly influenced by the Employer representatives„

Charges

of misconduct were levelled against him; but the Employer
had the right to present such charges for an explanation.
And their mere presentation, together with a review of the

- 6 grievant's work history, no matter how unpleasant or uncomplimentary, cannot be equated with unfair or unjust treatment.
I am critical of the Employer's failure to see to it
that the grievant had adequate Guild representation at that
time, because I find that Mr. Hoover, though bearing the title
of Shop Steward, was manifestly an Employer representative,
partisan to the Employer's position.

But because the grievant

had full opportunity to, and indeed did confer with top level
Guild representation after the meeting and before he submitted his resignation (during which time he had not yet made
his choice), I do not find this omission on the part of the
Employer, however irregular, to be material in determining the
issue in this case.

Certainly, if as I have held, the Employer

had the right to confront the grievant with allegations of
misconduct, the grievant's emotional and physical response,
peculiar to his own psychological and physiological make-up,
is neither the Employer's fault, nor example of coercion, intimidation or undue influence.
What is material, in my judgment, is that the grievant
had about 24 hours thereafter to think things over.

He had

the presence of mind to discuss the matter with the Guild's
Unit Chairman, who in the strongest terms cautioned the grievant not to resign.

During this period the grievant had no

further contact with representatives of the Employer and in
no way was under their direct influence.

This is not to

suggest that during this period his emotional stress subsided
entirely, but rather that I believe his perspective became
sufficiently balanced so that, together with his talk with the

- 7 Guild Unit Chairman, he could on August llth, make a rational and voluntary decision despite the fact that it was a
harsh and worrisome one.

In other words, though he may have

remained distressed, I do not believe that with the passage of
approximately 24 hours and the fact of his initiative in seeking and obtaining advice from the Guild, his mind was so
clouded by emotional or physical stress as to make his decision
involuntary, irrational or unreasoned.

Therefore, I conclude

that the period of 24 hours during which the grievant conferred
with the Guild, was a reasonable time within which to make a
voluntary choice as between resignation and discharge.

Hence

I am satisfied that when on August llth, he submitted a
written resignation it was a voluntary act on his part.

That

before he did, he sought more time to think it over (which the
Employer would not afford him) I attribute to the fact that
he realized the trying nature and finality of his decision, not
because his mind was not yet sufficiently clear to make a free
or rational choice.
The events that followed support this conclusion.

The

grievant stated that he thought he "had done the right thing;"
with some enthusiasm he shook hands with Employer representatives; permitted an announcement of his resignation to be made
in the office; and authorized plans for a farewell luncheon or
party.

I do not consider these to be the acts or attitudes of

a man who has been coerced or intimidated, or whose resignation
was involuntarily produced as a result of undue emotional or
physical stress.
The remaining question is whether the conditions and cir-

- 8 cumstances of the resignation violated the second paragraph
of Section 2 of the contract which reads:
The Publisher will not enter into any agreement
inconsistent with the provisions of this contract
with any individual employe or group of employes
affecting the conditions or terms of employment
of said employe or group of employes.
There is no dispute over the fact that the grievant,
upon resignation, received more severance pay than his entitlement under the contract.

It is equally undisputed that he was

paid what he would have received had he been discharged or resigned at age 60, instead of a lesser amount to which his age
of 59 and his resignation entitled him.

The Guild contends

that the grievant's resignation was "induced " by the Employer's offer of a greater sum of money; and that this offer
together with the grievant's acceptance, constituted an "individual agreement" proscribed by the foregoing contract provision.
I am unable to agree with the Guild's conclusion simply
because I cannot accept its theory of inducement.

The Employer

did not offer the grievant the greater sum of severance pay in
exchange for his resignation.
charge him if he resigned.

Rather, it offered not to dis-

It was not the Employer who brought

up the question of severance pay, but rather the grievant.
When confronted with the choice of discharge or resignation,
he asked the Employer what he would be entitled to as severance
pay.

Then, and only then, did the Employer indicate a willing-

ness to waive the one year between age 59 and 60, thereby extending to the grievant severance pay in the greater amount„
I have no doubt that this gesture on the part of the Employer
had something to do with the grievant1s decision to resign.

- 9 And I have little doubt that the Employer's decision was based
on an effort to make resignation more palatable.

But it was

based also, I believe, on a sincere desire to assist him financially.

So I am convinced that the greater sum of severance

pay was neither advanced, nor offered, nor "dangled" in front
of the grievant as an inducement or a consideration for his
resignation.

Rather it was a benefit which would attend his

resignation, not a contractual offer to be accepted by the
act of resignation.
Nor do I find the gratuitous statements of the Employer
representatives, also during the August 10th meeting, that
they would attempt to find some other job for the grievant,
to be violative of Section 2 of the contract.

Clearly, these

statements were neither offers nor considerations for the
resignation, because they were equivocal and speculative.
Furthermore, as there is nothing in the contract prohibiting
such statements, there is nothing about them that is "inconsistent with the provisions of the contract."

Nor, to repeat

again can such statements, which the Guild itself characterizes as "promises," be at the same time, construed as coercive,
intimidating, or threatening.
Moreover, I am not persuaded that to grant an employee
more severance pay than he is technically entitled to constitutes a proscribed individual agreement within the meaning
of the second paragraph of Section 2 of the contract.

There

is much authority to the view that where a specific sum of
money is due, the payment of a larger sum, which per force
meets the total obligation plus more, is not inconsistent

- 10 with the contractual obligation to pay the lesser amount.

In

other words the larger payment, by liquidating the lesser obligation can hardly be held to be at variance with it. Standing alone this general principle would not be enough.

But it

appears that the parties have endorsed this general principle
by practice.

The evidence shows several examples where em-

ployees were accorded greater or larger benefits than their
technical entitlement under the contract.

Employees received

added vacation time; severance pay when they were not eligible;
additional sick leave benefits and a preferential hiring
status.

Some were by mutual agreement; but others were uni-

laterally promulgated by the Employer with notice to and without objection from the Guild.

So it appears that the second

paragraph of Section 2 was not designed as a general prohibition to the granting of benefits in excess of the contract entitlement.

And this is logical.

For except where the great-

er benefit is extended for some nefarious purpose or for a
purpose inimical to the Guild's status, it is difficult to see
why there would be any objection to giving an employee more
than his bare entitlement under the contract.

And while I

can think of circumstances under which a grant of greater
benefits would be contrary to the Guild's interest and status,
I do not find the instant case, or its circumstances, to be
among them0
So considering this practice, I believe that the second
paragraph of Section 2 was designed primarily to prevent individual deals between the Employer and an employee for terms
and conditions of employment less favorable than those under

-lithe contract or for those damaging to the Guild's representational status,,
The amount of severance pay granted the grievant was
greater rather than less than the contract term, and he was
and has been afforded Guild representation both before and
after his resignation.

Hence in those respects the second par-

agraph of Section 2, as thus interpreted, is not applicable.
For the foregoing reasons I find that the grievant's
resignation was voluntary, and not violative of the contract.
Hence there were no grounds upon which the Guild Unit Chairman
could have revoked it, following its submission, if indeed he
tried to do so.
I take note of the contract provision that the losing
party is to bear the full cost of the Arbitrator's fee and expenses and the administrative charges of the American Arbitration Association, and the conditions under which the Arbitrator may assess those costs otherwise,,
I find good reason, both equitably and contractually to
apportion these costs equally between the parties.

The Guild

is the losing party on the substantive question concerning
the grievant's resignation.

But it is the winning party on

two procedural points, both of which are part of my Award that the issue is arbitrable and that the question ofjust
cause" is not part of this case.

So it would not be accurate

to say that either side won or lost totally.
Also, the Employer introduced much testimony and evidence
on the issue of "just cause," which I have ruled is not properly part of this case0

If this evidence had not been introduced,

- 12 or if I had made my ruling on its admissability or applicability during the hearings, rather than in this Award and Opinion,
fewer hearings may have sufficed.

This may well have been so,

even though the Guild held off responding to that evidence,
based on my ruling that I would afford it an opportunity to
do so, if, during my study and deliberations, I decided that
that issue was before me in this proceeding.
So, because of this, to which I assume my share of the
responsibility, and considering the nature of my Award in
all its aspects, I shall rule that the Arbitrator's fee and
expenses, and the administrative charges of the American
Arbitration Association be borne equally by the parties.

Eric /jT Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 5971, AFL-CIO

and

Award

Uddeholm Steel Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated July 1, 1966 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the Parties, Awards, as follows:
Walter Kukulak was not entitled under the contract
to holiday pay for Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day
or the day after Thanksgiving, 1967.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: April

1968

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss .
)

On this
day of April, 1968, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case No. 1330 0008 68

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
United Steelworkers of America,
Local 5971, AFL-CIO

and

Opinion

Uddeholm Steel Corporation

In accordance with the Arbitration Provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated July 1, 1966 between
Uddeholm Steel Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the
"Company," and United Steelworkers of America, Local 5971,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the
following stipulated issue:
Whether Employee Walter Kukulak is entitled under
the contract to holiday pay for Veterans Day,
Thanksgiving Day and the day after Thanksgiving
Day, 1967?
A hearing was held on March 29, 1968, at which time representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to
jointly as the "parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was

afforded the parties to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses„
The aforementioned holidays are amongst those enumerated
in Article VII Section lla of the contract as paid holidays
for eligible employees.

Paragraph c thereof reads:

No employee will receive holiday pay if a holiday
occurs while he is laid off or on leave of absence
or if a holiday occurs during a work stoppage in
violation of Section 4 Article II of this agreement.
The Company contends that Mr. Kukulak, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," was on leave of absence when the fore-

- 2 going holidays occurred and hence ineligible for holiday pay.
The Union disputes the Company's characterization of the grievant's status.

It asserts that he was "out due to a Workmen's

Compensation injury;" that he was not on leave of absence because he never requested such a leave.
The parties stipulated that the grievant enjoys more
than 12 years of seniority; that he was out due to illness
from September 29 to December 3, 1967 inclusive; and that he
received sick pay in accordance with Article XI of the contract
through November 7, 1967.
It is the Company's position that subsequent to November
7, 1967, when the grievant exhausted his sick pay he was placed by the Company on leave of absence until he was physically
able to return to work.

Only in this manner, the Company

argues, was it able to protect his status as an employee and
his right to return to his job.
The Union points to Article V Section 8 of the contract
which reads:
In its sole discretion, the Company may grant a
leave of absence. Employees will retain but will
not accrue seniority during leaves of absence.
It is understood that leaves of absence will not
be granted for the purpose of taking employment
elsewhere and an employee who engages in gainful
employment elsewhere during a leave of absence
will lose his status as an employee.
and argues that a leave of absence may be granted by the Company after it has been requested by the employee, but that
the Company may not initiate a leave of absence on its own
motion.
I do not dispute the fact that the grievant was out of

- 3 work because of a compensable injury.
does not dispute that.

Indeed the Company

But I am also persuaded that his

status was not one of active employment.

Yet, he was neither

laid off nor terminated from the Company's employ.

I find

there to be only one other possible recognized status which
would, as it did here, protect his job during his absence and
permit him to return to that job upon recovery from his injury.

And that is the status of a leave of absence.

There

was no evidence adduced as to whether the grievant was or
was not credited with accrual of seniority during the period
November 7 through December 3, 1967.

Hence that factor

cannot be determative of the issue in dispute.
I am satisfied that Section lie of Article VII was intended to deny holiday to those employees who are not actively at work at the time that the holiday occurred.

Hence the

exclusion of those on layoff or leave of absence.

Put another

way, the intent was to grant holiday pay to those who would
or could have worked, but for the holiday.

It is clear to

me that the benefit of holiday pay, under this contract, is not
a guarantee to all employees; but rather is extended to those
who were actively employed at the time of holiday.
ant does not fall within this category.
job ill or recovering from an injury.

The griev-

He was away from his

He was not nor could

he have been actively employed at the time of the holidays
involved.
I am persuaded that the grievant's status could have
been nothing other than a leave of absence due to illness or
to injury.

His job was being held open for him and he retained

- 4the right to return to it when able to do so.

This right is

neither consistent with the status of layoff nor of termination.

Rather it is a right which traditionally attaches to

an employee on leave of absence.

One of the benefits which

accrues to an employee on leave is that during his absence
his job rights are protected.

Either his job is not filled

or filled only temporarily while he is away.

At the end of

the leave he is entitled to reclaim his job, assuming it is
still being worked, to the exclusion of all other employees.
And this is precisely the benefit which the Company extended
to the grievant.

It told him and his wife that his job would

be kept open for him, and administratively, though not requested by the grievant, it placed him on a leave of absence
after November 7, 1967, the day his sick benefits ended.
I cannot agree with the Union that a leave of absence
must be initiated by the employee.
that way.

Certainly most come about

But that does not mean that the Company cannot, for

good cause, establish a leave of absence on its own motion.
In fact it seems to me that Section 8 of Article V permits
either.

The Company may grant a leave of absence, presumably

requested by an employee.
sole discretion."

It may also grant a leave "in its

The fact is, that in industrial relations

generally, a leave of absence initiated by an employer for an
employee who is or will be out ill for an extended period of
time, is by no means uncommon.

Employers have and may initiate

such leaves of absence, and I find nothing in the contract between the parties herein which prohibits this Company from
doing so.

- 5 For the foregoing reasons I conclude that though the
grievant was out of active work due to compensable injury, his
status with the Company, for the purposes of protecting his
right to return to his job, was, after his sick benefits had
expired, that of a leave of absence.

And that both by the

wording and intent of Section lie of Article VII of the contract, he was not entitled to holiday pay for the holidays
which fell during the period November 7 through December 3,
1967.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Wire Service Guild, Local No. 222
American Newspaper Guild
and
United Press International, Inc.

Opinion
and
Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and dated March 16, 1965 and having
been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, renders the following OPINION AND
AWARD:
Central to the issues in this case is the question of
what constitutes an 'out-of-town assignment" within the meaning of Article VI Section 4 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement,

Neither the language of the contract nor the

history of its negotiation provide a definition„

Resort to

past practice, the classical approach under such circumstances,
is of no help either.

Though the evidence offered by both

parties on past practice is substantial, I find it inconclusive.

The fact is that there has been no consistent or un-

varied practice with regard to the application of both the
"out-of-town assignment" and the "transfer" provisions of the
contract.

The evidence of past practice offered by the

Company supports its interpretation of the disputed contract
. clauses; and that offered by the Union supports the Union's

- 2 view.

The practices have been both ways, and the evidence

offsets each other.

The consequence is that there has been

no practice which can be determinative of the central question.
The parties, therefore, must be left without a precise delineation between a "transfer" and an "out-of-town assignment"
pending a subsequent proceeding where the evidence is more
conclusive, or collective bargaining on the issuea
I suggest that certain procedural facts unique to this
case, reflect its substantive inconclusiveness.

Following

the first hearing in November of 1966, the parties did not
undertake a second hearing until almost a year later at the
end of September, 1967.

Thereafter five months elapsed be-

fore briefs and reply briefs were filed.

And the Arbitrator

required 90 days rather than the customary 30 to render his
Award.
Because I have determined that an answer to the central
question is impossible because of the inconclusive nature of
the record, it follows that the Union, which is the grieving
party, has not met its burden of proving its theory of the
case.

Accordingly on that basis I render the following

Award:
The grievances of Albert Auvil and Charles Richards
are denied because the evidence offered by the
Union does not conclusively show that their work
was an "out-of-town assignment" within the meaning of Article VI Section 4 of the contract.
This Award is dispositive of those two grievances
but is in no way determinative of what constitutes
an "out-of-town assignment" under the aforementioned contract section. Therefore this Award is without prejudice to the positions of either party in
future matters or in collective bargaining0,/

Eric J'. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: May 24, 1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

ss.

On this 24th day of May, 1968, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz, to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 1330 0428 66

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration between
International Union of Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers, Local 837
Award

and
U. S. Metals Refining Company

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and dated July 1, 1964 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The discharge of Norvill Clark is reduced to a
suspension. He shall be reinstated with seniority, but without back pay. The suspension
shall run from the date of his discharge to the
date of his reinstatement and shall be noted as
a disciplinary suspension on his employment
record.

Eric fi. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December 17, 1968
STATE OF New York
)Ss.COUNTY OF New York
)
On this 17th day of December, 1968,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
ted the same.

before me personally
known and known to
who executed the
to me that he execu-

Case No. 1330 0599 68

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'
i

International Union of Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers, Local 837

'
"
i

and

'

U. S. Metals Refining Company

i
'

Opinion

In accordance with Article XII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated July 1, 1964 between U. S. Metals Refining
Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Local 837,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was
designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue:
Was the Company's discharge of Norvill Clark on
April 20, 1967 not for proper cause?
If the discharge was not for proper cause, what
shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held at the Company plant in Carteret, New
Jersey on November 19, 1968 at which time Mr. Clark, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of
the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded all con-

cerned to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the

Arbitrator's oath.
The immediate reason for the grievant' s discharge was
set forth by the Company in a telegram to him dated April 20,
1967 which read:

- 2 As of this date, 4/20/67 you are hereby discharged
for failure to report in after being out five consecutive days.
The Company took this action under Article XIII Section
57(d) of the contract which reads;
An employee shall lose his seniority rights if a
break in service occurs because of any one of the
following reasons:
(d) Is absent for five or more consecutive
days or shifts without notifying his forman or
department head and obtaining permission, unless the employee can establish that it was
impossible to so notify his foreman or department head.
In addition, and in the alternative the Company contends
that certain medical statements produced by the grievant covering a portion of his absences, are falsified.

And for that

reason itself, apart from any determination on the alleged
failure to report in as required by the foregoing contract
clause, the discharge was justified.
Because of the grievant1s prior disciplinary record, I
would have no difficulty upholding this discharge if he is
guilty of either of these latest offenses of absenteeism. His
record of absenteeism and tardiness is manifestly excessive,
and he received a series of prior disciplinary warnings and
suspension because of that record, all of which are uncontested.

So the penalty of discharge, in accordance with the well

established formula of progressive discipline, would be
appropriate for any further unauthorized

or falsified absences

or tardiness.
However, as a discharge case, the burden is on the Company to establish the grievant1s culpability by clear and convincing evidence.
of this standard.

I find that the Company's case falls short

- 3 Certain facts are not in dispute.

On the first day of

his absence, April 10, 1967, the grievant's wife did call the
plant and advise that the grievant was "sick and will not be
in."

The record of this call was noted in the Company daily

log.

Also the grievant underwent a minor eye operation on or

about April 26.

He was absent from work from April 10 until

his discharge on April 20.

He attempted to return to work on

May 9 but was not permitted to do so by the Company.
The Company claims that from April 10 to on or about
April 19 when the grievant was examined by Dr. Cunningham for
an eyelid lesion, he was not sick at all, or not so ill as to
be unable to report for work.

The Company contends that the

various medical statements from Drs. Verner and Cunningham,
covering treatments or visits from April 10 to April 19, are
either falsified, forged, or altered to suit the grievant's
purpose.

1 find the Company's case in this regard to be bas-

ically a conclusion, unsupported by hard evidence.

The griev-

ant was not visited at his home by a Company representative,
to verify the alleged absence, though the Company has followed
this practice in other instances.

None of the doctors were

called by the Company to testify nor were their records of
visitations and treatment produced or subpoened.

The Company

points to a difference in some of the signatures and to the
addition of or over-strikes of dates set forth in these medical statements, as evidence of falsification,,

No doubt these

factors give rise to some suspicions, but absent other supporting evidence, I cannot conclude that they represent proof of
falsification.

There is no doubt that the grievant suffered

- 4 from some sort of eye ailment as evidenced by the operation
and treatment, at least on and after April 19.

On the face

of it the medical statements indicate that the grievant was
under medical treatment from April 10.

The grievant's state-

ment that some of the slips were prepared by the doctor and
others by his nurse, in explanation of possible signature discrepancies, is plausible.

And in the absence of contrary testi-

mony or other probative contradictory evidence, I cannot find
his explanation to be untrue.

The same applies to his state-

ment with regard to the addition of the day of "April 12," as
an office visit to Dr. Cunningham, on the medical statement of
that physician dated April 30, 1968.

In short, with the bur-

den on the Company to prove the grievant's culpability, mere
suspicions and conclusions regarding the authenticity of the
medical statements are not enough to overturn the presumption
of their validity.
The Company's suspicion about the lack of bona fides of
the grievant's claim of illness between April 10 and April 19
was also derived, in part, by a phone call to the plant during
that period from the grievant's daughter, seeking the grievant 's whereabouts.

To the Company this meant that the griev-

ant' s story of illness was untrue, because he obviously was
not at home.

However, the grievant's explanation of this

event is equally plausible.

He had separated from his family

on or about April 10 and was living elsewhere.

So it is quite

possible that his family would not know if he was ill or at
work, because he was not living with them.
Accordingly, though there are some questionable aspects

- 5to the medical statements and the grievant's story concerning
his ailment, the evidence advanced by the Company does not
clearly and convincingly resolve those questions adverse to
the grievant.

Rather they remain either unanswered or specula-

tive, which I find is not enough to conclude that the medical
statements are false, forged or altered or that the grievant's
testimony is materially untrue.
There remains the question of whether the grievant lost
his seniority by failing to comply with Article XIII Section
57(d) of the contract.

The Company argues that by its lang-

uage and intent that Section requires an absent employee to
"report in" no later than after each of every five consecutive
days of his absence.

In the case of the grievant, the Com-

pany concedes that he reported in on April 10, but asserts
that in order to comply with the contract, he was required to
report in again no later than five days or shifts thereafter.
And that any time after the passage of five such days or
shifts, the Company may terminate an employee if this periodically required notification has not been met.
I am not persuaded that Section 57(d) can be interpreted
so rigidly.

Manifestly, it is intended to provide the Com-

pany of notification when an employee is absent for more than
a few days.

So notification within at least the first: five

days or shifts of the onset of illness causing absence from
work, is clearly required.

Or conversely, because the Com-

pany is entitled to know the whereabouts and condition of an
employee who is absent due to illness, so that a substitute
can be obtained and productivity planned, any employee who
fails to notify the Company after the first five such days of

- 6 absence, is subject to termination.

In that case failure to

notify may properly be deemed an abandonment of one's job. But
the grievant met that requirement.

Notification was supplied

the Company on April 10 that he was ill and would not be in.
So he met the undisputed obligation to notify the Company of
his absence within the first five consecutive days or shifts
thereof.

Was he obligated, however to again notify the Com-

pany some time after the fifth day of his absence?

I believe

that he should have, solely because of his past unsatisfactory
attendance record, but not because it is required under Section
57(d) of the contract.

I find that because of his prior dis-

ciplinary record, he had a special duty to keep the Company
notified of his illness and whereabouts.
do so, he should be penalized.

For his failure to

But I am not convinced that

loss of seniority (and hence his discharge) is mandated by
Section 57 (d).
It seems to me that if the parties intended Section 57(d)
to require an employee to report in every five consecutive
days or shifts it could easily have said so.

But it does not.

It leaves unclear whether subsequent reports, after the first
within five days, are required.

The instant contract clause

is not uncommon to collective bargaining agreements; and in
my experience its purpose has been confined to the requirement
that the employee notify the Company of his absence within the
prescribed time from its onset. But that unless it expressly
requires repeated notification within certain prescribed time,
the clause has not been interpreted to require a regular
"reporting in" at specific periodic points during the illness.

- 7 Instead, this type of clause has been interpreted and applied
in accordance with a "rule of reason/1
port in within the first five days.

The employee must re-

Thereafter he should keep

the Company informed of his condition, prognosis and approximate date of return, at reasonable intervals.

Indeed this

has been the practice under Section 57(d) as indicated by the
evidence in the record.

The evidence does not disclose that

employees regularly and invariably notify the Company each
five days of their absence.

Nor does the evidence show a

practice of simply one phone call within the first five days
irrespective of the length of the absence thereafter.

Rather,

the evidence indicates a reasonable interpretation of the duty
to inform the Company during the period of any absence that
exceeds five days after the first notification has been given.
Some employees have reported in a second or subsequent time.
Other have had their physician complete the disability forms
which the Company sends to employees ill for more than five
days, on which there is a statement of the diagnosis, the expected length of disability, and the approximate date of return.

In both ways the Company has been kept informed about

an employee's illness and absence.

But neither method has in-

cluded the rigid requirement that notification be provided
the Company by the absent employee after each and every five
consecutive days or shifts of his absence.

So I am not pre-

paired to conclude that Section 57(d) requires a report each
five days; and therefore I cannot interpret it to mean that a
failure to do so would result in loss of employment.

Accord-

ingly the Company's interpretation of Section 57(d) in support

- 8 of its action in terminating the grievant is not upheld.
Yet I am not persuaded that the grievant either did or
was planning to keep the Company informed of his medical condition on a reasonable basis and at reasonable intervals. His
only notification to the Company was on April 10.

He concedes

that he did not receive medical forms and therefore cannot rely upon their completion as notice to the Company of the details of his condition or its duration.

He cannot deny knowl-

edge of some obligation to keep the Company reasonably informed, in view of his past record of excessive absenteeism and
tardiness and his disciplinary penalties for that record.

I

think it doubtful that he intended to again inform the Company of the details of his ailment until he returned to work,
which would have meant no information from him from April 10
to May 9.

I conclude such a period of time to be beyond reason-

able bounds and inconsistent with the reasonable application
of Section 57(d) of the contract.
Under the circumstances, though I have not found his discharge justified on either of the grounds advanced by the Company, I am not prepared to find the grievant blameless.
had a duty to do more than he did.

He

He could have and should

have kept the Company better informed of the nature of his
illness, his whereabouts and when he would be able to return
to work.

I shall impose what I consider to be an appropriate

penalty, which because the grounds for the Company's action
have not been proved to my satisfaction, shall be less than
the penalty of discharge.

1 direct that the grievant's dis-

charge be converted to a suspension.

He shall be reinstated

- 9 with seniority but without back pay.

The period of time from

the day of his discharge to the date of his reinstatement
shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension and so noted on his
employment record.

The grievant is admonished that any con-

tinuation of a record of unauthorized absenteeism or tardiness
or any other misconduct or violation of the contract would,
in the opinion of this Arbitrator, be grounds for his summary
discharge.

Ericyu. Schmertz
Arbitrator

FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'

Communication Workers of America and
Local 3060 Communication Workers of
America, AFL-CIO
and

Award

Western Electric Company, Incorporated
North Carolina Works

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated November 1, 1963 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
1. The Compan}7 did not discriminate against
Mrs. Cavan because of her sex in violation
of Article 4 of the Labor Agreement,
2. The Company did not unreasonably exercise
its judgment in violation of Article 25
by its selection of Mr. Wilson rather than
Mrs. Cavan for the job of Tape Control Press
Operator on May 2, 19660

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June 17, 1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF
On this 17th
and appeared Eric
be the individual
instrument and he

day of June, 1968, before me personally came
J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
described in and who executed the foregoing
acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

FM&CS #67A/3821
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In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Communication Workers of America and
Local 3060 Communication Workers of
America, AFL-CIO
and
Western Electric Company, Incorporated
North Carolina Works

'
t
'
'
'
i
'
i
'
'

Opinion

In accordance with Article 29 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement effective November 1, 1963 between Western
Electric Company, Incorporated, North Carolina Works, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Communication Workers
of America and Local 3060 Communication Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned
was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company discriminate against Mrs. Cavan
because of her sex in violation of Article 4
of the Labor Agreement, or did the Company unreasonably exercise its judgment in violation
of Article 25 by its selection of Mr. Wilson for
the job of Tape Control Drill Press Operator on
May 2, 1966?
Hearings were held in Greensboro, North Carolina on February 9 and February 17, 1968 at which time Mrs. Cavan, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of
the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded all concern-

ed to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitra-

tor's oath, and filed post hearing briefs.
The resolution of this case, after thorough study of the
entire record, has caused me considerable concern.

I find that

- 2 a judgment must be made among conflicting positions of the
parties, each of which I deem to be held in good faith and with
sincerity.
I understand the Union's dismay at the Company's refusal
to grant the grievant, who is concedely a superior employee
with an outstanding record of competence, skill and loyalty,
a promotion to the job of Tape Control Drill Press Operator,
when undisputedly she can perform
97 to 99% of the duties re'
quired.

And I understand the Union's bewilderment by the

Company's disinclination to make adjustments in the work methods
of the remaining 1 to 3% so as to eliminate the risk of injury
which the Company fears.
Similarly I understand the Company's vigorous denial of
the Union's charge that the grievant was discriminatorily denied the job promotion solely because she is female.

Rather,

the Company asserts, she was passed over for the promotion in
favor of a less senior male employee, not because of her sex,
but because she, as an individual lacked the physical requisites
to perform certain aspects of the required duties; and that it
would have denied the job to a male bidder had he also lacked
the physical ability to perform those duties.
Also, an ingredient in my concern is the manifest fact
that by the wording of the issue (specifically the second
part thereof) and the express provisions of Article 29 of the
contract, my authority is narrow.

Unless I find that the

Company discriminated against the grievant because of her sex,
or unreasonably exercised its judgment in denying her the promotion, the Company's action must be sustained even if I think

- 3 that action to be unwise, unnecessary or even damaging to good
industrial relations.
The pertinent contract sections are Articles 4, 25 and 29
which read respectively.
"Article 4 - Non-Discrimination
"Neither the Company, its agents nor the Union,
its agents or members shall:
"1. Discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed,
color, sex or national origin,....
iiArticle 25 - Movement of Personnel
"1. General

*

* *

"1.2

For purpose of upgrading or reclassification upward, the factors to be taken into consideration shall be qualifications
for the job and TERM OF EMPLOYMENT, TERM
OF EMPLOYMENT shall be given most weight
in the selection of an employee for a vacancy
when two (2) or more employees possess substantially the same qualifications needed to
fill such vacancy.

"1.3

Qualifications as used in this Article shall
be determined by the Company and shall be
based upon the employee's experience, transferable skill and demonstrated productive
efficiency. If the LOCAL objects to the
Company's determination of qualifications
within ten (10) days after the effective date
of any move under this Article, or within
ten (10) days after date of notification to the
LOCAL of such move, whichever is later, the
matter may be processed in accordance with
Article 27, 'Grievance Procedure1, and
Article 29, 'Arbitration', provided that in
any such case the authority of the Arbitrator shall be limited to a determination as to
whether the Company's judgment has been unreasonably exercised."

- 4There is no dispute over certain facts.
senior to Mr. Wilson.

The grievant is

She is an outstanding employee who has

established a superior record during her approximately 15 years
of service with the Company.

At present she operates a manual

Drill Press with a high degree of skill, ability and dedication.
The problem regarding her bid for promotion to the Tape
Control Drill Press centers on the required duty of handling
two castings or fixtures, RS-184 and RS-223, both of which
weigh approximately 30 Ibs; measure about three feet in diameter
and are of irregular configuration,,

The Company contends that

the grievant does not possess the physical ability to remove
these castings from the service rack on which they are delivered to the job; or to position them on various required locations on the machine; and that she is not tall enough to reach
and operate, without strain, various levers on the upper part
of the Drill Press which must be activated when these castings
are worked on.

It is the Company's judgment that to allow the

grievant to perform this work is to subject her to the risk of
injury.

There is no dispute that Wilson can do this work.

There is also no dispute that work on the castings has averaged
about 1 to 370 of the total work on the job0
Specifically the Company determined that the following
four operations involving these two castings "would have posed
a serious danger to the grievant's health and safety," if she
had been awarded the job0
1. She would be required to remove the RS-184
casting from a five level horizontal storage

- 5 rack, with the top level about 57 inches above
the floor; and carry the 30 Ib. casting to the
Drill table.
2. She would be required to remove the RS-223 casting from a vertical storage rack either by reaching over the front of the rack and lifting the
casting vertically to a clearance height of
33 inches or by reaching across the 26 inch
width of the rack from a position at its side
and lifting the casting out vertically.

And

again carry the casting to the machine„
3. While carrying the castings for placement on
the machine, she would be required to step up
on to a 13 inch platform from which the machine
is operated, and raise the edge of the casting
high enough to clear a piece of equipment which
protrudes over the drill table.

She would be

required to place, attach, and re-position the
RS-184 casting on the machine as work on the
casting was performed.
4. Work on the castings would require her to manually operate a level or spindle wheel which is
located on the top of the machine, 82 inches
above the platform on which the operator stands.
This is a recurring task and requires the operator
to exert about 23 Ibs. of force downward.
Based on medical testimony, it is the Company's position
that because of the grievant's height and reach, all four tasks

- 6 would be too demanding physically, and any one of them, performed singly, as well as cumulatively, could result in strains
and other injuries.

The grounds for this conclusion by the

Company is apparent with regard to lifting the castings from
the storage racks and positioning them on the machine.

Its

conclusion in connection with the operation of the spindle
wheel is based on a measurement showing that the grievant's
normal reach falls 7 or 8 inches short of the spindle wheel.
And that if, as needed, she stood on her toes, leaned inward
and stretched upward to reach the spindle wheel, she would be
exposed to both strain and frontal bodily injury, especially
when 23 Ibs. of downward force must be exerted to make the
wheel work0
The Union's answer is threefold.

First, it claims that

as a matter of policy the Company is determined not to place a
female employee on this job in the Machine Shop irrespective of
her physical capabilities; and that the Company's arguments
about the grievant's height, reach and physiological make-up
are only advanced to camouflage that policy.

Second, the

Union claims that the grievant possesses the physical attributes
necessary to perform this work, principally because she has
handled fixtures of equal or greater weight on her present job.
And that accordingly she should have at least been given an
opportunity to demonstrate her ability to handle the heavier
work of the job she seeks.

And third, assuming without con-

ceding that handling the castings would expose her to risk of
injury, the exposure is so infrequent

(only 1 to 3% of the

- total work), that the Company acted unreasonably in failing to

- 7 change the work methods to accommodate that small percentage
to the grievant, whose ability to perform all other duties of
the job is undisputedly superior.

In this connection the Union

suggested that the platform on which the operator stands could
be raised to eliminate or reduce any difficulty in reaching
the spindle wheel.

And that the side railings on the racks

could be adjusted to unhinge and swing outward so that the
castings could be removed vertically and from a less awkward
standing position.

Additionally the Union suggests that be-

cause the grievant can perform 97 to 99% of the job duties
under present work methods, there is no reason why the Company
should not have made a male attendant available to assist her
on those very few occasions when work on the castings was to
be performed.

The Union states that there is precedent for

this in the grievant's present job, where heavier work is routed
to male employees in the same job classification.
There is just not enough in the record to support the
Union's first claim.

Based on the evidence, I think it probable

that the machine shop foreman preferred a male employee on the
job, but I am not persuaded that he and the Company rejected
the grievant on that basis.

I think that if, in the opinion of

the Company, the grievant was tall enough and strong enough to
handle the castings, she would have been placed on the job
despite any predilection for a male employee.

Indeed though

there is testimony that the machine shop foreman "did not want
a female in the machine shop" his testimony at the hearing
indicates in my view the primary basis upon which he selected
Mr. Wilson.

His statement:

- 8 "Well, of course this was quite apparent to me
that one was a male and the other a female..."
might be interpreted to mean that he only wanted a male on
the job.

But that is to take it out of context, for he went

on to explain as part of the same statement:
"...but wasn't the sole deciding factor. Mr. Wilson, being a male, had attributes that I felt
provided for the accomplishment of the job, as
opposed to Mrs. Cavan whose physical attributes
were somewhat less effective, I think, or less
adequate. The fact that Mrs. Cavan1s height,
for example - I couldn't conceive of placing her
or subjecting her to handling the heavier objects,
not just from a standpoint of weight, the dead
weight of the part alone; this is only a small
part. But in the operation of the machine and
the strenuous positions that the body is subjected to, the position of the body trunk, the twisting motions, the bending motions, the strenuous
positions that the operator wmld be in transporting the large-diameter parts, I felt just
would not be in Mrs. Cavan's best interest."
There is more that supports this view.

Mr. Wyrick testi-

fied in a manner most flattering to the grievant.

He freely

acknowledged her skills, competence and conscientiousness.

I

judged that he was pleased to have her among the employees he
supervised.

And therefore I find no reason to disbelieve his

statement that he did not nor would he discriminate against her
merely because she was female.

This is further supported by

his statement that he would not have hesitated to grant the
promotion if the job did not include the two heavy castings.
Additionally, there is no evidence that any other Company offic* ial or the Company itself intends to deny any and all female
employees access to jobs in the machine shop.

Such intent

would of course be violative of Article 4 of the contract as
well as the equal opportunity statutes.

- 9 Therefor?-, taken as a whole, there may be reason to believe
that Wyrick would have summarily chosen a male employee, if he
had absolute discretion.

But I am satisfied that in the instant

case he knew his discretion was limited by Articles 4 and 25 of
the contract, and weighed the relative qualifications of the
grievant and Wilson in making the selection.,
I am not persuaded that the grievant could have performed
the 1 to 3% of the work dealing with the castings, without exposing herself to risk of injury.

That she handles fixtures of

equal or greater weight on her present job is not determinative.
The Company makes a distinction.

It points out that if she

handles heavy weights on her present job, she deals with them
no higher than waist level, usually in connection with a washing
procedure, part of which entails sliding the fixture on a horizontal platform.

Even if this not be so, but rather that the

grievant presently deals with heavy fixtures to a comparable
degree and manner as she would if promoted, I do not see how
that eliminates the risk of injury.

It may be that she is

presently exposed to risk of injury by handling heavy fixtures,
though I make no determination on that one way or the other.
So, the mere fact that she handles heavy weights on her present
job does not mean that there is no risk in doing so if promoted.
Critical, I believe, is the medical testimony advanced by
the Company.

Dr. Belk's professional opinion, based on a study

of the duties required in handling the two castings, was simply
that the grievant would risk serious injury each and every time
she handled them.

No evidence offered by the Union, including

the written statement by the grievant's doctor, refutes this
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And this Arbitrator, in the absence of contravening

evidence has no probative basis upon which to make a different
evaluation.

Clearly, again in the absence of contravening med-

ical evidence, it is not for the Arbitrator, who is not a
physician, to substitute his judgment for that of Dr. Belk.
Therefore I must conclude that had the grievant been promoted
she would have been exposed to risk of injury on 1 to 3% of the
total work involved on the job0
The question then is whether in view of this percentage
of risk, the Company's judgment in denying the promotion was unreasonably exercised.

Though I think the Company could have

acted differently, I do not find that it acted unreasonably.
If the grievant was unable to perform 1 to 3% of the duties because of lack of experience or for any other reason which could
be cured after a short period on the job, I would no doubt find
that she was entitled to the promotion.

I do not believe that

one who bids for a promotional opportunity must be able to perform every single duty.

When he is qualified to handle 97 to

99% of the work, his lack of familiarity with the balance should
not disqualify him.

Also if, as here, the 1 to 3% of the work

exposed the operator to risk of injury on a cumulative basis,
- i.e. where no single job function represented a risk of injury
itself - I might well determine that such risks would be no
greater to the grievant than to any other employee, including a
male.

In other words, where an injury is possible only as a

cumulative result of a series of duties, I do not think that I
would be persuaded that such duties, performed only 1 to 3% of
the time, would constitute any more than a normal risk attend-

- 11 ant to the job.

And therefore the risk would be no greater

nor any less normal to the grievant than to Mr. Wilson.
Under those two hypothetical instances, and especially because the grievant's qualifications on the balance of the work
is at least equal to that of Mr. Wilson, I would find the
grievant to be at least substantially equal in qualifications
to Mr. Wilson and therefore entitled to the promotion because
of her greater seniority.
But such are not the circumstances in this case. Experience on the job will not increase the grievant's height nor
her reach nor her strength.

So what difficulties she might

have with the castings because of her individual physical makeup, she would continue to have.

And though the exposure to

risk of injury would occur infrequently, only 1 to 3% of the
time when the castings came through, the potential of injury
is not based on the repeated or cumulative nature of that work.
Rather, the risk of injury is present each and every time a
casting is handled.

Just one occasion, any time within the 1

to 3%, could produce a serious injury.

Therefore, though the

frequency of the risk is rare, the possibility of severe injury
is real and present with each frequency„

Thus as a real possi-

bility, no matter how infrequently it might occur, I cannot find
as unreasonable the Company's decision not to so expose the
grievant.

That subsequent to the arbitration hearing the job

ran or will run without these castings is not significant to
this case.

My determination must be based on the conditions of

the job at the time the grievant bid for it.

However, if the

two heavy castings are now no longer part of the job duties

- 12 and are not expected to be reintroduced later, it would appear
that the grievant could qualify for any subsequent opening.
There remains the question of whether the Company should
have made adjustments so as to accommodate the grievant to that
small portion of the job which she could not perform without
risk of injury.

I am of the opinion that the Company could

have done so but was not required to do so0
In this regard I have decided to make some gratuitous remarks, because they represent part of my concern about this
case.

Rarely do I do so.

I am mindful of the limits of my

authority and the fact that such remarks cannot, of course, be
fashioned into an Award.

Frankly though I find the Company did

not act unreasonably, I am disappointed that it did not act
differently.,
I am surprised, considering the grievant's outstanding
record and the high regard in which she is held by supervision,
that the Company did not undertake ways and means to effectuate
this promotion0

I think the Company lost a good opportunity to

confirm its willingness to promote good and loyal employees.

I

am not suggesting that it should expose her to risk of injury.
Rather I think that certain feasible adjustments could have been
made to obviate those risks.
the platform was possible.

Experimentation with the height of

Adjustment of the storage racks was

clearly practicable, since the Company had given an award for
that suggestion.

And simply a de minimus availability of a

male employee is all that would be needed to help her on those
few occasions when the castings came through the job.

- 13 I am aware that to have made these adjustments might open
the door to claims by other employees that jobs should be
tailored to them as well.

There is this possibility of course.

But I wonder how real it may be.
ation is isolated and unique.

I think the grievant's situ-

What tailoring had to be done

applied to only 1 to 3% of the total work.

It was the type of

job promotion which I think, will not often occur within the
plant.

The circumstances are sufficiently peculiar in my

judgment, to be limited to themselves.

In any event I think

that the value achieved by satisfying a worthy employee, with
the wider positive effects which would flow therefrom, outweighs any speculative possibility

of adverse precedent.

But, returning to the limits of my authority, I find nothing in the contract which requires the Company to make any
adjustments in existing jobs or changes in the methods of handling the job duties, so as to accommodate any particular bidder.
Article 25 of the contract is applicable to jobs as they are
constituted when promotion is sought.

Here the job as constitu-

ted represented, in part, a risk to the grievant's safety and
health.

The Company was not required to take steps to change

the job to eliminate those risks.

Accordingly, as between the

grievant and Wilson, I cannot find that the Company unreasonably
exercised its judgment in selecting the latter.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
~-~ "

~™~

:

~ '

~

~

~

?
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International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, Local 746, AFL-CIO
and

'

Westinghouse Electric Corporation

Award

'

The Undersgined Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated October 1, 1950 as revised and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties,
Awards, as follows:
The "severance" of Josephine V. Funk was a discharge
in violation of the progressive disciplinary procedure of Rule 9, Group C of the Plant Rules„ Her discharge is reduced to a three-day suspension, and she
shall be reinstated, but without back pay.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: May )3 1968
STATE OF New York
)gs .
COUNTY OF
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In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'
i

International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, Local 746, AFL-CIO

'
'

and

'

Opinion

!

Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Columbus Plant

'
t

In accordance with the Grievance and Arbitration Procedures of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, dated October 1,
1950 as revised, between Westinghouse Electric Corporation,
Columbus Plant, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
Local 746, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union,"
the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide a dispute relating to the grievance of Josephine V.
Funk.
A hearing was held in Columbus, Ohio, on February 21,
1968 at which time Miss Funk, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to as the "parties," appeared.

Full oppor-

tunity was afforded all concerned to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitra-

tor's oath was expressly waived and the parties filed post
hearing briefs.
The Union claims that the grievant was discharged without
just cause.

It is the contention of the Company that she was

released from the Company's employ because she was no longer
industrially employable.
The excessiveness and unsatisfactory nature of the griev-

- 2 ant's attendance record is manifest.

For a number of years,

especially since 1964 to the date of her termination, she was
absent from her job more than half the time.

These absences

were due primarily to various illnesses and disabilities.

The

Company may wish to characterize the action it took as a
"release" or "severance" and this no doubt is accurate0
it was no less a "discharge" as well.

But

Based on the facts in

this case all three terms are correct and synonymous with each
other.
The grievant's termination was involuntary.

Though her

dismissal was not based on any misconduct on her part, it is
well settled that cause may exist for a discharge even though
an employee is blameless.

Indeed it is well established, as

the Company argues in its brief, that an employee who absents
himself excessively may be discharged even though he is unable
to control those absences because of illness or other disability,
It is precisely a discharge of this nature which is involved in the instant case.

The grievant has suffered from

various illnesses and disabilities which appear to be chronic,
and which caused her numerous absences.

Though she is not

guilty of any misconduct in connection with the absences, the
fact that the Company is unable to rely upon her as a steady
and regular employee, places a burden on the Company which it
is not required to tolerate indefinitely.
In my judgment Rule 9 of Group C of the Plant Rules promulgated by the Company, was intended to cover and is explicitly
concerned with this type of problem.
absences.

It relates to excessive

It does not limit its application to absences caused

- 3 by factors other than illness or disability.

Rather it is all

inclusive, covering excessive absences for any reason.

In

fact, because it is well known that excessive absenteeism stems
in a vast number of cases from illnesses and disabilities,
those reasons must have been within the contemplation of the
Company when it promulgated this Rule.

If absences due to

illness or disability were not to fall within this Rule, the
Company could have and should have expressly excluded those
causes.

Hence I am satisfied that a discharge or termination

of an employee because of excessive absenteeism is a disciplinary penalty within the meaning of Rule 9 of Group C.
It is clear to me that the Company dismissed the grievant,
not because she suffered from illness or disabilities, but because those conditions impeded her attendance on the job.

Ob-

viously if though ill and disabled she was able to attend to
and perform her job with the Company, no action against her
would have been taken or warranted,,

The Company concedes this,

and therefore the grievant"s termination was for excessive
absenteeism.
I am in full agreement with the well settled line of
arbitral decisions that an employer may discharge an employee
who is unable to meet his regular work schedule even though
his absences from work are due to illness or disability beyond
his control and fault.

But the Company overlooks the fact

that this well accepted rule is based, in most instances, on
the application of the equally well recognized rule of "progressive discipline."

In other words the penalty of discharge

is proper but only in the ultimate, after the subject employee

- 4 has been warned and suspended.
templates just this approach.

Indeed Rule 9 of Group C conIt provides for a reprimand

for the first violation; a three-day disciplinary suspension
for the second violation and discharge for the third,
In my judgment there is a compelling presumption in favor
of a strict application of Rule 9, especially when that Rule
was promulgated by the Company.

Based on the record before

me I do not find that the Company's action against the grievant
was either immune from the Rule or that any of the steps set
forth in the Rule were justifiably waived.

I am mindful of

the decision of Arbitrator Milton Rubin in which he held that
under the facts in the case before him, involving a different
grievant, the imposition of a three-day suspension would be
useless because the employee there involved could not be rehabilitated.

I am not prepared to conclude that the grievant in

the instant case was similarly situated.

No doubt she suffer-

ed from chronic disorders; but the record shows that she produced first one doctor's statement and then at the request of
the Company, a second from a different physician, attesting to
her employability.

Because the Company asked her for these

statements, which she then obtained, there must have been some
thought in the mind of the Company that she might be employable,
And I believe that she is entitled to the benefit of that
possibility which the Company itself raised.
However, even if that were not the case, I am not persuaded that the Arbitrator should rule that the imposition of a
three-day suspension under Rule 9 would be a useless or meaningless act.

Again the Rules do not limit the circumstances

- 5 under which the progressive disciplinary penalties are to be
imposed.

Instead, they provide (under Group C) for a three-

day disciplinary furlough for a second violation.

There is no

provision for the waiver of that penalty (before discharge)
where it is thought that it would have no rehabilitative effect.
I am fully cognizant of the fact that one of the purposes
of the theory of progressive discipline is to attempt to
correct the offender before it is too late.

But it is equally

true that where by contract or by Plant Rules, a progressive
disciplinary system has been legislated without explicit exception, the Arbitrator should not introduce exceptions into
its application.

So for this latter reason together with my

conclusion that the grievant, by the Company's own act, was
entitled to a presumption of possible employability, I find no
reason why the penalty for a second violation of Rule 9 was
bypassed.
I am also persuaded that Rule 9 is applicable to the instant case because the Company used it previously in connection
with the grievant's absentee records.

She received a formal

reprimand under Rule 9 and had been warned on several occasions
that a continuation of her unsatisfactory attendance record
could result in her discharge.

It should be noted that the

Company did not warn her that she would be "released" or
"severed" rather than discharged.

So the Company all along

treated her record within the intent and application of that
Rule.

And I find nothing which now ousts it therefrom,,
The grievant's discharge followed a formal reprimand.

She was not suspended for three days.

Therefore I must conclude

- 6 that the Company's action was premature and violative of its
own applicable Plant Rule.

Accordingly, the grievant's dis-

charge is reduced to a three-day suspension.
instated.

She shall be re-

But, because I do not know whether in fact she

would have been physically able to attend to her job regularly had she been returned to active duty following her disability leave, her reinstatement under this Award shall be
without back pay.

It should be recognized by all concerned

that a continuation of her unsatisfactory attendance record
will be just cause of the imposition of the final penalty
under Rule 9 - the penalty of discharge„

Eric /.Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'
i

Local 1805, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO

'
'

and

'
i
'
'

Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Aerospace Division

Award

T

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated as last modified November 26,
1966 and having duly heard the proofs

and allegations of the

Parties, Awards as follows:
The Company violated the provisions of Article XV
Section 2 when it did not allow H. Wauters a second
shift employee, to bump a less senior employee on
the first shift on or about February 13, 1967. The
Company is directed to permit Mr. Wauters to do so.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: May 1, 1968

Case No. 1430 0771 67

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 1805, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Aerospace Division

In accordance with Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement as last modified November 26, 1966, between
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Aerospace Division, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local 1805, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decida the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the provisions of Article XV,
Section 2 when it did not permit Employee H. Wauters,
a second shift employee, to bump a less senior employee on the first shift, on or about February 13,
1967? If so, what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held in Baltimore, Maryland on January 11,
1968 at which time representatives of the Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared.
The parties waived the Arbitrator's oath and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties filed post hear-

ing briefs.
On or about February 13, 1967, while H. Wauters, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," occupied the classification of Class "A" Inspector on the second shift in Section X-73,
two vacancies in that classification became available, one on

- 2 the first shift and the other on the third shift.

The vacan-

cies were filled by up-grading two qualified class "B" Inspectors to Class "A" category.

Based on their seniority, both

elected to work on the first shift; one filling the vacancy on
that shift and the other bumping a less senior employee.

The

less senior displaced employee moved to and filled the vacancy
on the third shift.

Thereafter the grievant who was undisturb-

ed by the aforementioned moves sought to transfer from the
second shift to the first shift by exercising his seniority
over a less senior first shift Inspector.

The Company denied

him the opportunity to do so on the grounds that he was not
"the employee involved" within the meaning of Article XV
Section 2 of the contract.

The contract provision reads:

In the assignments resulting from the administration
of this procedure, management will give shift preference to the most senior employee involved in each instance to the extent that previously unforeseen operating conditions permit, except in those cases where
temporary shift changes are made for the purpose of
obtaining qualified replacement in which event reassignment to the previous shift will be made when the replacement has acquired sufficient skill to perform the
job.
In the event of reassignment from one job to another
(transfer, upgrading, downgrading), shift preference
may be exercised on the job within the job classification and section on the basis of seniority at the time
the employee involved is reclassified or reassigned and
placed on such job0
The Company contends that what the grievant sought is proscribed by the clear and unequivocal language of Article XV
Section 2.

It asserts that only the employee or employees in-

volved in the transfer, up-grading or down-grading, and those
bumped or displaced as a result, may exercise their seniority

- 3for the purpose of selecting their shift preference.

But that

employees within the Section who are not affected thereby possess
no such right.
The Union argues that by intent and application Article XV
Section 2 affords all employees within a job classification and
Section the opportunity to select their preference of shift,
based on seniority, in the event of a reassignment resulting
from a transfer, up-grading or down-grading.

And that only in

this way may employees with greater seniority periodically move
to more desirable shifts.
As stated, the Company's case is based primarily on what
it considers to be the clear language of Article XV Section 2.
With this premise I am unable to agree.

Indeed, I am persuaded

that Article XV Section 2 is manifestly ambiguous.

It is sus-

ceptible, in my judgment, to two divergent but equally plausible
interpretations.

On the one hand, as the Company argues, it

may vest only the employees involved:-in the reassignment and
those directly affected thereby, with the right to exercise
seniority in the selection of shifts,,

On the other, as the

Union contends, the bare contract language, and especially the
second paragraph thereof, may well be interpreted to mean that
all employees within the job classification and section may exercise their seniority in the selection of shifts when a reassignment of any employee is made within the Section.

Paragraph 1

refers to a shift preference for "the most senior employee involved in each instance" whereas Paragraph 2 provides generally
for the exercise of a shift preference within the job classification and Section, on the basis of seniority at the time of a

- 4reclassification or reassignment.

No limit is placed on which

employees may exercise their seniority when that event occurs,,
In short, the bare language of Article XV Section 2 is by
no means clear or subject to a single logical interpretation.
In the circumstance of an ambiguous contract clause it
is well settled that the Arbitrator may look to past practice
and the manner in which the clause has been administered for
clarity.

The Union's case on past practice, in support of its

interpretation of Article XV Section 2, I find to be not only
of probative value but persuasive.

The Union offered not just

general testimony but specific instances since 1963 when the
disputed clause was negotiated, of an unvaried practice of
allowing all employees within a Section to select their shift
based on seniority when a reassignment within the Section was
made.

Significant is the fact that the Company offered not one

single example in refutation.

Additionally, the Union further

buttressed the details of past practice by offering into evidence a string of grievances settled by the Company in favor of
employees who sought to exercise their seniority in the selection of shifts though they were not directly involved or displaced when reassignments were made in their Section and job
classification.

And while it is true that the settlement of

grievances is not necessarily prejudicial to the party acceding
to the demands, the unvaried and consistent recognition by the
Company of the right of each grievant to exercise seniority in
circumstances comparable to the instant case, rebuts the
Company's argument that the Union's case on past practice lacks
specifics.

- 5 But if this was not enough, the testimony of the Company
witness, Kendall, the Administrator of the assembling and wiring Sections, conclusively supports the Union's position.

In

answer to Union counsel Rubinstein^ Kendall testified as follows:
Rubinstein: I am now not talking about Article XV,
Section 2 -- that is up to the Arbitrator to decide
what it means -- what I am interested in is the way
that it has operated, and the way that it has operated is that when - - i s this not correct? -- there
is an upgrading, for example, all the employees in
the section, in the job and in the section, are given
their shift preference -- all the employees - and
you then fill the shifts from their preference, I
believe, as you said, in the cases where you can't
give everybody his choice, the least senior person
has to take the remaining shift. Is that correct?
Kendall;

Yes, that would be correct.
(Transcript Page 136)

Kendall also stated that the testimony of Union witness,
Gladys Greene, in support of the Union's case on past practice,
was "correct," and that since he has been administrator there
had been "no problems ...because of our flexibility..."

And

he replied in the affirmative to the Arbitrator's question of
whether he could manage his department by giving all employees
an opportunity to select their shifts based on their seniority
at the time of an up-grading within the department or section.
The foregoing evidence, particularly in the absence of
any contradictory evidence or testimony by the Company, meets
the union's burden of establishing a consistent and uniform
practice over an extended period of time.

As such it clarifies

the meaning and intent of Article XV Section 2 of the contract.
The Company argues that if the Union's interpretation
is adopted, all Sections would be immobilized by the application of a "musical chairs" procedure each time a reassignment

- 6 (transfer, up-grading, down-grading) took place, and that
this would be administratively intolerable.

This argument by

the Company, however, is not supported by the evidence in the
record.

Rathe^ supervision and the Union have worked closely

together in determining seniority and the shift preference of
employees when reassignments were made.
to the procedure he follows„

Kendall testified as

He stated that he works closely

with the Union with which he has "a good relationship."

He

notifies the Union and the employees of the job vacancy.

He

determines which employees are interested in the vacancy.
When he has obtained the people he needs,

he then undertakes

"to determine the preference of all the employees in the
Section for the shift on which they wish to work."

He said:

"I would say that towards the end of the amount of
people that I need, I notify the Supervisor to get
all his people in line. By this I mean his people
that are on the first shift, the people on the
second shift, based on their seniority and their
preference at this particular time which shifts
would they desire to be on at this particular
time based on their seniority."
(Transcript Page 133)
And explicity in connection with the Company's claim
that a department would be immobilized if subjected to the
"musical chairs" procedure, Kendall testified as follows in
response to a question by the Arbitrator:
Mr. Schmertz: And you have found you can do it as
described by Mrs. Greene and yourself within your
large department? You have found you could manage
to administer that department by giving all the
employees in the department an opportunity to express their preference for shifts at the time of
an upgrading, and then to allocate them amongst
the shifts in accordance with those preferences,
based of course upon their seniority?
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Kendall;
do this.

Yes sir.

We have found that we could

(Transcript page 138)
The department to which Mr. Kendall referred consists
of 1200 employees.

Certainly if the procedure worked within

that large department, through a cooperative effort between
the Company and Union representatives, there can be little
doubt of its workability in Section X-73 consisting of 8 employees.
Accordingly, the grievance of employee H. Wauters is
granted.

The Company shall allow him to exercise his senior-

ity by permitting him to bump a less senior employee on the
first shift in Section X-73.

Eric /. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 144 Hotel & Allied Services Employees
Union, BSEIU, AFL-CIO

and

Award

Wyckoff Heights Hospital

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated August 1, 1966 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the Parties, Awards as follows:
The assignment to Mr. Giaraffa, a supervisor, of
driving an ambulance on a regular scheduled basis
violates the contract. The assignment shall be
removed from his duties.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: March
1968
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)gs .
)

On this
day of March, 1968, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and::who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0
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In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 144 Hotel & Allied Services Employees
Union, BSEIU, AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Wyckoff Heights Hospital

In accordance with Article VII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated August 1, 1966 between Wyckoff Heights
Hospital, hereinafter referred to as the "Hospital," and Local
144 Hotel & Allied Services Employees Union, BSEIU, AFL-CIO,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was
designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue;
Is the assignment to Mr. Giaraffa, a supervisor,
of driving an ambulance on a regular scheduled basis,
a violation of the contract? If so, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on January 25, 1968 at which time representatives of the Union and Hospital, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded

the parties to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

Post hearing briefs were filed and

the hearings were declared closed on February 16, 1968„
The facts are simple and undisputed.

Both prior and sub-

sequent to the recognition of the Union and the negotiation of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Hospital has assigned
an employee with supervisory authority as one of the ambulance
drivers.

The Union was recognized as the bargaining agent by

decision and order of the New York State Labor Relations Board,
28 SLRB No. 58, Case No. SE 37101. dated August 24, 1965.

- 2Said certification included within the bargaining unit, the
employees in the ambulance department.

Recognition of the

Union as the bargaining agent for all employees in the Hospital,
as set forth in said certification, is further recited in
Article I Recognition of the aforementioned Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Schedule A of the Collective Bargaining Agree-

ment lists, among others, the wage rate for ambulance drivers0
The Union contends that because the job of ambulance
driver is within the bargaining unit, and because the Union is
the exclusive representative of employees within the unit, only
bargaining unit workers may be assigned the duty of driving an
ambulance.

Accordingly the Union objects to the use of a

supervisory employee in that capacity.
The Hospital points to the continuing practice of assigning a supervisory employee to ambulance driving duty, both
prior to and since the Union's certification and the negotiation
of the contract.

It asserts that because the contract does not

expressly prohibit the use of supervisory employees on jobs
within the bargaining unit, and especially because a supervisor's
assignment to an ambulance pre-dates the contract, the Hospital
is and should be able to continue that assignment.
I am not persuaded by the Hospital's argument.

My view is

that where a job falls clearly within the bargaining unit and
where the Union is certified as the exclusive representative of
employees within that unit, all employees within the covered
classification should be part of the bargaining unit and not
supervisory0

A contrary interpretation would open the door to

- 3 an erosion of the Union's certified jurisdiction.

Exceptions

should be clearly and unmistakably set forth in the contract.
I find no such express exceptions here0
In general I agree with the Hospital's assertion and with
Arbitrator Turkus' theory in the Anton Machine Works case,
that an employer retains all rights except as relinquished in
the collective bargaining agreement.

But in applying that

theory I do not reach the same conclusion reached by that Arbitrator and advanced herein by the Hospital.

In my judgment the

contractual recognition of the Union as the exclusive representative of all the employees within the certified bargaining
unit, including those in the ambulance department, serves to
relinquish the Hospital's right to assign non-bargaining unit
personnel to jobs within the bargaining unit.

I consider the

certification, and the definition of the bargaining unit which
specifically includes the ambulance drivers, as an explicit
contractual limitation on the Hospital's pre-contract authority.
Nor can the use of the supervisor to drive an ambulance
be upheld as a continuing practice„

For there is no evidence

that the Union, after certification, accepted or acquiesced
in the assignment.

On the contrary the record shows that it

complained repeatedly, leading to the grievance in this case.
Therefore, considering the contract, and the absence of
a practice binding on the Union, any exception, which would
permit the assignment of a supervisory employee to the work
of driving an ambulance ought to be specially described within the contract.

Otherwise in my view, it is proscribed„

- 4No such exception is herein present and hence the assignment
to a supervisory employee of driving an ambulance on a regular
basis is violative of the contract.

The Hospital shall remove

that assignment from Mr. Giaraffa's duties.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

